

1 **Tissue Tropism and Transmission Ecology Predict Virulence of Human**

2 **RNA Viruses**

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10

12 Abstract

13 Novel infectious diseases continue to emerge within human populations. Predictive studies  
14 have begun to identify pathogen traits associated with emergence. However, emerging  
15 pathogens vary widely in virulence, a key determinant of their ultimate risk to public health.  
16 Here, we use structured literature searches to review the virulence of each of the 214 known  
17 human-infective RNA virus species. We then use a machine learning framework to determine  
18 whether viral virulence can be predicted by ecological traits including human-to-human  
19 transmissibility, transmission routes, tissue tropisms and host range. Using severity of clinical  
20 disease as a measurement of virulence, we identified potential risk factors using predictive  
21 classification tree and random forest ensemble models. The random forest model predicted  
22 literature-assigned disease severity of test data with 90.3% accuracy, compared to a null  
23 accuracy of 74.2%. In addition to viral taxonomy, the ability to cause systemic infection,  
24 having renal and/or neural tropism, direct contact or respiratory transmission, and limited ( $0 <$   
25  $R_0 \leq 1$ ) human-to-human transmissibility were the strongest predictors of severe disease. We  
26 present a novel, comparative perspective on the virulence of all currently known human RNA  
27 virus species. The risk factors identified may provide novel perspectives in understanding the  
28 evolution of virulence and elucidating molecular virulence mechanisms. These risk factors  
29 could also improve planning and preparedness in public health strategies as part of a  
30 predictive framework for novel human infections.

31

32 Author Summary

33 Newly emerging infectious diseases present potentially serious threats to global health.

34 Although studies have begun to identify pathogen traits associated with the emergence of

35 new human diseases, these do not address why emerging infections vary in the severity of

36 disease they cause, often termed ‘virulence’. We test whether ecological traits of human

37 viruses can act as predictors of virulence, as suggested by theoretical studies. We conduct

38 the first systematic review of virulence across all currently known human RNA virus species.

39 We adopt a machine learning approach by constructing a random forest, a model that aims to

40 optimally predict an outcome using a specific structure of predictors. Predictions matched

41 literature-assigned ratings for 28 of 31 test set viruses. Our predictive model suggests that

42 higher virulence is associated with infection of multiple organ systems, nervous systems or

43 the renal systems. Higher virulence was also associated with contact-based or airborne

44 transmission, and limited capability to transmit between humans. These risk factors may

45 provide novel starting points for questioning why virulence should evolve and identifying

46 causative mechanisms of virulence. In addition, our work could suggest priority targets for

47 infectious disease surveillance and future public health risk strategies.

48

49 Blurb

50 Comparative analysis using machine learning shows specificity of tissue tropism and

51 transmission biology can act as predictive risk factors for virulence of human RNA viruses.

52 Introduction

53 The emergence of novel infectious diseases continues to represent a threat to global public  
54 health. Emerging pathogens have been defined as those newly recognised infections of  
55 humans following zoonotic transmission, or those increasing in incidence and/or geographic  
56 range [1]. High-profile examples of emerging pathogens include the discovery of the novel  
57 MERS coronavirus from cases of respiratory illness in 2012 [2], and the expansion of the  
58 range of Zika virus across the South Pacific and the Americas [3]. The emergence of  
59 previously unseen viruses means that the set of known human viruses continually increases  
60 by around 2 species per year [4,5]. Initial comparative studies identified trends among  
61 emerging human pathogens, for example, increased risk of emergence for pathogens with  
62 broad host ranges, and RNA viruses [6–9]. However, more recent comparative analyses have  
63 focused on risk factors for specific pathogen traits, such as transmissibility [10–12]. Here, we  
64 focus on understanding the ecological determinants of pathogen virulence, using all currently  
65 recognised human RNA viruses as a study system.

66

67 Emerging RNA viruses vary widely in their virulence, with some never having been associated  
68 with human disease at all. For example, Zaire ebolavirus causes severe haemorrhagic fever  
69 with outbreaks, including the 2014 West African outbreak showing case fatality ratios of ~60%  
70 or more [13,14]. In contrast, human infections with Reston ebolavirus have never exhibited  
71 any evidence of disease symptoms [15]. Applying the comparative approach to understand  
72 the ecology of virulence could offer valuable synergy with studies of emergence, towards  
73 prioritisation and preparedness in the detection of potential new human viruses [16].

74

75 Few comparative analyses have addressed the risk factors driving human pathogen virulence  
76 to date (but see [17–19]), and none have exhaustively investigated virulence across the  
77 breadth of all currently recognised human RNA viruses. Several hypotheses regarding how  
78 pathogen ecology affects virulence have been derived from theoretical models of evolution.  
79 For example, the trade-off hypothesis was developed based on the assumption that rate of  
80 transmission between individuals may increase as a function of virulence, but there will be a  
81 consequential increase in host mortality (or decrease in host recovery as the inverse of  
82 mortality). As a result, pathogen fitness will be subject to trade-off between virulence and  
83 transmissibility over a longer infectious window [20,21]. The trade-off hypothesis is highly  
84 debated as it is difficult to empirically characterise due to dependency on many other aspects  
85 of host-pathogen coevolution [22,23]. However, comparative analysis has been suggested as  
86 one method to assess evidence for a virulence-transmission trade-off [22]. Based on these  
87 core principles, we hypothesised that limited capability to transmit between humans may act  
88 as a predictive risk factor for virulence. We also note that evolutionary trade-offs will only  
89 apply to coevolved host-virus relationships and that many human viruses result from zoonotic  
90 cross-species transmission without onward transmission or adaptation. In these cases,  
91 ‘coincidental’ non-adapted virulence may result [24,25], and as above, we hypothesised that  
92 limited human-to-human transmissibility may predict higher virulence.

