# Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying motivated seeing

**Authors:**

Yuan Chang Leong*[1], Brent L. Hughes[2], Yiyu Wang[1], Jamil Zaki[1]

**Affiliations:**

[1] Department of Psychology, Stanford University

[2] University of California, Riverside

* Correspondence to: ycleong@stanford.edu

**Abstract**

People tend to believe their perceptions are veridical representations of the world, but also commonly report perceiving what they want to see or hear, a phenomenon known as *motivated perception*. It remains unclear whether this phenomenon reflects an actual change in what people perceive or merely a bias in their responding. We manipulated the percept participants wanted to see as they performed a visual categorization task for reward. Even though the reward maximizing strategy was to perform the task accurately, this manipulation biased participants' perceptual judgments. Motivation increased activity in voxels within visual cortex selective for the motivationally relevant category, indicating a bias in participants' neural representation of the presented image. Using a drift diffusion model, we decomposed motivated seeing into response and perceptual components. Response bias was associated with anticipatory activity in the nucleus accumbens, whereas perceptual bias tracked category-selective neural activity. Our results highlight the role of the reward circuitry in biasing perceptual processes and provide a computational description of how the drive for reward can lead to inaccurate representations of the world.

**Keywords:** Motivation, perceptual decision-making, computational modeling, striatum, ventral temporal cortex

People tend to think of their perception as a veridical representation of the external world, but this view has long been challenged by psychological research[1,2]. Instead, people often report percepts that they are motivated to perceive, a phenomenon we term *motivated perception*. In one classic example in the visual domain, Dartmouth and Princeton students watched the same football game. Fans of each team subsequently reported seeing the other team commit more fouls[3]. Likewise, participants presented with ambiguous line drawings were more likely to report seeing the interpretation associated with desirable outcomes[4].

One interpretation of these findings is that motivational factors, such as desires and wants, exert top-down influence over perceptual processing, such that people become biased towards seeing what they want to see[5]. We refer to the bias in perceptual processing as a *perceptual bias*. Alternatively, these effects could instead reflect a *response bias*: a bias not in what participants see, but merely in what they report seeing[6,7]. Although these two interpretations appear at odds with each other, they are not mutually exclusive; motivation could simultaneously both bias perception and responses. Computational models offer a promising analytical approach by which we can dissociate these two sources of bias and identify their independent contributions to perceptual judgments.

Drift diffusion models assume that perceptual judgments arise from the accumulation of noisy sensory evidence towards one of two decision thresholds[8,9]. When the level of evidence exceeds the threshold associated with a particular percept, the corresponding response is made. Within this framework, a response bias can be modeled as a bias in the *starting point* of evidence accumulation. This reduces the amount of evidence needed to make a response, but assumes no effect on perceptual processing. On the other hand, a perceptual bias can be modeled as a bias in the *rate* of evidence accumulation. This in turn reflects sensory information accumulating faster for one percept than another, implying that perceptual processes are biased towards seeing that percept. The extent to which each bias influences behavior can then be estimated from empirical data.

Neuroimaging offers a second, complementary approach through which to dissociate response and perceptual biases. The neural mechanisms underlying motivational effects on perceptual judgments are not well understood, but separate literatures on the neuroscience of motivation and perception suggest distinct neural processes that could be related to different components of bias. In particular, both fMRI and electrophysiology studies have identified the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) as a key structure in mediating motivational processes[10,11]. One putative role of the NAcc is that it biases response selection in favor of actions associated with higher reward[12–14]. This suggests that it could play a role in response biases by increasing the readiness to make motivationally desirable judgments.

On the other hand, previous work suggests that perceptual judgments are determined by comparing the activity of neurons selective to different perceptual features[15,16]. For example, monkeys in a direction-of-motion task were more likely to categorize a cloud of dots as moving upward when activity was higher in sensory neurons preferring upward motion than in sensory neurons preferring downward motion[17]. Similarly, Heekeren and colleagues demonstrated in

2

humans that perceptual judgments on a face-scene categorization task were computed by comparing activity in areas in the ventral temporal cortex selective to each category[18]. Motivation could potentially bias this comparison process by driving attention towards the features associated with a motivationally desirable percept[19]. This enhances the neural response to those features, thus giving rise to a perceptual bias.

