The visual system has the remarkable ability to integrate fragmentary visual input into a perceptually organized collection of surfaces and objects, a process we refer to as perceptual integration. Despite a long tradition of perception research, it is not known whether access to consciousness is required to complete perceptual integration. To investigate this question, we manipulated access to consciousness using the attentional blink. We show that behaviorally, the attentional blink impairs perceptual decisions about the presence of integrated surface structure from fragmented input. However, when applying a multivariate classifier to electroencephalogram (EEG) data, the ability to decode the presence of integrated percepts remains intact when conscious access is impaired. In contrast, when disrupting consciousness through masking, decisions about integrated percepts and decoding of integrated percepts are impaired in concert with each other, while leaving feedforward representations intact. Together, these data show a dissociation between access to consciousness and perceptual integration.