

1 A divisive model of evidence accumulation explains
2 uneven weighting of evidence over time

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Summary

5 Divisive normalization has long been used to account for computations in vari-
6 ous neural processes and behaviours. The model proposes that inputs into a neural
7 system are divisively normalized by the total activity of the system. More recently,
8 dynamical versions of divisive normalization have been shown to account for how
9 neural activity evolves over time in value-based decision making. Despite its ubiq-
10 uity, divisive normalization has not been studied in decisions that require evidence
11 to be integrated over time. Such decisions are important when we do not have all
12 the information available at once. A key feature of such decisions is how evidence is
13 weighted over time, known as the integration ‘kernel’. Here we provide a formal ex-
14 pression for the integration kernel in divisive normalization, and show that divisive
15 normalization can quantitatively account for the perceptual decision making be-
16 haviour of 133 human participants, performing as well as the state-of-the-art Drift
17 Diffusion Model, the predominant model for perceptual evidence accumulation.

18 **Keywords:** divisive normalization, evidence accumulation, computational modeling

19 1 Introduction

20 Divisive normalization has been proposed as a canonical computation in the brain [1]. In these
21 models, the firing rate of an individual neuron is computed as a ratio between its response to
22 an input and the summed activity of a pool of neurons receiving similar inputs. For example,
23 activity of a visual cortex neuron f_i responding to an input u_i can be computed as the input
24 divided by a constant S plus a normalization factor — the sum of inputs received by the total
25 pool of neurons [1]:

$$f_i = \frac{u_i}{S + \sum_j u_j} \quad (1)$$

26 Divisive normalization models such as described in equation 1 have been used successfully
27 to describe both neural firing and behavior across a wide range of tasks — from sensory pro-
28 cessing in visual and olfactory systems [2–5], to context-dependent value encoding in premotor
29 and parietal areas [6]. For example, in the visual domain, divisive normalization explains sur-
30 round suppression in primary visual cortex, where the response of a neuron to a stimulus in

31 the receptive field is suppressed when there are additional stimuli in the surrounding region [7].
32 Analogously, in economic decision making, divisive normalization explains how activity in pari-
33 etal cortex encodes the value of a choice option relative to other available alternatives instead
34 of the absolute value [6]. More recently, *dynamic* divisive normalization models have been used
35 to describe how neural activity in economic decision making tasks evolves over time [8, 9].

36 Despite the success of divisive normalization models, they have never been studied in situa-
37 tions that require evidence to be *integrated* over time. Such ‘evidence accumulation’ is important
38 in many decisions when we do not have all the information available at once, such as when we
39 integrate visual information from moment to moment as our eyes scan a scene.

40 In the lab setting, evidence accumulation has typically been studied in perceptual decision
41 making tasks over short periods of time. In one such task, called the Poisson Clicks Task [10],
42 participants make a judgment about a train of auditory clicks. Each click comes into either
43 the left or right ear, and at the end of the train of clicks participants must decide which ear
44 received more clicks. The optimal strategy in this task is to ‘count,’ i.e. integrate, the clicks on
45 each side and choose the side with the most clicks.

46 A key feature of any evidence accumulation strategy is how evidence is weighted over time,
47 which is also known as the ‘kernel’ of integration. For example in the optimal model of counting,
48 each click contributes equally to the decision, i.e., all clicks are weighed equally over time. In
49 this case, the integration kernel is flat — the weight of every click is the same. While such
50 flat integration kernels have been observed in rats and highly trained humans [10], there is
51 considerable variability across species and individuals. For example, [11] showed that monkeys
52 exhibit a strong primacy kernel, in which early evidence is over weighed. An opposite, recency
53 kernel, where early evidence is under weighed, was observed in humans [12, 13]. Recently, in a
54 large scale study of over 100 humans, we found that different people use different kernels with
55 examples among the population of flat, primacy and recency effects. Intriguingly, however, the
56 most popular kernel in our experiment was a ‘bump’ shaped kernel in which evidence in the
57 middle of the stimulus is weighed more than either the beginning or the end [14].

58 In this work we show how dynamic divisive normalization [8] can act as a model for evidence
59 accumulation in perceptual decision making. We provide theoretical results for how the model
60 integrates evidence over time and show how dynamic divisive normalization can generate all of
61 the four integration kernel shapes: primacy, recency, flat, and (most importantly) the bump

62 kernel which is the main behavioral phenotype in our task [14]. In addition, we provide ex-
63 perimental evidence that divisive normalization can quantitatively account for human behavior
64 in an auditory perceptual decision making task. Finally, with formal model comparison, we
65 show that divisive normalization fits the data quantitatively as well as the state-of-the-art Drift
66 Diffusion Model (DDM), the predominant model for perceptual evidence accumulation, with
67 the same number of parameters.