93

94 Transmission route may also influence the evolution of virulence. Ewald [18] suggested that  
95 vector-borne pathogens should be less constrained by costs of virulence, i.e. morbidity and

96 immobilisation of the vertebrate host does not impede transmission if it occurs through an  
97 arthropod vector. We therefore hypothesised a vector-borne transmission route would predict  
98 higher virulence.

99

100 Several studies have also suggested a link between host range and virulence. Assuming an  
101 evolutionary trade-off exists between virulence and transmission rate, higher virulence may  
102 result in pathogens with narrower host ranges following selection pressures to increase  
103 transmission rate within the specialist host(s) [19]. Furthermore, the degree of virulence in  
104 experimental infections with *Drosophila C virus* was more similar between closely related  
105 hosts [26]. Though similar ideas have not yet been formally tested for human infections,  
106 parasite infectivity correlates with phylogenetic relatedness among primates [27]. We  
107 hypothesised infection of non-human primates as a specific related host taxon would predict  
108 higher virulence. Finally, although yet unexplored via theoretical models, it may be an intuitive  
109 expectation that systemic infections present with more severe disease than local infections. A  
110 broader tissue tropism could therefore also predict higher virulence.

111

112 We aimed to determine patterns of virulence across the breadth of all known human RNA  
113 viruses. We then aimed to use predictive machine learning models to ask whether ecological  
114 traits of viruses can act as predictive risk factors for virulence in humans. Specifically, we  
115 examined hypotheses that viruses would be more highly virulent if they: lacked transmissibility  
116 within humans; had vector-borne transmission routes; had a narrow host range including non-  
117 human primates; or had greater breadth of tissue tropisms.

118 Results

119 Virulence of Human RNA Viruses

120 Following [5], as of 2015 there were 214 RNA virus species containing viruses capable of  
121 infecting humans, spanning 55 genera and 21 families (with one species unassigned to a  
122 family). Using a two-category system, 58 of these were rated as causing ‘severe’ clinical  
123 disease and 154 as ‘nonsevere’ following systematic literature review (Fig 2, see also S1  
124 Table, S2 Table). Two virus species could not be assigned a disease severity rating and were  
125 excluded from all analyses (*Hepatitis delta virus*, which is reliant on *Hepatitis B virus*  
126 coinfection; and *Primate T-lymphotropic virus 3*, which may be associated with chronic  
127 disease like other T-lymphotropic viruses, but has not been known in humans long enough for  
128 cohort observations). Disease severity differed between viral taxonomic families (Fisher’s  
129 exact, 1000 simulations,  $p < 0.001$ ), with *Arenaviridae*, *Filoviridae* and *Hantaviridae* having  
130 the highest fractions of severe-rated virus species (Fig 2). Fatalities were reported in healthy  
131 adults for 64 viruses and in vulnerable individuals only for an additional 26 viruses, whilst 8  
132 viruses rated ‘nonsevere’ had severe strains, 6 of which belonged to the family  
133 *Picornaviridae*.

134

135 Classification Tree Risk Factor Analysis

136 To find predictive risk factors for virulence, we firstly divided the 212 virus species into a  
137 training set ( $n = 181$ ) and test set ( $n = 31$ ) based on taxonomy and severity in order to  
138 minimise potential biases from trait imbalances. Using the training set, we then constructed a  
139 single classification tree that aimed to optimally classify viruses in virulence based on their

140 ecological traits. The final pruned classification tree included variables relating to  
141 transmissibility, tissue tropism and taxonomy (Fig 2). Severe disease was predicted by the  
142 model for four generalised groups: i) viruses with a neural or systemic primary tropism with  
143 limited human-to-human transmissibility (excluding orthomyxoviruses, phenuiviruses and  
144 reoviruses); ii) viruses known to have a renal tropism (primary or otherwise); iii) hantaviruses;  
145 and iv) retroviruses with sustained human-to-human transmissibility.

146

#### 147 Random Forest Risk Factor Analysis

148 Although the illustrated classification tree identified several risk factors, this represents one of  
149 many possible trees, as tree structure is dependent on the exact sampling partition between  
150 training and test data. We therefore constructed a random forest model containing 5000  
151 individual trees, each built using a bootstrapped sample of the training data and a randomly  
152 restricted subset of predictors.