The goal of the present study was two-fold: (i) to decompose motivational influences on perceptual judgments into a response bias and a perceptual bias and (ii) to examine the neurocomputational mechanisms underlying motivational biases on perceptual judgments. Human participants were presented with visually ambiguous images created by morphing a face image and a scene image together, and were rewarded for correctly categorizing whether the face or scene was of higher intensity. We manipulated participants' motivation by instructing them on each trial that they would win or lose extra money if the upcoming stimulus was of a particular category. Crucially, participants would gain or lose this additional money based only on the actual category of the stimulus, not what they reported seeing. As such, even though participants were motivated to see one category over the other, they would earn the most money on the task if they reported the stimulus category accurately.

We estimated the magnitude of response and perceptual biases exhibited by our participants by fitting a drift diffusion model to choice and reaction time data. Using fMRI, we searched for distinct neural processes associated with each bias. Furthermore, as the perception of faces and scenes is associated with distinct patterns of activity in the ventral occipito-temporal cortex[18,20,21], we used multivoxel pattern analysis to measure the level of face- and scene-selective activity as a correlate of perception. If the motivation to see one category increases the level of neural activity selective for that category, it would provide additional evidence that motivation modulates perceptual processing. By combining the neural measures with computational modeling, our approach provides a mechanistic account of motivational influences on perceptual judgments.

## Results

Thirty participants were scanned using fMRI while they performed a categorization task with visually ambiguous images comprising a mixture of a face and a scene (Fig. 1A). For each image, participants were rewarded for correctly indicating which category was of higher intensity (i.e. "more face" or "more scene"). To motivate participants to see one category over another, we informed them that they would be performing the task with a teammate or an opponent. This other "player" would bet on whether the upcoming image would be one with more face or more scene. Participants were told that neither the teammate nor opponent had seen the upcoming image and their bets provided no informational value. Participants won a monetary bonus if the teammate's bet was correct, and lost money if the teammate's bet was wrong (*Cooperation Condition*). In contrast, participants lost money if the opponent's bet was correct, and won a bonus if the opponent's bet was wrong (*Competition Condition*). The *Competition Condition* allowed us to assess the effect of motivation above and beyond that of semantic

3

priming due to having seen the words "Face" and "Scene". The outcome of each bet was determined by the objective face-scene proportion of the presented image, and not by participants' subjective categorizations. To earn the most money, participants should ignore the bets and make their categorizations accurately (Fig. 1B).



**Figure 1.** *Experimental Design.* **A.** Motivated Visual Categorization Task. Participants were presented with composite face/scene images. In the Cooperation Condition, a teammate first makes a bet on whether the face or scene will be of higher intensity (i.e. "more face" or "more scene"). Participants are then presented with the composite image, and have to categorize whether it comprises mostly face or mostly scene. They then rated how confident they were in their categorization. In the Competition Condition, an opponent makes the bet instead. Participants performed 2 blocks of each condition, each with 40 trials. All bets were pseudo-randomly generated such that both the teammate and the opponent made correct bets on 50% of the trials. The order of the blocks was interleaved and counterbalanced across participants. **B.** Payoff structure. Participants won an extra 40 cents if the teammate's bet was correct, but lost 40 cents if the teammate's bet was wrong. Conversely, they lost 40 cents if the opponent's bet was correct, but won 40 cents if the opponent's bet was wrong. Participants earned 10 cents for each correct categorization. As the outcome of the bets was determined by the objective face-scene ratio of the presented image and not by participants' subjective categorizations, the reward maximizing strategy was to ignore the bets and perform the categorizations accurately.