68 2 Results

69 2.1 A divisive model of evidence accumulation

70 Our model architecture was inspired by the dynamic version of divisive normalization developed
71 by Louie and colleagues to model neural activity during value based decision making [8]. We
72 assume that the decision is made by comparing the activity in two pools of excitatory units,
73 R_{left} and R_{right} (Figure 1a). These pools receive time varying input C_{left} and C_{right} . In the
74 Clicks Task (below), these inputs correspond to the left and right clicks, more generally they
75 reflect the momentary evidence in favor of one choice over the other. An inhibitory gain control
76 unit G , which is driven by the total activity in the excitatory network, divisively inhibits the R
77 unit activity. The time varying dynamics of the model can be described by the following system
78 of differential equations:

$$\tau_R \frac{dR_i}{dt} = -R_i + \frac{C_i}{1+G} \quad (2)$$

79

$$\tau_G \frac{dG}{dt} = -G + \omega_I \sum_{i=1}^N R_i \quad (3)$$

80 A decision is formed by comparing the difference in activity δ between the two R units

$$\delta = R_{\text{left}} - R_{\text{right}} \quad (4)$$

81 . Example simulated dynamics of the R and G units for punctate inputs (of the form used in
82 the Clicks Task) are shown in Figure 1b. The model has three free parameters: τ_R , τ_G , and
83 ω_I . As is clear from this plot, the R unit activity integrates the input, C , over time, with each
84 input increasing the corresponding R unit activity. In addition, closer inspection of Figure 1b
85 reveals that the inputs have different effects on R over time — for example, compare the effect

86 of the first input on the right, which increases R_{right} considerably, to that of the last input on
 87 the right, which increases R_{right} much less. This suggests that the model with these parameter
 88 settings integrates evidence over time, but with an uneven weighting for each input.




Figure 1: Dynamic divisive normalization schematic and simulated model dynamics. (a) Schematic of dynamic divisive normalization model. The two excitatory R units integrate punctate inputs C respective to left and right. The inhibitory G unit receives the sum of the two R unit activity weighted by ω_I , and in turn divisively normalizes the input to R . (b) Results of the model activity simulated with $\tau_R = 2.27$, $\tau_G = 11.10$, and $\omega_I = 36.20$

89 2.2 Dynamic divisive normalization generates different integra- 90 tion kernel shapes

91 How can we quantify the integration kernel — how much each piece of evidence weighs — given
 92 by a circuit that generates divisively normalized coding? We integrate the set of differential
 93 equations to provide an explicit expression for the integration kernel. We first consider the
 94 evolution of the difference in activity, δ , over time. In particular, from equation (2) and (4), we
 95 can write

$$\tau_R \frac{d\delta}{dt} = -\delta + \frac{\Delta C}{1+G} \quad (5)$$

96 where ΔC is the difference in input,

$$\Delta C = C_{\text{left}} - C_{\text{right}} \quad (6)$$

97 We can then integrate equation 5 using the ansatz

$$\delta(t) = e^{-\lambda_R t} \tilde{\delta}(t) \quad (7)$$

98 to compute the the following formal solution for δ as a function of time (for details of derivation
99 see Methods Section 4.5):

$$\delta(t) = \int_0^t K(t, t') \Delta C(t') dt', \text{ where } K(t, t') = \frac{1}{\tau_R} \frac{\exp(-(t-t')/\tau_R)}{1+G(t')} \quad (8)$$

100 This expression shows explicitly that the activity of the network acts to integrate the inputs
101 ΔC over time, weighing each input by the integration kernel function $K(t, t')$. Importantly,
102 $K(t, t')$ represents the degree to which evidence ΔC at time t' contributes to the decision.

103 While clearly not a closed form expression for the integration kernel (notably $K(t, t')$ still
104 depends on $G(t)$), equation (8) gives some intuition in how evidence is accumulated over time in
105 this model. In particular, the kernel can be written as a product of two factors: an exponential
106 function (Figure 2a left panel) and the inverse of the G activity (Figure 2a middle panel).
107 The exponential function is increasing over time, and since G is increasing with time (Figure
108 1b)), the inverse of G is decreasing over time. Under the right conditions, the product of these
109 increasing and decreasing functions can produce a bump shaped kernel, Figure 2a right panel.

110 More intuitively, we can consider integration kernel as being affected by two processes: the
111 leaky integration in R and the increasing inhibition by G . If we consider the start of the train
112 of clicks when G is small, the model acts as a leaky integrator (equation (2)), which creates a
113 recency bias since earlier evidence is ‘forgotten’ through the leak. Over time, as G unit activity
114 increases, G exerts an increasing inhibition on R , and when inhibition overcomes the leaky
115 integration, later evidence was weighed less than the preceding evidence.

116 These intuitions suggest that the shape of the integration kernel is determined by a balance
117 between how fast the leaky integration in R happens (the rate of R) and how fast the inhibitory
118 G activity grows (the rate of G). These two rates are determined by the the inverse of the time
119 constants τ_R and τ_G respectively — i.e. when τ is large, the rate is slow. The balance between
120 the rate of R and the rate of G can then be described as the ratio τ_R/τ_G — i.e. when τ_R is
121 larger than τ_G , R activity is slower than G activity, and similarly; when τ_R is smaller than τ_G ,
122 R activity is faster than G activity.




Figure 2: How divisive normalization generates different integration kernel shapes. (a) Example simulation demonstrates how the two components in the integration kernel K (equation (8)) combines to generate a bump shaped kernel. K (right panel) is a product of an increasing exponential function (left panel) and the inverse of $1 + G$ (middle panel) which is decreasing over time. (b) Simulations of primacy, bump, flat, and recency integration kernels using decreasing log ratios of τ_R and τ_G to demonstrate that the shape of the integration kernel is determined by a balance between the rate of the leaky integration in R and the rate of the G inhibition.

123 To investigate how integration kernels can change depending on a ratio between the rate of
124 R and the rate of G , we simulated the integration kernel using different τ_R/τ_G ratios, and show
125 that integration kernel shape changes from primacy, to bump, to flat, and then to recency as
126 τ_R/τ_G decreases (Figure 2b). When τ_R/τ_G is much larger than 1, rate of integration is much
127 slower than rate of inhibition by G . This inhibition suppresses input from later evidence, thus
128 producing a primacy kernel. As τ_R/τ_G decreases towards one — τ_R decreases and τ_G increases,
129 inhibition slows down and allows for leaky integration to happen, thus producing a bump kernel.
130 When τ_R/τ_G reaches one, i.e. the two rates balances out, a flat kernel is generated. Finally,
131 when τ_R/τ_G decreases to below one, leaky integration overcomes inhibition, generating a recency
132 kernel.