153

154 Aggregated over these bootstrapped trees, the most informative predictor variables for  
155 classifying virulence were taxonomic family and primary tissue tropism (Fig 4). However,  
156 transmission route, human-to-human transmissibility level, and having a known neural or  
157 renal tropism were also relatively informative, broadly mirroring the risk factors observed in  
158 the single tree. Host range predictors were generally uninformative.

159

160 To quantify the effects of the most informative risk factors, partial dependences were  
161 extracted from the random forest, describing the marginal predicted probabilities of severe



162 virulence associated with each virus trait (Fig 5, S3 Table). Averaging across other predictors,  
163 viruses having tissue tropisms within neural, renal or systemic across multiple organ systems  
164 presented the highest risk of severe virulence, whilst respiratory and gastrointestinal tropisms  
165 presented the lowest risk. An increased probability of severe virulence was also observed for  
166 viruses transmitted by direct contact or respiratory routes, and those with known but limited  
167 human-to-human transmissibility.

168

#### 169 Model Performance in Predicting Viral Virulence

170 Although the single classification tree model predicted the training set well, it did not appear  
171 generalisable to novel data within the test set. The single tree correctly predicted virulence  
172 ratings from literature-based criteria for 24 of 31 viruses in the test set giving a resulting  
173 accuracy of 77.4% (95% confidence interval [CI]: 58.9% - 90.4%), no evident improvement on  
174 the null model assigning all viruses as nonsevere (null accuracy = 74.2%). The random forest  
175 gave better predictive accuracy, correctly predicting virulence ratings for 28 of 31 test set  
176 viruses (accuracy: 90.3%, 95% CI: 74.3% - 98.0%), significantly greater than the null  
177 accuracy (exact binomial one-tailed test,  $p = 0.025$ ). The random forest also achieved  
178 superior performance when considering sensitivity, specificity, True Skill Statistic, and the  
179 negative predictive value as a performance measure prioritising correct classification of  
180 'severe'-rated viruses (Table 1). The random forest also outperformed the classification tree in  
181 AUROC, area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (Table 1, Fig 3).

182 All misclassifications from the random forest occurred within the genus *Flavivirus* (S2 Table).

183 Within the test set, there were two flaviruses rated as severe from literature protocols that

184 were predicted to be nonsevere (*Rio Bravo virus*, *Yellow fever virus*), and one nonsevere  
185 flavivirus predicted to be severe (*Usutu virus*).

186

187 The observed predictor importances and risk factor directions were robust to constructing  
188 random forest models for subsets of viruses, removing those with low-certainty data or data  
189 from serological evidence only (S1 Fig, S2 Fig), and similar performance diagnostics were  
190 obtained (S5 Table). Redefining our virulence measure to integrate information on known  
191 fatalities and differences with subspecies or strains in an ordinal ranking system (S5 Table)  
192 did not improve predictive performance (S6 Table). Using alternative virulence  
193 measurements, the most informative variables and virus traits predicting severity showed  
194 good agreement with that of the main analysis (S3 Fig, S4 Fig) though when definitions of  
195 ‘severe’ virulence were widened, hepatic tropism became an informative predictor towards  
196 disease severity.

197 Discussion

198 We present the first comparative analysis of virulence across all known human RNA virus  
199 species to our knowledge. We find that disease severity is non-randomly distributed across  
200 virus families and that beyond taxonomy, severe disease is predicted by risk factors of tissue  
201 tropism, and to a lesser extent, transmission route and level of human-to-human  
202 transmissibility. In both the classification tree and random forest, viruses were more likely to  
203 be predicted to cause severe disease if they caused systemic infections, had neural or renal  
204 tropism, transmitted via direct contact or respiratory routes, or had limited capability to  
205 transmit between humans ( $0 < R_0 \leq 1$ ). These risk factors were robust to alternative modelling  
206 methods, alternative definitions of virulence, and exclusions of poor quality data.

207

208 Ecology and Evolution of Risk Factor Traits

209 Primary tissue tropism was the most informative non-taxonomic risk factor (Fig 4) and the first  
210 split criteria in the classification tree (Fig 2), with specific neural tropism and generalised  
211 systemic tropism predicting severe disease (Fig 5). Few evolutionary studies have directly  
212 predicted how tissue tropism should influence virulence. The identified risk factor tropisms  
213 could be explainable as a simple function of pathology occurring in multiple or sensitive  
214 tissues respectively, increasing intensity of clinical disease. However, it has been suggested  
215 that an excessive, non-adapted virulence may result if infections occur within non-target  
216 tissues that do not contribute to transmission [28]. Furthermore, the evolutionary determinants  
217 of tissue tropism themselves are not well understood [29]. Tissue tropism should be a key  
218 consideration for future comparative and evolutionary modelling efforts.

219

220 We also found viruses primarily transmitted by direct contact and respiratory routes to have a  
221 higher predicted probability of severe virulence than viruses transmitted by more indirect  
222 faecal-oral or vector-borne routes. Contrastingly, Ewald [18] reported a positive association  
223 between virulence and vector-borne transmission in comparative analyses pooling several  
224 microparasite types, including a limited range of viruses, and suggested virulence has fewer  
225 costs to viral evolutionary fitness if vector transmission can occur independent of host health  
226 and mobility. The opposite association we observe may imply that even if transmission occurs  
227 via an indirect route such as through an arthropod vector, virulence could bring ultimate  
228 fitness costs due to host mortality before encountering a vector, fomite, etc..

