RT Journal Article SR Electronic T1 Replicator Dynamics with Feedback-Evolving Games: Towards a Co-Evolutionary Game Theory JF bioRxiv FD Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory SP 043299 DO 10.1101/043299 A1 Joshua S. Weitz A1 Sam P. Brown A1 Ceyhun Eksin A1 Keith Paarporn A1 William C. Ratcliff YR 2016 UL http://biorxiv.org/content/early/2016/03/11/043299.abstract AB A tragedy of the commons occurs when individuals take actions to maximize their payoffs even as their combined payoff is less than the global maximum had the players coordinated. The originating example is that of over-grazing of common pasture lands. In game theoretic treatments of this example there is rarely consideration of how individual behavior subsequently modifies the commons and associated payoffs. Here, we generalize evolutionary game theory by proposing a class of replicator dynamics with feedback-evolving games in which environment-dependent payoffs and strategies coevolve. We apply our formulation to a system in which the payoffs favor unilateral defection and cooperation, given replete and depleted environments respectively. Using this approach we identify a new class of dynamics: an oscillatory tragedy of the commons in which the system cycles between deplete and replete environmental states and cooperation and defection behavior states. Further, we utilize fast-slow dynamical systems theory to provide an intuitive explanation for the observed changes. In closing, we propose new directions for the study of control and influence in games in which individual actions exert a substantive effect on the environmental state.