133 **2.3 Humans exhibit uneven integration kernels in a perceptual** 134 **decision making task**

135 To examine the model in the context of behaviour, we looked at behavioural data from 133
136 human participants. Most of this data (108 subjects) was previously published [14]. We ob-
137 served that a large cohort of human participants weighed evidence unevenly when performing
138 an auditory decision making task adapted from Poisson Clicks Task [10]. In this task, on every
139 trial participants listened to a train of twenty clicks over one second at 20 Hz (Figure 3a). Each
140 click was on either the left or the right side. At the end of the train of clicks participants decided
141 which side had more clicks. Participants performed between 666 and 938 trials (mean 750.8)
142 over the course of approximately one hour. Basic behaviour in this task was comparable to
143 that in similar perceptual decision making tasks in previous studies [10, 11]. Choice exhibited
144 a characteristic sigmoidal dependence on net difference in clicks between left and right (Figure
145 3b).

146 We quantified the integration kernel, i.e. the impact of every click on choice, with logistic
147 regression in which the probability of choosing left on trial t was given by

$$\text{logit}(p_{\text{left}} \text{ at trial } t) = \sum_{i=1}^{20} \beta_i^{\text{click}} \Delta C_i + \beta^{\text{bias}} \quad (9)$$

148 where ΔC_i was difference between left and right for the the i th click (i.e. $\Delta C_i = \Delta C_{\text{left},i} -$
149 $\Delta C_{\text{right},i}$, therefore, ΔC_i was +1 for a left click and -1 for right). The integration kernel was




Figure 3: Humans exhibit uneven integration kernels in a perceptual decision making task. Task design, psychometric function, and different integration kernel shapes in human participants. Participants listened to a train of twenty clicks coming in either the left (L, black bars) or right (R, grey bars) ear for one second, and decided which side had more clicks. (b) Psychometric curve — choice probability (probability of choosing left) — showed sigmoidal relationship with difficulty (the difference in number of clicks between left and right). Error bars indicate s.e.m. across participants. Size of grey dots is proportional to number of trials. Dotted line indicates sigmoidal function fit. Shaded area indicate s.e.m. across participants. (c) Integration kernel, as β_i^{clicks} , estimated from logistic regression (equation (9)), averaged across all participants. (d) Plots of participants' integration kernels grouped into four groups of different integration kernel shapes. All shaded areas indicate s.e.m. across participants.

150 quantified by the regression weights β_i^{click} , and β^{bias} characterized the overall bias.

151 We found that participants weighed the clicks unevenly over time (repeated measures
152 ANOVA on β_i^{click} : $F(19, 2508) = 34.47$, $p < 0.00001$). Importantly, post-hoc Tukey’s test
153 showed that the middle of the kernel was significantly higher than either the beginning or the
154 end of the click (3rd–9th clicks were higher than the 1st click, and 10th–12th clicks were higher
155 than 16th–20th clicks, $p < 0.00001$), which indicated that on average participants tended to
156 weigh the middle of the click train more than the beginning or the end, forming a ‘bump’ shaped
157 kernel (Figure 3c). This uneven kernel shape contributed as a source of approximately 27% of
158 the total errors in participants’ choices (see Supplementary Materials S1 and Figure S1).

159 To explore individual differences in integration kernels, we furthered quantified the shape of
160 the integration kernel for each participant (for detailed description of categorization of integra-
161 tion kernels into shapes, see Supplementary Materials S2 and Figure S2). Specifically, we found
162 that participants exhibited one of four distinct kernels: bump ($n = 71$, 53%), primacy ($n = 41$,
163 31%), flat ($n = 16$, 12%), and recency ($n = 5$, 4%) (Figure 3d).

164 **2.4 Dynamic divisive normalization accounts for different inte-** 165 **gration kernels in human behavioural data**

166 To investigate whether our divisive model could account for the range of integration kernels ob-
167 served in human behavior, we fit the model to participants’ choices using a maximum likelihood
168 approach. To fit the model to human behavior we assumed that a choice is made by comparing
169 the activity in the two R units (i.e., $\delta = R_{\text{left}} - R_{\text{right}}$) with some noise, parameterized by σ ,
170 and an overall side bias (i.e. overall bias to either left or right). We also added an additional
171 offset parameter μ to the kernel. With equation (8), the probability of choosing left is given by

$$\text{logit}(p_{\text{left}}) = \delta'(t)/\sigma + \text{bias}, \text{ where } \delta'(t) = \int_0^t (K(t, t') + \mu)\Delta C(t')dt' \quad (10)$$

172 We computed the probability of a choice on a given trial at $t = T$, where T is the time at the
173 end of the stimulus. The model has a total of six free parameters (τ_R , τ_G , inhibition weight ω_I ,
174 noise σ , offset μ , and an overall bias). Using parameters that best fitted to each participant’s
175 choice, we first reconstructed integration kernel from divisive normalization for each participant
176 from the kernel function (equations (8) and (10)). Divisive normalization can account for all




Figure 4: Dynamic divisive normalization accounts for integration kernels and psychometric curves in human participants. (a) Integration kernels generated by divisive normalization model fitted to human participants' choices, compared to human integration kernels. Plots are grouped into groups of four different integration kernel shapes. Grey line indicates human integration kernels. Red line indicates model generated kernels. All shaded areas indicate s.e.m. across participants. (b) Psychometric curves generated by divisive normalization model compared to human psychometric curve. Grey circle indicates human psychometric curve. Red circle indicates model generated psychometric curve. Error bars indicate s.e.m. across participants. (c) Log ratios of fitted τ_R and τ_G values averaged within each integration kernel shape group. Log ratios of fitted τ_R and τ_G change significantly across kernel shape groups (***: one-way ANOVA $F(3, 129) = 25.06$, $p < 0.001$). Error bars indicate s.e.m. across participants within each group.