229

230 The relationship between virulence and transmissibility appears more complex. Firstly, the  
231 random forest model suggested a lower risk of severe virulence for viruses with sustained  
232 human-to-human transmissibility (level 4) (Fig 5). This would lend support towards  
233 hypothesised virulence-transmissibility trade-offs [20–22] and suggests that the adaptation  
234 necessary to develop efficient human-to-human transmissibility could result in attenuation of  
235 virulence in RNA viruses. Sustained transmissibility appeared to positively predict severe  
236 disease for a specific subset of four viruses in the single classification tree (Fig 2), all  
237 retroviruses causing chronic syndromes (*HIV 1 and 2*, *Primate T-lymphotropic virus 1 and 2*),  
238 which are likely subject to different evolutionary dynamics – if disease occurs after the  
239 infectious period, virulence brings fewer costs to pathogens from host mortality, essentially  
240 ‘decoupling’ from transmission [24]. We note only three non-chronic level 4 viruses rated

241 severe: *Severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus*, *Yellow fever virus*, and *Zaire*  
242 *ebolavirus*.

243

244 Secondly, cross-species infections incapable of onward transmission (sometimes termed  
245 ‘dead-end’ infections) have been predicted to result in higher virulence as without any  
246 evolutionary selection, viral phenotypes within that host will be non-adapted, i.e. a  
247 ‘coincidental’ by-product [24,25]. However, we did not observe viruses incapable of human-to-  
248 human transmissibility to be more virulent, the highest risk instead being observed for viruses  
249 with self-limited transmissibility. This may suggest that if virulence is entirely unselected in  
250 dead-end infections, ultimate levels of virulence could also feasibly turn out to be  
251 ‘coincidentally’ low.

252

253 Taxonomic family being a highly informative predictor in the random forest implies that there  
254 is a broad phylogenetic signal to virulence, but it is also highly likely that the explanatory  
255 power represents a proxy for many other phylogenetically-conserved viral traits that are  
256 challenging to implement in comparative analyses of this scale, such as variation at the  
257 proteomic, transcriptomic or genomic level; or further data beyond simple categorisations, e.g.  
258 specific arthropod vector species. Untangling these sources of variation from different scales  
259 of traits will be a critical next step in predictive modelling of viral virulence.

260

## 261 Analytical Limitations

262 We acknowledge several limitations to the quality of our data, as with any broad comparative

263 analysis. Risk factor data was problematic or missing for certain viruses, e.g. natural  
264 transmission route for viruses only known to infect humans by accidental occupational  
265 exposure, and tissue tropism for viruses only known from serological evidence. However, the  
266 consistency of findings between alternative, stricter definitions of virulence and data subsets  
267 removing viruses with suspected data quality issues suggests scarcity of data does not bias  
268 our analyses.

269

270 Virulence also exhibits substantial variation at the sub-species level, i.e. between strains or  
271 variants. For example, severity of Lassa virus disease superficially varies with infection route  
272 and geography, though this appears to be driven by variation between genotypes [30].

273 Confirmatory analyses at a finer resolution would validate our identified risk factors, e.g.  
274 phylogenetic trait models of individual genera or species. Furthermore, clinical symptoms are  
275 also subject to traits of the host individual, e.g., immunocompetence, age, microbiome  
276 [31,32]. Our risk factor analysis brings a novel, top-down perspective on virulence at the  
277 broadest level, though caution must be exerted in extrapolating the risk factors we find to  
278 dynamics of specific infections.

279

## 280 Implications for Public Health

281 The value of predictive modelling as an inexpensive and rapid tool for risk assessments  
282 during early emergence is increasingly recognised [16]. Instances where machine learning  
283 model predictions do not match outcomes could indicate likely candidates for outcome class  
284 changes, e.g. future reservoir hosts for zoonotic disease [33]. Severe virulence was predicted

285 for one virus rated ‘nonsevere’ from literature protocols, *Usutu virus*, potentially suggesting  
286 the capability for more severe disease to be recognised in future.

287

288 However, our models have restricted function in predicting the virulence of a newly identified  
289 virus. Although taxonomy is easily accessible and applicable to give simple virulence  
290 estimates, the most informative non-taxonomic predictor, tissue tropism, is not likely to be  
291 known with confidence before clinical observations of virulence. One way to address this  
292 paucity of data lies in the potential predictability of tissue tropism from cell receptors, and  
293 more challengingly, cell receptors from viral sequence data [34], an increasingly accessible  
294 information source during early emergence following advances in genomic sequencing  
295 methods [35]. However, the exact links between tissue tropism, cell receptors, and sequences  
296 are currently a critical knowledge gap, but a potentially powerful focus for future predictive  
297 efforts. A further key area will be the possibility to directly infer virulence itself from other  
298 aspects of sequence data, e.g. genome composition biases, which have recently  
299 demonstrated the potential to predict reservoir host taxa and arthropod vectors via machine  
300 learning [36].