## Motivation biases visual categorization

For each condition, we estimated the psychometric function describing the relationship between participants' categorizations and the relative proportions of face and scene in an image. Not surprisingly, as the proportion of scene in an image increases, participants were more likely to

4

categorize the image as having more scene (b = 2.19, SE = 0.13, z = 16.9, p < 0.001; statistical significance was assessed using a generalized linear mixed effects model, see Methods).

To examine the effect of motivation, we estimated separate psychometric functions depending on the teammate or opponent's bet (Fig. 2A). In the *Cooperation Condition,* participants were more likely to report seeing more scene when the teammate bet on scene than when the teammate bet on face (b = 0.33, SE = 0.13, z = 2.52, p = 0.012). That is to say, participants were more likely to report seeing the category that the bet motivated them to see.

The bias in participants' perceptual judgments could also be due to semantic priming. For example, when the teammate bet that the upcoming image would have more face, participants might be more likely to report seeing more face because they were semantically primed by having just seen the word "face", and not because they were motivated to see more face. The *Competition Condition* allows us to directly test this competing account.

In the *Competition Condition*, participants were motivated to see the category that was inconsistent with the opponent's bet. For example, if the opponent bet that the upcoming image would have more scene, participants would be motivated to see more face. If the bias in participants' judgments resulted from semantic priming, participants would instead be more likely to report seeing the category consistent with the opponent's bet. Consistent with a motivational account, participants were *less* likely to categorize an image as having more scene when the opponent bet scene than when the opponent bet face (b = -0.47, SE = 0.11, $z$ = -4.11, $p$ = 0.012).

To quantify the magnitude of a motivational bias across the two conditions, we computed the *Condition* x *Bet* interaction on participants' categorizations. This interaction was highly significant (b = 0.81, SE = 0.24, $z$ = 3.35, $p$ < 0.001), such that participants were more likely to make categorizations consistent with the teammate's bet and inconsistent with opponent's bet. Taken together, these results indicate that participants' categorizations were biased by what they were motivated to see.

Although the majority of participants exhibited motivational bias, the degree of bias varied across individuals. We estimated each participant's motivational bias by extracting the random slopes of the Condition x Bet interaction (Fig. 2B). Participants who exhibited stronger motivational bias also made fewer correct categorizations, indicating that the motivational bias impaired performance on the task and led to decreased earnings (robust regression: b = -0.31, SE = 0.09, F(1, 28) = 10.5, $p$ = 0.003, Fig. 2C). All behavioral findings replicated in a separate group of 28 participants who performed the task without undergoing fMRI (Fig. S1).

Across both conditions, reaction times were faster when participants categorized an image as the category they were motivated to see (*Motivation Consistent* trials) than when they categorized the image as the other category (*Motivation Inconsistent* trials; b = -0.05 SE = 0.02, $t$(27) = -2.80, $p$ = 0.009; Fig. S2A). Participants were marginally less confident on *Motivation Consistent* trials than on *Motivation Inconsistent* trials (b = -0.08, SE = 0.04, $t$(28) = -2.04, $p$ = 0.051; Fig. S2B).

5

**Figure 2. Motivation biases visual categorization**. **A.** Participants were more likely to categorize the ambiguous image as what they wanted to see. *Cooperation Condition:* Participants' psychometric function was shifted left when the teammate bet on more scene (blue) relative to when the teammate bet on more face (red), indicating that less scene evidence is needed to categorize an image as having more scene. *Competition Condition:* Participants' psychometric function was shifted right when the opponent bet on more scene (blue) relative to when the opponent bet on more face (red), indicating that more scene evidence is needed to categorize an image as having more scene. Statistical significance was assessed using a generalized linear mixed-effects model (see Methods). Error bars indicate S.E.M. **B.** Magnitude of bias in each participant, defined as the random slope of the Bet x Condition interaction. We performed a median split and defined the participants with stronger motivational bias as "High Bias" participants, and participants with weaker motivational bias as "Low Bias" participants. **C.** Participants with greater motivational bias performed worse on the task and received lower earnings. Statistical significance was assessed using a robust regression analysis that down-weights the influences of outliers. See Fig. S1 for replication with an independent group of participants.