177 four types of integration kernel in human participants (Figure 4a and Supplementary Figure
178 S3). We also used divisive normalization to generate simulated choices for each participant for
179 each trial using the best fitting parameters, and showed that the resulting psychometric curve
180 also matched well to that of human participants (Figure 4b and Supplementary Figure S4). The
181 distribution of best fitted parameters is plotted in Supplementary Figure S5.

182 Our simulations in the previous section suggested that by shifting the balance between the
183 integration and inhibition time constants (the ratio τ_R/τ_G), divisive normalization can generate
184 the four types of kernel. We therefore examined the fitted parameter values in terms of τ_R/τ_G .
185 As shown in Figure 4c $\log(\tau_R/\tau_G)$ is significantly different across kernel shapes (one-way ANOVA
186 $F(3, 129) = 25.06$, $p = 8 \times 10^{-13}$). In particular, post-hoc Tukey test showed that $\log(\tau_R/\tau_G)$
187 in participants with bump, primacy, and flat kernels are significantly different from each other.
188 Participants with bump or primacy kernels also have a significantly different $\log(\tau_R/\tau_G)$ from
189 participants with recency kernel.

190 **2.5 Dynamic divisive normalization performs as well as Drift** 191 **Diffusion Model does in formal model comparison**

192 Finally, to demonstrate that divisive normalization is comparable to an established model for
193 such evidence accumulation tasks, we compared our model quantitatively with state-of-the-art
194 Drift Diffusion Model (DDM) developed by Brunton, et al[10].

195 In its simplest form, the DDM assumes that an accumulator integrates incoming evidence
196 over time (for example in our task the evidence +1 for a left click and -1 for a right click), with
197 some amount of noise σ_a added at every time step. In addition, a bias term is added to describe
198 an overall bias to choosing either left or right. In an interrogation paradigm such as ours, a
199 decision is made by comparing the accumulator activity with the bias when the stimulus ends,
200 e.g. in our task, if the accumulator activity is larger than the bias, the model chooses left.

201 Later work added a ‘memory parameter’ λ to describe the extent to which the model is
202 ‘forgetful,’ or ‘impulsive’ [15]. In particular a leaky accumulator ($\lambda < 0$) ‘forgets’ previous
203 evidence and exhibits recency effect, while an impulsive accumulator ($\lambda > 0$) overweights early
204 evidence and exhibits a primacy effect. When there is no memory noise ($\lambda = 0$), the integration
205 kernel is flat.

206 Brunton and colleagues extended this standard DDM to include additional processes [10]:
207 First, a bound, B , that describes the threshold of evidence at which the model makes a decision.
208 In the context of an interrogation paradigm, evidence coming after the bound has been crossed
209 is ignored. Second, a sensory adaptation process which controls the impact of successive clicks
210 on the same size. This process is controlled by two adaptation parameters: 1) the direction of
211 adaptation ϕ , which dictates whether the impact of a click on one side either increases ($\phi > 1$)
212 or decreases ($\phi < 1$) with the number of clicks that were previously on the same side; and 2) a
213 time constant τ_ϕ , that determines how quickly the adapted impact recovers to 1.

214 Overall the Brunton model has six free parameters — neuronal noise, memory noise, bound,
215 two parameters controlling sensory adaptation, and bias. We fit these parameters using the
216 maximum likelihood procedure described in [10] and following code from [16]. We generated
217 choices for each participant using the best fitting parameters, and computed an integration
218 kernel for each participant using these model generated choices.

219 We found that divisive normalization can account for the behavioral data as well as the
220 Brunton DDM can, both in formal model comparison using log likelihood, AIC, and BIC (Ta-
221 ble 1), and in integration kernel and choice curve (Supplementary Materials S5 and Figure
222 S7). Importantly, we show that the full Brunton DDM as reported in [10] with nine param-
223 eters accounts for the behavioral data equally well (Supplementary Materials S5 and Figure
224 S8), suggesting that increasing the number of parameters did not improve model performance
225 significantly. We also show that the standard form of DDM without bound or sensory adap-
226 tation does not account for participants' choices as well as divisive normalization, even after
227 accounting for the number of parameters with AIC and BIC (Supplementary Materials S5, Fig-
228 ure S6, and Table S1), suggesting that decreasing the number of parameters worsens the model
229 performance. This result that divisive normalization can account for behavior as well as DDM
230 can further supports divisive normalization as a model for evidence accumulation.

model	log likelihood	AIC	BIC
Divisive normalization (6 param)	-357.8	727.5	755.2
Brunton et al. DDM (6 param) [10]	-358.5	729.5	756.8

Table 1: Dynamic divisive normalization performs as well as Drift Diffusion Model does in formal model comparison. Comparison of log likelihood, AIC, and BIC scores between divisive normalization and DDM.