301

302 More widely, our analysis brings a novel focus that complements comparative models  
303 predicting other aspects of the emergence process, such as zoonotic transmission  
304 [8,9,27,33], propagation within humans [10,11] or geographic hotspots [37,38]. After  
305 continued calls for model-informed strategy, predictive studies are now beginning to shape  
306 surveillance and prevention with respect to emerging zoonoses [16,39], with virulence being

307 been suggested as a factor to direct viral surveillance [40], albeit in non-human hosts. The  
308 virulence risk factors we identify suggest that broadly targeting direct contact or respiratory  
309 transmission interfaces within ecological systems and/or tailoring detection assays towards  
310 certain virus families (e.g. *Hantaviridae*) or tissues (e.g. neural tissue) could contribute to a  
311 viable strategy to detect future virulent zoonoses.

312

### 313 Conclusion

314 This work adds to the comparative and predictive modelling efforts surrounding emerging  
315 infectious diseases. Here, we contribute a novel focus in ecological predictors of virulence of  
316 human RNA viruses, which can be combined in holistic frameworks with other models such  
317 as those predicting emergence dynamics. As a predictive model, the featured random forest  
318 offers valuable inference into the evolutionary determinants of virulence in newly emerging  
319 infections. We propose that future predictive studies and preparedness initiatives with respect  
320 to emerging diseases should carefully consider potential for human virulence.



321 Materials and Methods

322 Data Collection

323 For each of the 214 recognised human-infective RNA virus species following standardised  
324 data compilation efforts and critical assessment protocols [5], data on virulence and potential  
325 risk factors were collected via a systematic search and review of clinical and epidemiological  
326 literature. The following were consulted in turn: clinical virology textbooks [41–43]; references  
327 from the dataset described by [5]; literature searches using Google Scholar (search terms: 1)  
328 [virus name] AND human, 2) [virus name] AND human AND case, 3) [virus name] AND  
329 human AND [fatal\* OR death], 4) [virus name] AND human AND [tropi\* or isolat\*]. Searches 3  
330 and 4 were carried out only when fatality or tropism data respectively were not already found  
331 from previous sources. Data collection and virus name search terms included the full species  
332 name, any synonyms or subspecies (excluding vaccine strains) and the standard virus  
333 abbreviation as given by ICTV Online Virus Taxonomy [44].

334

335 Although many possible measurements of virulence have been proposed [45,46], even simple  
336 metrics like case fatality ratio (CFR) have not been calculated for the majority of human RNA  
337 virus species. Therefore, virulence was rated using a simple two-category measure of severity  
338 of typical disease in humans. We rated viruses as ‘severe’ if they firstly had  $\geq 5\%$  CFR where  
339 data was available (159/214 viruses including those with zero CFR), otherwise, we rated  
340 viruses as ‘severe’ if they had frequent reports of hospitalisation, were associated with  
341 significant morbidity from certain conditions (haemorrhagic fever, seizures/coma, cirrhosis,  
342 AIDS, hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, HTLV-associated myelopathy) or were explicitly

343 described as “severe” or “causing severe disease” (S1 Table, S2 Table). We rated viruses as  
344 ‘nonsevere’ if none of these conditions were met. Note that this led to ‘nonsevere’ ratings for  
345 some viruses with clinically severe, but rare syndromes, e.g. Dengue virus can cause  
346 haemorrhagic dengue fever, though this is much rarer than typical acute dengue fever  
347 [41,42]. To address this, data were also collected on whether the virus has caused fatalities in  
348 vulnerable individuals (defined as age 16 and below or 60 and above, immunosuppressed,  
349 having co-morbidities, or otherwise cited as being ‘at-risk’ by sources for specific viruses) and  
350 in healthy adults, and whether any ‘nonsevere’ virus has atypically severe strains (for  
351 example, most infections with viruses within the species *Human enterovirus C* cause mild  
352 disease; however, poliovirus, which causes severe paralytic disease, is also classified under  
353 this species). These were examined both individually and within a composite six-rank system  
354 (S5 Table).

355

356 Data were compiled for four main risk factors: transmission route(s) and tissue tropisms,  
357 sourced from literature search exercises as described; and extent of human-to-human  
358 transmissibility and host range, sourced directly from [5]. Although evolutionary theories also  
359 predict virulence to vary with other traits, e.g. environmental survivability [47], paucity of data  
360 or nestedness within taxonomic family prevented their inclusion in our analysis. Transmission  
361 route was defined as the primary route the virus is transmitted by, classified as either vector-  
362 borne (excluding mechanical transmission), direct contact, faecal-oral or respiratory  
363 transmission. Tissue tropism was specified the primary organ system the virus typically  
364 infects or targets, classified as either neural, gastrointestinal, hepatic, respiratory, circulatory,

365 vascular, or ‘systemic’ (primary tropism within multiple organ systems). We accepted isolation  
366 of the virus, viral proteins or genetic material, or diagnostic symptoms of the virus (such as  
367 characteristic histological damage) as evidence of infection within an organ system but did not  
368 accept generalised symptoms such as inflammation. However, many human viruses were  
369 isolated from blood with no further evidence of any specific tissue tropisms ( $n = 69$ ).