## Motivation biases both starting point and drift rate

Having established that participants' categorizations were biased by what they wanted to see, we proceeded to examine *how* motivation biased the decision process. To this end, we fit a drift diffusion model (DDM) to participants' choice and reaction time (RT) data. The DDM is a model of the cognitive processes involved in two-choice decisions[9], and assumes that choice results from the accumulation of noisy sensory evidence towards one of two decision bounds. The starting point of the accumulation process is determined by a free parameter, $z$, and the decision boundary is determined by a free parameter, $a$. The rate of evidence accumulation is determined by the drift rate, $v$, which depends on the sensory information on each trial. In the

6

case of our task, an image with a high scene proportion would be associated with a highly positive $v$, while an image with a high face proportion would be associated with a highly negative $v$. When the accumulation process reaches one of the bounds (top boundary for scene, bottom boundary for face), a response is initiated.

From a DDM perspective, our participants' motivational bias could reflect either or both of two mechanisms (Fig. 3A). First, a shift in the *starting point*, $z$, could decrease the distance between the starting point and the decision bound of the motivationally consistent category. This reduces the amount of evidence needed to make the motivationally consistent response, thus creating a *response bias*. Second, a bias in the *drift rate, v,* could favor evidence accumulation in favor of the motivationally consistent category. This results in sensory evidence accumulating faster for the motivationally consistent category, thus creating a *perceptual bias*.

To examine if either or both of these processes explained the bias observed in our task, we fit three different DDMs to participants' data[22] (see Methods): i. a model in which the starting point varied (*z*-model), ii. one in which the drift rate varied (*v*-model), iii. and one in which both the starting point and drift rate varied depending on the motivationally consistent category (*z & v* model). We compared the models based on the deviance information criterion (DIC[23], a common metric of model comparison for hierarchical models that penalizes for model complexity, with lower values indicating better fit). The *z & v* model provided the best fit to participants' data (DIC: *z & v:* 10880; *z:* 10889; *v:* 10901), suggesting that motivation biased both the starting point and rate of information accumulation.

Next, we examined how $z$ and $v$ were affected by motivation. We extracted the posterior distributions of $z$ and $v$ estimated by the *z & v* model, separately for trials in which participants were motivated to see more scene ($z_{scene}$ and $v_{scene}$) and more face ($z_{face}$ and $v_{face}$). These distributions reflect our best guess for each parameter given participants' data. As seen in Figure 3B, the mean estimate of $z$ was higher (i.e. closer to the scene boundary) when participants were motivated to see a scene, compared to a face ($p = 0.013$, statistical significance was assessed by comparing the posterior distribution of the difference between $z_{scene}$ and $z_{face}$ against 0; Fig. 3C). This indicates that motivation biased the starting point of evidence accumulation. Similarly, the mean estimate of $v$ was higher (i.e. more biased towards scenes) when participants were motivated to see a scene, compared to a face ($p < 0.001$; Fig. 3D, 3E), indicating that evidence accumulation was also biased in favor of the motivationally consistent category.

Interestingly, the estimates of $v$ were positive regardless of which category participants were motivated to see (Fig. 3D), indicating that evidence accumulation was generally biased towards scenes. This scene bias was also evident in participants' categorizations, such that an image with a 50:50 face-scene proportion was more likely to be judged as having more scene (M = 0.60, SE = 0.03, $t(29) = 2.82$, $p = 0.008$, Fig. S3). We discuss a potential explanation for this overall scene bias in Fig. S3.

Finally, the model also provides an account of why participants were faster when making motivation consistent categorizations (e.g., responding scene when motivated to see a scene, Fig. S2A). With both a biased starting point and drift rate, it takes less time for evidence

accumulation to reach the decision bound of the motivation consistent category. Figure S4 shows each participant's reaction time distribution and the corresponding model predicted reaction times.