231 3 Discussion

232 In this work we proposed dynamic divisive normalization as a model for perceptual evidence
233 accumulation. Theoretically, we provided a formal expression for the integration kernel —
234 how this model weighs information over time — and how the shape of integration kernel is
235 determined by the ratio of time constants within the model. Experimentally, we showed how
236 dynamic divisive normalization can account for the integration kernels of human participants in
237 an auditory perceptual decision making task. In addition, with quantitative model comparison,
238 we show that dynamic divisive normalization explains participants' choices as well as the state-
239 of-the-art Drift Diffusion Model (DDM), the predominant model for such perceptual evidence
240 accumulation tasks. Together, these results suggest that evidence accumulation can arise from
241 a divisive normalization computation achieved through the interactions within a local circuit.

242 While our findings suggest that our model accounts well for human behavior in this one
243 task, an obvious question is whether dynamic divisive normalization is at play in other types
244 of evidence accumulation and in other decisions? For example, the drift diffusion model has
245 been used to model evidence accumulation in a number of paradigms (from auditory clicks
246 [10, 16, 17], to visual discrimination [18–20], to random dot motion [21–24]). Likewise the
247 DDM can account for choice and reaction time data in quite different settings such as memory
248 retrieval [25], cognitive control [26], and economic and value-based decision making [27–32].
249 Is divisive normalization also at play in these cases? If divisive normalization is a canonical
250 neural computation, then the simple answer is 'it must be,' but whether its influence extends
251 to behavior is largely unknown (although see the emerging literature on divisive normalization
252 in economic and value-based decisions [6, 8, 33]).

253 If people are using divisive normalization in these decisions then what computational pur-
254 pose does it serve? From a computational perspective, the DDM is grounded in the sequential
255 probability sampling test (SPRT) which is the optimal solution to evidence accumulation prob-
256 lems for two-alternative decisions under certain assumptions [21, 34]. Is divisive normalization
257 optimal under other decision making constraints? In this regard an intriguing finding by Tajima
258 and colleagues suggest that divisive normalization may be almost optimal for multi-alternative
259 decisions [35]. Other advantages of divisive normalization may be its ability to encode the state
260 of the accumulator over a wide dynamic range of evidence [1, 36], or its relation to optimal
261 Bayesian inference in some cases [37]. Of course an alternate account is that divisive normal-

262 ization is necessary for other functions (e.g. balancing excitation and inhibition [1]) and the
263 behavior we observe is simply the exhaust fumes of this function leaking out into behavior.

264 At the neural level, an obvious question is whether our neural model can explain neural
265 data? In this regard it is notable that our model was adapted from Louie et al.'s model of
266 lateral intraparietal (LIP) area neurons [8]. LIP has long been thought to contain a neural
267 representation of the state of the accumulator [38–40] and it is likely that, just like Louie's
268 model accounts for the firing of LIP neurons in his task, our model may well be consistent
269 with many of these past results. However, the accumulator account of LIP has recently been
270 challenged [41–44] and other areas in prefrontal cortex [45–48] and striatum [49] have been
271 implicated in evidence accumulation. Whether our divisive normalization explains neural firing
272 in these areas is unknown.

273 Finally, we note that other neural network models of evidence integration have also been
274 proposed, perhaps most importantly the model of Wang [50]. In its simplest form, the Wang
275 model also considers two mutually inhibiting units that, superficially, look similar to the R units
276 in Figure 1. However, the dynamics of the Wang model and the way it makes decisions are quite
277 different. In particular, the mutual inhibition is calibrated in such a way that the Wang network
278 has two stable attractor states corresponding to the outputs of the decision (e.g. left or right).
279 The input, combined with the dynamics of the network, pushes the network into one of the two
280 attractor states, which corresponds to the decision the network makes. Because the attraction
281 of an attractor gets stronger the closer the network gets to it, the initial input to the model
282 has a strong effect on the ultimate decision leading to a pronounced primacy effect in the Wang
283 model. In contrast to Wang attractor model, our dynamic divisive normalization is essentially
284 a line attractor network, with a single fixed point in $A-G$ space which is stable for all values
285 of δ (Supplementary Materials S6). This structure allows divisive normalization to exhibit a
286 number of different integration kernels as shown in Figure 2 depending on the parameters.

287 In sum, dynamic divisive normalization can account for human behavior in an auditory
288 perceptual decision making task, but much evidence remains to be accumulated before we can
289 be sure that this model is correct!

290 4 Methods

291 4.1 Participants.

292 188 healthy participants (University of Arizona) took part in the experiment. We analyzed
293 the data from 133 participants (55 participants were excluded due to poor performance —
294 accuracy lower than 60%). All human participants provided informed written consent prior to
295 the experiment, and both experiments were approved by the local ethics committee.

296 4.2 Experimental procedures.

297 Participants made a series of auditory perceptual decisions. On each trial they listened to a
298 series of 20 auditory “clicks” presented over the course of 1 second. Clicks could be either ‘Left’
299 or ‘Right’ clicks, presented in the left or right ear. Participants decided which ear received the
300 most clicks. In contrast to the Poisson Clicks Task [10], in which the click timing was random,
301 clicks in our task were presented every 50 ms with a fixed probability ($p = 0.55$) of occurring
302 in the ‘correct’ ear. The correct side was determined with a fixed 50% probability.

303 Participants performed the task on a desktop computer, while wearing headphones, and
304 were positioned in chin rests to facilitate eye-tracking and pupillometry. They were instructed
305 to fixate on a symbol displayed in the center of the screen, where response and outcome feedback
306 was also displayed during trials, and made responses using a standard keyboard. Participants
307 played until they made 500 correct responses or 50 minutes of total experiment time was reached.

