PT  - JOURNAL ARTICLE
AU  - Michael D. Makowsky
AU  - Paul E. Smaldino
TI  - The Evolution of Power and the Divergence of Cooperative Norms
AID  - 10.1101/004416
DP  - 2015 Jan 01
TA  - bioRxiv
PG  - 004416
4099  - http://biorxiv.org/content/early/2015/01/29/004416.short
4100  - http://biorxiv.org/content/early/2015/01/29/004416.full
AB  - We consider a model of multilevel selection and the evolution of institutions that distribute power in the form of influence in a group’s collective interactions with other groups. In the absence of direct group-level interactions, groups with the most cooperative members will outcompete less cooperative groups, while within any group the least cooperative members will be the most successful. Introducing group-level interactions, however, such as raiding or warfare, changes the selective landscape for groups. Our model suggests that as the global population becomes more integrated and the rate of intergroup conflict increases, selection increasingly favors unequally distributed power structures, where individual influence is weighted by acquired resources. The advantage to less democratic groups rests in their ability to facilitate selection for cooperative strategies – involving cooperation both among themselves and with outsiders – in order to produce the resources necessary to fuel their success in inter-group conflicts, while simultaneously selecting for leaders (and corresponding collective behavior) who are unburdened with those same prosocial norms. The coevolution of cooperative social norms and institutions of power facilitates the emergence of a leadership class of the selfish and has implications for theories of inequality, structures of governance, non-cooperative personality traits, and hierarchy. Our findings suggest an amendment to the well-known doctrine of multilevel selection that “Selfishness beats altruism within groups. Altruistic groups beat selfish groups.” In an interconnected world, altruistic groups led by selfish individuals can beat them both.