**Figure 3. Modeling Results**. **A.** Schematic diagram of the drift diffusion model. $t_0$ and $t_1$: non-decision time related to stimulus encoding and response execution; $a$: decision boundary, $z$: starting point, $v$: drift rate. On each trial, choice depends on the accumulation of noisy sensory evidence towards one of two decision bounds. Motivation biases categorizations by modulating both the starting point and the drift rate. Blue: Motivated to see more scene; Red: Motivated to see more face. **B.** Posterior distribution of $z$ estimated by the $z$ & $v$ model. $z$ was higher when participants were motivated to see more scene than when participants were motivated to see more face. **C.** Posterior distribution of the bias in starting point. Dashed line indicates 0 (no bias) while the solid line indicates the 5th percentile of the distribution. More than 95% of the distribution was greater than 0, indicating the $z_{scene}$ was credibly higher than $z_{face}$. **D.** Posterior distribution of $v$ estimated by the $z$ & $v$ model. $v$ was higher when participants were motivated to see more scene than when participants were motivated to see more face. **E.** Posterior distribution of the bias in drift rate. More than 95% of the distribution was greater than 0, indicating that $v_{scene}$ was credibly higher than $v_{face}$. * $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.001$.

**Motivation consistent categorizations are associated with activity in the salience network and dorsal attention network**

To identify the brain areas associated with motivational biases in perceptual judgments, we first performed a whole-brain contrast to identify voxels that responded differently on Motivation Consistent trials than on Motivation Inconsistent trials. This contrast revealed activations in two network of brain regions: i. the salience network, which includes the nucleus accumbens (NAcc), insula, dorsal anterior cingulate (dACC), and ii. the dorsal attention network, including the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and frontal eye-fields (FEF) (Fig. 4, https://neurovault.org/collections/EAAXGDRJ/images/62743/)



**Motivation Consistent > Motivation Inconsistent**

**Figure 4. Neural correlates of motivational bias.** Activity in the salience and dorsal attention networks was higher when participants made motivation consistent categorizations than when participants made motivation inconsistent categorizations. NAcc: nucleus accumbens, dACC: dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, IPS: intraparietal sulcus, FEF: Frontal eye fields. Correction for multiple comparisons was performed using threshold-free-cluster-enhancement (TFCE) with an alpha of 0.05[24]. Shown in blue is a NAcc ROI defined using the Harvard-Oxford Cortical Structural Atlas.

**NAcc activity is associated with motivational bias across participants and trials**

Having identified candidate brain regions underlying participants' motivational bias, we proceeded to examine the role of each brain region. Regions of interest (ROI) for the NAcc, insula, dACC, IPS and FEF were defined using publicly available atlases (see Fig. 4 for NAcc ROI). For each participant and each ROI, we extracted the average z-statistic from the Motivation Consistent > Motivation Inconsistent contrast. We took the average z-statistic as a measure of the extent to which a participant's BOLD response is higher on Motivation Consistent trials than on Motivation Inconsistent trials.

Reproducing the results from the whole-brain contrast, NAcc response was higher on Motivation Consistent trials than on Motivation Inconsistent trials ($t(29) = 2.10$, $p = 0.044$). To explore the relationship between the NAcc response and biased categorizations, we performed a median split on participants based on the magnitude of their motivational bias, and separately examined the NAcc response in High Bias participants and Low Bias participants. While there

was a significant NAcc response in High Bias participants ($t(14) = 2.86, p = 0.013$), the NAcc response in Low Bias participants was not different from zero ($t(14) = -0.17, p = 0.870$). NAcc response on Motivation Consistent trials was greater for High Bias participants than Low Bias participants ($t(28) = 2.46, p = 0.020$, Fig. 5A). Notably, this result was not observed in the other ROIs (Fig. S5).