370 Therefore, we also included an additional ‘viraemia’ category in this variable to indicate only  
371 blood presence was known. Binary variables were also constructed denoting whether viruses  
372 were ever known to utilise a) more than one transmission route/tissue tropism, and b) each  
373 individual transmission route and tropism, including additional categories that were never  
374 among the primary routes/tropisms (food-borne and vertical transmission; renal, cardiac, joint,  
375 reproductive, sensory, skin, muscular and endocrine tropism).

376

377 Human-to-human transmissibility was specified using infectivity/transmissibility levels, based  
378 on previous conceptual models and a systematic compilation and review of evidence [4,5,12].  
379 Level 2 denotes a virus capable of infecting humans but not transmitting between humans ( $R_0$   
380 = 0), level 3 denotes a virus with limited human-to-human transmissibility ( $0 < R_0 \leq 1$ ); and

381 level 4 denotes a virus with sustained human-to-human transmissibility ( $R_0 \geq 1$ ). Host range  
382 was specified as either ‘narrow’ (infection known only within humans or humans plus non-  
383 human primates) or ‘broad’ (infection known in mammals or animals beyond primates) [5].

384 Binary variables were also sourced as to whether infection was known within a) humans only,  
385 b) non-human primates, c) other mammals and d) birds. All virulence and risk factor data

386 pertained to natural or unintentional artificially-acquired human infection only and data from  
387 intentional human infection, animal infection, and *in vitro* infection were not considered. Viral  
388 taxonomy was included in analyses by specifying both genome type and taxonomic family as  
389 predictors. All virulence and risk factor data are available via Figshare [48].

390

#### 391 Machine Learning Risk Factor Analysis

392 Firstly, the 212 retained virus species were split into a training set for model fitting and test set  
393 for model evaluation at an approximate 75:25 ratio using stratified random sampling based on  
394 taxonomic family and virulence rating. Fisher's exact tests confirmed equal representation of  
395 families ( $p = 0.991$ ) and virulence ratings ( $p > 0.999$ ) between training and test data.

396 Comparative risk factor analyses were firstly carried out by constructing a classification tree  
397 using the R package 'rpart' v4.1-11 [49]. Classification trees are a simple form of machine  
398 learning models that aim to optimally classify data points into their correct category of  
399 outcome variable based on a structure of binary predictor splits. Tree-based methods are  
400 well-suited for comparative analyses where confounding often results from taxonomic signal  
401 or suites of otherwise co-occurring traits as their high structure can intuitively fit complex non-  
402 linear interactions and local effects.

403

404 A tree model was fitted to the training set to predict virulence ratings by 'recursive  
405 partitioning', the repeated splitting of the dataset using every possible binary permutation of  
406 each predictor, and retaining the split that minimises the Gini impurity [50], defined as  $1 -$

407  $\sum_{i=1}^n p(x_i)^2$  for outcome variable  $x$  with  $n$  possible ratings and  $p(x_i)$  denoting proportion of

408 data with rating  $i$ , which is equal to zero for perfectly separated data. To prevent overfitting,  
409 the tree was pruned back to the optimal branching size, taken as most common consensus  
410 size over 1000 repeats of 10-fold cross-validation. To validate the predictive power of the  
411 classification tree, predictions of virulence rating were generated when applied to the test set.  
412 Tree accuracy was then calculated comparing the proportion of correct predictions compared  
413 to literature-assigned ratings (assuming these to be 100% accurate as the ‘gold standard’ or  
414 ‘ground truth’). As virulence ratings were imbalanced (i.e. only a minority of viruses cause  
415 severe disease, so correct nonsevere classifications are likely to be achieved by chance),  
416 accuracy was directly compared to the null model, i.e. a model with no predictors that  
417 predicted ‘nonsevere’ for all viruses. Additional diagnostics of interest (sensitivity, specificity,  
418 negative predictive value, and True Skill Statistic [60]) were also obtained.

419

420 Although classification trees have the advantage of presenting an interpretable schematic of  
421 risk factor effects and directions, individual tree structures may be sensitive to particular data  
422 points and have no intuitive measures of uncertainty. Therefore, we constructed a random  
423 forest, an ensemble collection of a large number of bootstrapped classification trees [51].  
424 Having many predictor variables compared to the relatively limited and fixed number of  
425 human-infective RNA virus species, random forests handle such ‘large p, small n’ data  
426 architecture much more easily than traditional regression frameworks [52]. Missing data in all  
427 predictors was imputed using the R package ‘missForest’ v1.4 [53]. Then, using the R  
428 package ‘randomForest’ v4.6-12 [53], a random forest was created containing 5000 individual  
429 trees, each built upon a bootstrapped sample of the training data and restricted to test a

430 randomly selected subset of predictors ( $k = 5$ ) at each split during construction and  
431 convergence confirmed by inspection. Predictive power of the random forest model was  
432 evaluated using the test set as for the classification tree and receiver operating characteristic  
433 curves were visualised and area under curves calculated to directly compare the two machine  
434 learning methodologies.