308 4.3 Psychometric curve.

309 Psychometric curves show the probability of the participant responding leftward as a function
310 of the difference between the number of left clicks and the number of right clicks $C_{left} - C_{right}$.
311 The identical procedure was used to produce model-predicted curves, where the model-predicted
312 probability of choice on each trial was used instead of the participants’ responses.

313 4.4 Integration kernel.

314 To measure the contribution of each click to the participant’s choice on each trial (Figure 2A),
315 we used logistic regression given by $\text{logit}(Y) = \beta X$, where $Y \in \{0, 1\}$ is a vector of the choice

316 on each trial and X is a matrix in which each row is the twenty clicks ($\Delta C = C_{\text{left}} - C_{\text{right}}$) on
317 that trial, coded as +1 for left and -1 for right. The identical procedure was used to produce
318 model-predicted integration kernels, where the model-predicted choice on each trial was used
319 instead of the participants' responses.

320 4.5 Derivation of kernel function of divisive normalization

321 The model and the dynamical equations for R and G are described in the main text. These are
322 reproduced here:

$$\tau_R \frac{dR_i(t)}{dt} = -R_i(t) + \frac{C_i(t)}{1 + G(t)} \quad (1)$$

323

$$\tau_G \frac{dG(t)}{dt} = -G(t) + \omega_I \sum_{i=1}^N R_i(t) \quad (2)$$

324 From equation (1) we can consider how the difference in activity $\delta(t) = R_{\text{left}}(t) - R_{\text{right}}(t)$
325 changes over time:

$$\tau_R \frac{d\delta(t)}{dt} = -\delta(t) + \frac{\Delta C(t)}{1 + G(t)} \quad (3)$$

326 where $\Delta C(t) = C_{\text{left}}(t) - C_{\text{right}}(t)$ describes the difference in input over time.

327 To derive a formal expression for the kernel function, we integrate equation (3) using the
328 ansatz:

$$\delta(t) = e^{-\lambda t} \tilde{\delta}(t) \quad (4)$$

329 Taking the derivative of (4) and multiplying both sides with τ_R , we get:

$$\tau_R \frac{d\delta(t)}{dt} = -\tau_R \lambda e^{-\lambda t} \tilde{\delta}(t) + \tau_R e^{-\lambda t} \frac{d\tilde{\delta}(t)}{dt} \quad (5)$$

330 Combining equations (3), (4), and (5), we get:

$$\lambda = 1/\tau_R \quad (6)$$

$$\tau_R e^{-\lambda t} \frac{d\tilde{\delta}(t)}{dt} = \frac{\Delta C(t)}{1 + G(t)} \quad (7)$$

331 Integrating equation (7) we get:

$$\tilde{\delta}(T) = \frac{1}{\tau_R} \int_0^T \frac{e^{\lambda t} \Delta C(t)}{1 + G(t)} dt \quad (8)$$

332 Substituting equation (8) back into equation (4), we get

$$\delta(T) = \frac{1}{\tau_R} \int_0^T \frac{\exp(-(T-t)/\tau_R)}{1 + G(t)} \Delta C(t) dt \quad (9)$$

333 Acknowledgments

334 We thank Samuel Feng for his advice and discussion. Maxwell Alberhasky, Chrysta Andrade,
335 Daniel Carrera, Kathryn Chung, Michael de Leon, Zamigul Dzhalilova, Asha Esprit, Abigail
336 Foley, Emily Giron, Brittney Gonzalez, Anthony Haddad, Leah Hall, Maura Higgs, Marcus Ja-
337 cobs, Min-Hee Kang, Kathryn Kellohen, Neha Kwatra, Hannah Kylo, Alex Lawwill, Stephanie
338 Low, Colin Lynch, Alondra Ornelas, Genevieve Patterson, Filipa Santos, Shlishaa Savita, Catie
339 Sikora, Vera Thornton, Guillermo Vargas, Christina West, and Callie Wong for help in running
340 the experiments.

341 Author contributions

342 W. K. analyzed the data. W. K. and R. C. W. did the modelling work. T. H. collected the
343 data. T. H. and R. C. W. designed the experiment. W. K. and R. C. W. wrote the manuscript.
344 All three authors contributed to interpretation of the results and critical discussion.

345 Declaration of Interests

346 The authors declare no competing financial or non-financial interests as defined by Nature
347 Research.

348 Data availability

349 The data sets generated and analysed during the current study are available from the corre-
350 sponding author upon reasonable request.

351 Code availability

352 Experiment code was created with Psychtoolbox-3 and custom MATLAB code. All analyses
353 were created with custom MATLAB and R code. All code will be uploaded to [https://github.com](https://github.com/janekeung129/click-model)
354 [/janekeung129/click-model](https://github.com/janekeung129/click-model)

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468 Supplementary Materials

469 S1 Errors contributed by uneven integration kernel

470 To understand how much error an uneven integration kernel introduces, we estimated error
471 rates using simulations that keep the uneven integration kernel as the only source of error.

472 We first used logistic regression to estimate the regression weights of each click for each
473 participant, as described in Main Text equation (9), with the equation replicated here:

$$\text{logit}(p_{\text{left}} \text{ at trial } t) = \sum_{i=1}^{20} \beta_i^{\text{click}} \Delta C_i + \beta^{\text{bias}} \quad (1)$$

474 β_i^{click} is the weight of the i th click on choice, and β^{bias} is the weight of an overall side bias (i.e.
475 the weight of always choosing left).

476 We then simulated participants' choices by reversing the logistic regression — for each
477 participant, using the estimated betas, we computed p_{left} , the probability of that participant
478 choosing left on a given trial, using the same equation (equation (1)). We then reproduced the
479 participant's choices by randomly drawing from a binomial distribution with the computed p_{left}
480 for each trial.

481 Then we compared the error rate of the simulated choices to participants' actual choices.
482 We showed in the rightmost two data points in Figure S1 that we reproduced the same total
483 error rate in simulations using the original estimated regression weights (20.6%) as the total
484 error rate in human participants' data (20.2%).

485 We then removed the overall side bias by setting β^{side} to be zero. We also removed overall
486 noise by making the choices deterministic. That is, instead of randomly drawing from a binomial
487 distribution using p_{left} , we asked whether $\text{logit}(p_{\text{left}})$ at a given trial is larger or smaller than zero:
488 if $\text{logit}(p_{\text{left}})$ is larger than zero, choose left, and if $\text{logit}(p_{\text{left}})$ is smaller than zero, choose right.
489 If $\text{logit}(p_{\text{left}})$ is equal to zero, then flip a coin with 50% probability. By removing these other
490 sources of errors, we asked how much errors the uneven integration kernel shape contributes to.
491 We showed that an uneven integration kernel shape contributed to 5.5% error rate (Figure S1),
492 which accounted for 27.2% of the total error rate. We also showed that by removing the uneven
493 integration kernel, simulations showed zero error rates.




Figure S1: Error rates from simulated choices compared to human participants. From left to right: error rates of simulated choices with 1) no suboptimalities, 2) only uneven integration kernel, and 3) original betas, and error rate of human participants.

494 S2 Categorizing integration kernels into shapes

495 To categorize the kernel for each participant into one of the four shapes, we fit polynomial
496 functions with different degrees to participants' choices, and selected the best fitting model with
497 model comparison using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to account for the different
498 number of free parameters. In particular, we assume that the probability of choosing left at
499 trial t is (the logit of) the weighted sum of clicks, where the weights are from a polynomial
500 function, as shown in the following equation:

$$\text{logit}(p_{\text{left}} \text{ at trial } t) = \sum_{i=1}^{20} \beta_i^{\text{poly}} \Delta C_i, \text{ where } \beta_i^{\text{poly}} = \sum_{n=0}^N \alpha_n i^n \quad (2)$$

501 We fitted three different polynomial functions by changing N from 0 to 2: constant, linear, and
502 quadratic. We then selected the best fitting function for each participant by comparing the fits
503 from different polynomials with AIC. We categorized each participant's integration kernel into
504 one of the four shapes using the following criteria: (1) flat: kernel was best fit with the constant
505 function; (2) primacy: kernel was best fit with linear function with a negative slope (α_1), or
506 with quadratic function with a minimum ($\alpha_2 > 0$) and the minimum is located later than the
507 10th click, or with quadratic function with a maximum ($\alpha_2 < 0$) and the maximum is located
508 earlier than the 2nd click; (3) recency: kernel was best fit with linear function with a positive
509 slope, or with quadratic function with a minimum ($\alpha_2 > 0$) and the minimum is located earlier
510 than the 10th click, or with quadratic function with a maximum ($\alpha_2 < 0$) and the maximum
511 is located later than the 18th click; (4) bump: kernel that did not meet the previous three
512 criteria (i.e. kernel was best fit with quadratic function and was neither primacy nor recency).
513 Individual integration kernels and their categorizations are plotted in Figure S2.




Figure S2: Individual integration kernel plots. Colored lines are regression weights of clicks from equation (9). Plots are sorted and color coded by kernel shape. Light grey line shows smoothed integration kernel.

514 **S3 Individual plots of integration kernels and psychometric curves**
515 **generated by divisive normalization**




Figure S3: Individual integration kernels generated by divisive normalization compared to human integration kernels.




Figure S4: Individual psychometric curves generated by divisive normalization compared to human psychometric curves.

516 **S4 Histogram of fitted divisive normalization parameters**




Figure S5: Histogram of fitted divisive normalization parameters.

517 S5 DDM

518 S5.1 Standard DDM does not fit bump kernel

519 We first tested how standard DDM fits to the behavioural data. Intuitively, the standard DDM
520 (i.e. without a bound) should not be able to generate a ‘bump’ shaped integration kernel. The
521 most standard form of DDM:

$$da = C(t)dt + \sigma dW \quad (3)$$

522 with only drift (input, i.e. clicks C) and diffusion (noise added by Wiener process W), and
523 without any bound, would predict that every piece of evidence over time is integrated with
524 equal weight — i.e. a flat integration kernel. An extension can be added to the standard DDM
525 in the form of a ‘memory noise’ to account for primacy or recency integration kernels as well.
526 This ‘memory’ parameter λ arises out of leaky competitive accumulators (LCA) model under
527 certain constraints [15, 21]:

$$da = (\lambda a + C(t))dt + \sigma dW \quad (4)$$

528 λ acts to maintain the memory of the evidence estimate. When memory is subtractive ($\lambda < 0$),
529 DDM becomes leaky and earlier evidence is ‘forgotten’ and thus weighed less, creating a recency
530 bias. When memory is additive ($\lambda > 0$), accumulator activity drifts exponentially over time,
531 and the direction of the drift is determined by the initial stimulus, thus creating a primacy
532 effect. When $\lambda = 0$, LCA (equation (4)) reduces to standard DDM (equation (3)).