435

436 Due to their high structuring, random forest models cannot give a simple parametric predictor  
437 effect size and direction (e.g., an odds ratio). Instead, potential virulence risk factors were  
438 evaluated using two metrics: variable importance and partial dependence. Variable  
439 importance is calculated as the mean decrease in Gini impurity following tree splits on the  
440 predictor and can be considered as how informative the risk factor was towards correctly  
441 predicting virulence. Partial dependence is calculated as the mean relative change in log-  
442 odds of predicting severe virulence, which were converted to predicted probabilities of  
443 severity associated with each risk factor. Partial dependences describe marginal effects  
444 averaging across any influence of other predictors and as such, a single estimate may not  
445 reflect any complex risk factor interactions. Therefore, to test hypotheses regarding virulence  
446 risk factors, we present both random forest partial dependences and the less robust but more  
447 accessible single classification tree for its ease of interpretation in risk factor structure, and  
448 directly compare the statistical validity of both methods by plotting receiver operating  
449 characteristic curves. All modelling was carried out in R v 3.4.3 [54], with a supporting R script  
450 available via Figshare [48].

451

452 Acknowledgements

453 We thank Jarrod Hadfield, Samantha Lycett, and Daniel Streicker for helpful discussion, and  
454 Alex Bhattacharya, Christopher McCaffery, David McCulloch, Conor O'Halloran, Claire Taylor  
455 and Feifei Zhang for assistance in data collection.

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581 Figure Captions

582 **Fig 1. Virulence of currently known human RNA viruses with respect to taxonomy.**

583 Number of known human RNA virus species split by ICTV taxonomic family. Shading denotes  
584 disease severity rating.

585

586 **Fig 2. Final pruned classification tree predicting disease severity for 181 human RNA**  
587 **viruses.**

588 Final classification tree structure predicting virulence. Viruses begin at the top and are  
589 classified according to split criteria (white boxes) until reaching terminal nodes with the  
590 model's prediction of disease severity, and the fraction of viruses following that path correctly  
591 classified, based on literature-assigned ratings (shaded boxes). 'Tp: primary' denotes primary  
592 tissue tropism, 'Tr level' denotes level of human-to-human transmissibility, and 'Tp: renal.'  
593 denotes having a known renal tissue tropism.

594

595 **Fig 3. Receiver operating characteristic curve for tree-based machine learning models.**

596 Plotted model predictive performance for the single classification tree (bold black line) and the  
597 random forest (bold red line) models when applied to the test set. Y axis denotes sensitivity  
598 (or true positive rate; proportion of viruses rated 'severe' by literature protocol that were  
599 correctly predicted as 'severe' by the model), and X axis denotes 1 – specificity (or false  
600 positive rate; proportion of viruses rated 'nonsevere' by literature protocol that were incorrectly  
601 predicted as 'severe' by the model). Dashed black line indicates null expectation (i.e. a model

602 with no discriminatory power). Model profiles further toward the top left indicate a better  
603 predictive performance.

604

605 **Fig 4. Variable importances from the random forest model.**

606 Importance of each predictor variable across the 5000 bootstrapped trees within the random  
607 forest, calculated as the mean decrease in Gini impurity following a tree split based on that  
608 predictor and scaled against the most informative predictor (taxonomic family) to give a  
609 relative measure. ‘Tp’ denotes tissue tropism predictor, ‘Tr’ denotes transmission route  
610 predictor, ‘Tr level’ denotes level of human-to-human transmissibility, and ‘H’ denotes host  
611 range predictor.

612

613 **Fig 5. Partial dependences from the random forest model in predicting severe**  
614 **virulence.**

615 Predicted probability of classifying virulence as ‘severe’ for each of the most informative risk  
616 factors (primary tissue tropism, any known neural tropism, any known renal tropism, level of  
617 human-to-human transmissibility, and primary transmission route). Probabilities given are  
618 marginal, i.e. averaging over any effects of other predictors. Dashed line denotes raw  
619 prevalence of ‘severe’ virulence rating among the training dataset.

620

621 **Tables**

622 **Table 1. Predictive performance metrics for classification tree and random forest**  
623 **model.**

624 Sensitivity, specificity, NPV (negative predictive value; proportion of ‘nonsevere’ predictions  
625 that correctly matched literature rating), TSS (true skill statistic; sensitivity + specificity – 1)  
626 and AUROC (area under receiver operating characteristic curve) for predictive model  
627 methods applied to predict virulence of 31 viruses within the test set.

628

---

<b>Model</b>	<b>Sensitivity</b>	<b>Specificity</b>	<b>NPV</b>	<b>TSS</b>	<b>AUROC</b>
Classification tree	0.625	0.826	0.864	0.451	0.636
Random forest	0.750	0.957	0.917	0.707	0.957

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629

630



631 Supporting Information Captions

632 **S1 Table. Virulence literature rating data for human RNA virus training dataset.**

633 Virulence data for the 181 virus species in the training set, ordered by genome type and  
634 taxonomy, including disease severity rating and supporting criteria for viruses rated ‘severe’,  
635 whether virus is known to have caused fatalities in vulnerable individuals and/or otherwise  
636 healthy adults, and whether virus is known to have ‘severe’ strains if species is rated  
637 ‘nonsevere’. CFR = Case fatality ratio, HPS = Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, HFRS =  
638 Hantavirus haemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome, HTLV = Human T-lymphotropic virus,  
639 AIDS = Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.

640

641 **S2 Table. Virulence literature rating data and predictions for human RNA virus test**  
642 **dataset.**

643 Virulence data for 31 virus species in the test set, ordered by genome type and taxonomy,  
644 whether virus is known to have caused fatalities in vulnerable individuals and/or otherwise  
645 healthy adults, and whether virus is known to have ‘severe’ strains if species is rated  
646 ‘nonsevere’. Both disease severity rating/supporting criteria following the literature protocol  
647 given in the main text, and predicted probability of severe disease from the random forest  
648 model are given. Bold type denotes where predictions do not match literature-based ratings.  
649 CFR = Case fatality ratio, HPS = Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome.

650

651 **S3 Table. Partial dependence from the random forest model for all predictor variables.**

652 Partial dependence given as marginal relative change in log-odds and predicted probability of  
653 classifying virulence as ‘severe’ from the random forest for all predictor variables.

654

655 **S4 Table. Diagnostics of random forest models using stringent data subsets.**

656 Predictive performance metrics of random forest models applied to datasets excluding viruses  
657 with low-certainty data (n denotes number of viruses excluded). In each case, data were  
658 randomly resampled using stratification upon taxonomic family and virulence rating, resulting  
659 in differing training and test sets from the main analysis. Otherwise, random forest  
660 methodology follows that of Materials & Methods.

661

662 **S5 Table. Six-rank system of classifying virulence for human RNA viruses.**

663 Six-rank system of classifying human RNA virus virulence with available data (specifically,  
664 severity rating from main text, fatalities in vulnerable individuals and healthy adults, and  
665 severe strains), along with example viruses and number of viruses fitting each exclusive  
666 rank’s criteria.

667

668 **S6 Table. Diagnostics of random forest models predicting alternative metrics of  
669 virulence.**

670 Predictive performance metrics of random forest models predicting alternative virulence

671 measures using different two-category definitions of ‘severe’ (n denotes number of viruses  
672 considered ‘severe’ using that definition). Vulnerable individuals are defined as those age 16  
673 and below, age 60 and above, immunosuppressed, having co-morbidities, or otherwise cited  
674 as being ‘at-risk’. Ranks follow those given in Table S5. Otherwise, random forest  
675 methodology follows that of Materials & Methods.

676 **S1 Fig. Variable importances from random forest models using stringent data subsets.**

677 Variable importance for virulence risk factors from random forest models applied to datasets  
678 excluding a) viruses only known to infect humans from serological evidence (n = 36), b)  
679 viruses with < 20 recognised human infections (n = 55), and c) viruses with poor data quality  
680 in at least one predictor (n = 71). Variable importance is calculated as the relative mean  
681 decrease in Gini impurity scaled against the most informative predictor within each model,  
682 alongside importances from the main analysis for comparison. 'Tp' denotes tissue tropism  
683 predictor, 'Tr' denotes transmission route predictor, 'Tr level' denotes level of human-to-  
684 human transmissibility, and 'H' denotes host range predictor.

685

686 **S2 Fig. Partial dependences from random forest models using stringent data subsets.**

687 Predicted probability of classifying virulence as 'severe' for each of the most informative risk  
688 factors from random forest models applied to datasets excluding a) viruses only known to  
689 infect humans from serological evidence (n = 36), b) viruses with < 20 recognised human  
690 infections (n = 55), and c) viruses with poor data quality in at least one predictor (n = 71),  
691 alongside predicted probabilities from the main analysis for comparison. Probabilities given  
692 are marginal, i.e. averaging over any effects of other predictors. As each data subset required  
693 random resampling of the training and test data, note that the raw prevalence of 'severe'  
694 virulence differed between each model (see S4 Table).

695

696 **S3 Fig. Variable importances from random forest models using stringent data subsets.**

697 Variable importance for virulence risk factors from random forest models predicting alternative  
698 virulence measures using different two-category definitions of ‘severe’, calculated as the  
699 relative mean decrease in Gini impurity scaled against the most informative predictor within  
700 each model, alongside importances from the main analysis for comparison. ‘Tp’ denotes  
701 tissue tropism predictor, ‘Tr’ denotes transmission route predictor, ‘Tr level’ denotes level of  
702 human-to-human transmissibility, and ‘H’ denotes host range predictor.

703

704 **S4 Fig. Partial dependences from random forest models using stringent data subsets.**

705 Predicted probability of classifying virulence as ‘severe’ in alternative virulence measures for  
706 each of the most informative risk factors from random forest models, alongside predicted  
707 probabilities from the main analysis for comparison. Probabilities given are marginal, i.e.  
708 averaging over any effects of other predictors. As each measurement used a different two-  
709 category definition of ‘severe’, note that the raw prevalence of ‘severe’ virulence differed  
710 between each model (see S6 Table).




Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3






Figure 4




Figure 5