533 We fitted the standard DDM without bound to participants’ choices using a maximum
534 likelihood approach. An analytical solution of the probability of choosing a certain side exists
535 for DDM without bound under fixed decision time protocol [22]. Specifically, assuming the
536 probability distribution of the initial accumulator state is Gaussian (with initial mean μ_0 and
537 initial variance v_0), the probability distribution of the accumulator state at the end of the
538 stimulus train is also Gaussian, and the mean and variance can be computed analytically.
539 Thus, the probability of choosing one side is the cumulative normal distribution.

540 We used maximum likelihood approach to fit these five parameters in LCA: initial mean μ_0 ,
541 initial variance v_0 , memory noise λ , noise σ , and an overall bias. We generated choices from
542 the model using best fitting parameters. Integration kernels from DDM can be reconstructed
543 by regressing the stimulus onto model generated choices using logistic regression (equation (9)).




Figure S6: Standard DDM fits

544 Confirming our intuition, we show that the standard DDM can produce a primacy, recency, and
 545 flat effect, but cannot fit to the bump kernel (Figure ??a).

546 S5.2 6 parameter Brunton et al. DDM fits participants' behaviour

547 We then fitted the Brunton et al. DDM [10] to the behavioural data. The key differences
 548 between the Brunton et al. DDM and standard LCA model is the addition of two processes.
 549 The first is a 'sticky' bound — that is, a decision is made either at the end of the stimulus
 550 train, or at the time when the accumulator hits the bound, depending on which event happens
 551 earlier. The second is a sensory adaptation process which controls the actual impact of a click

552 (without adaptation the impact of every click will always be 1). The process is controlled by two
 553 parameters: 1) the direction of adaptation — either no adaptation, depression (the impact of
 554 each click is smaller than 1, or facilitation (the impact is larger than 1), and 2) a time constant
 555 that determines how quickly the adapted impact recovers to 1.




Figure S7: Brunton 6 param DDM fits.

556 To fit the Brunton et al. model, the probability distribution of accumulator state evolves
 557 over time following a similar logic to the standard DDM. To model the bound in the probability
 558 distribution space, a ‘sticky’ bound is added to DDM such that when the probability mass hits
 559 the bound, it sticks to the bound. The evolution of the probability distribution for each trial
 560 has to be computed numerically, until the end of the stimulus. Similar to the case of standard
 561 DDM, the probability of choosing one side is the cumulative distribution of the probability

562 distribution at the end of the stimulus train. This cumulative distribution is also computed
563 numerically. We fitted the model to participants' choices using code provided in [16]. We show
564 that Brunton DDM fits to all four integration kernel shapes.

565 **S5.3 9 parameter Brunton et al. DDM fits behaviour as well as 6 param** 566 **does**

567 The original model reported in Brunton et al. [10] has three additional parameters: 1) an
568 additional noise parameter σ_s that characterizes the noise added at each incoming stimulus (i.e.
569 click), 2) a noise parameter σ_i that characterizes the amount of noise in the initial state of the
570 accumulator, and 3) a lapse rate that characterizes the probability of a random response being
571 made. We fitted the Brunton et al. DDM with the nine parameters to our behavioural data
572 and show that the DDM fit to the data as well as the DDM with six parameters.




Figure S8: Brunton 9 param DDM fits.

573 **S5.4 Formal model comparison**

model	log likelihood	AIC	BIC
Divisive normalization (6 param)	-357.8	727.5	755.2
Brunton et al. DDM (6 param) [10]	-358.5	729.5	756.8
Brunton et al. DDM (9 param) [10]	-357.7	733.1	774.7
Standard DDM [22]	-364.2	738.5	761.6

Table S1: scores

574 S5.5 Histogram of fitted parameters of 6 param Brunton DDM




Figure S9: Histogram of fitted DDM parameters.

575 **S6 Attractor space of divisive normalization**

576 We show that there is one attractor in the A - G space where A is the total network activity:

$$A = R_{\text{left}} + R_{\text{right}} \quad (5)$$

577 Since with our experimental design, there is always a click input at each time point (so
578 either $C_{\text{left}} = 1$ or $C_{\text{right}} = 1$), the sum of inputs into the network is constant at 1 over time.
579 Thus, the set of differential equations for the A - G space are:

$$\tau_R \frac{dA}{dt} = -A + \frac{1}{1+G} \quad (6)$$

580

$$\tau_G \frac{dG}{dt} = -G + \omega_I \sum_{i=1}^N R_i = -G + \omega_I A \quad (7)$$

581 Analytically, a full proof for the existence of a unique equilibrium point that is asymptotically
582 stable for general families of this set of differential equations was provided by Louie, et al. [8].
583 Numerically, we produce plots of vector field and model trajectory to demonstrate the stable
584 equilibrium point for divisive normalization in the A - G space (Figure S10).




Figure S10: Characteristic model dynamics simulated with $\tau_R = 1$, $\tau_G = 1$, and $\omega_I = 20$. (a) Example model vector field. Arrows indicate instantaneous change in the activities of the (A, G) pair for certain values of A and G . The vector field shows a stable equilibrium point in the A - G space. (b) Example network activity trajectory corresponding to the vector field in (a), indicated by red solid line. Grey and black dashed lines indicate the nullclines of the two differential equations for A and G respectively. The nullclines show values at which either A or G activity does not experience a change in activity (regardless of change in the activity in the other component). The intersection of the two nullclines is where neither the activity of A nor G changes, again indicating the stable equilibrium point of the network.