We next examined this relationship at the single trial level. We used a mixed logistic regression model to predict whether participants would categorize an image as scene or a face, based on (1) the objective proportion of scene in an image, (2) the category participants were motivated to see, and (3) NAcc activity on that trial (Fig. 5B). For High Bias participants, we found a significant interaction between NAcc activity and the motivation consistent category ($b = 0.28$, SE $= 0.13$, $z = 2.07$, $p = 0.039$). Specifically, NAcc activity was more positively associated with categorizing an image as containing more scene when participants were motivated to see a scene, versus a face. The same interaction was not observed in Low Bias participants ($b = -0.11$, SE $= 0.13$, $z = 0.933$, $p = 0.351$). Similar results were also observed in the dACC, FEF and IPS (Fig. S5).

Taken together, both group-level and within-participant level results suggest that greater activity in the NAcc was associated with a stronger motivational bias in behavior.

**NAcc response is associated with response bias**

We next sought to relate NAcc activity to response and perceptual biases more specifically. For each participant, we computed response bias as the difference between the model estimates of the starting point when the participant was motivated to see a scene and when the participant was motivated to see a face ($z_{bias} = z_{scene} - z_{face}$, Fig. 3C). Similarly, we computed perceptual bias as the difference between the model estimates of the drift rate when the participant was motivated to see a scene and when the participant was motivated to see a face ($v_{bias} = v_{scene} - v_{face}$, Fig. 3E). A linear regression analysis indicated the NAcc response was associated with participants' response bias ($\beta = 0.48$, SE $= 0.17$, $t(27) = 2.88$, $p = 0.008$) but not their perceptual bias ($\beta = 0.09$, SE $= 0.17$, $t(27) = 0.54$, $p = 0.60$, Fig. 5C).

NAcc activity can lead to a response bias by increasing the readiness to make a particular response. This account would predict that the increase in NAcc activity was preparatory in nature and would precede the onset of the image. To test this prediction, we examined the average activity in the NAcc as a trial unfolded, separately for trials on which participants made motivation consistent categorizations (Motivation Consistent trials) and for trials on which participants made motivation inconsistent categorizations (Motivation Inconsistent trials).

For High Bias participants, the start of a trial (i.e. "Waiting for Teammate/Waiting for Opponent" screen) was associated with an increase in NAcc activity. NAcc activity remains elevated on Motivation Consistent trials, but not Motivation Inconsistent trials. In particular, a significant difference in the NAcc timecourses emerged *prior* to the image appearing on screen (Fig. 5D). For Low Bias participants, NAcc activity did not differ between Motivation Consistent and Motivation Inconsistent trials at any time-point (Fig. S6).

These results indicate that NAcc activation precedes image onset, and that sustained NAcc activation was associated with increased likelihood of making motivation consistent category judgments. They also provide evidence against the alternative account that NAcc activation reflects the reward participants experience upon seeing the category they were motivated to see. The NAcc activation preceded image onset, suggesting that, instead, NAcc activity *predisposes* participants to categorize an image as the category they were motivated to see.



**Figure 5. NAcc activity is associated with response bias A.** NAcc response to Motivation Consistent trials was higher in High Bias participants than Low Bias participants. **B.** Interaction between trial-by-trial NAcc activity and motivation-consistent category on participant's choice. Single dots denote individual choices made by participants. Colored lines indicate probability of making a scene categorization as predicted by a linear mixed effects model. For High Bias participants, NAcc activity was more positively associated with making a scene categorization when participants were motivated to see a scene (Blue line) than when participants were motivated to see a face (Red line). There was no relationship between NAcc activity and choice in Low Bias participants. **C.** Linear regression analysis predicting participants' NAcc response from the model estimates of their starting point bias ($z_{bias}$) and drift bias ($v_{bias}$). The regression coefficient for $z_{bias}$ was significant but that for $v_{bias}$ was not. **D.** NAcc timecourse of High Bias participants time-locked to image onset, corrected for hemodynamic lag by shifting the BOLD data by 4 seconds. The trial starts with the "Waiting for Teammate/Opponent" screen at -6s. The teammate or opponent makes a bet at -4s, which remains on the screen for 4s. The image is presented at 0s and stays on screen for 4s. NAcc activity was significantly different between Motivation Consistent trials and Motivation Inconsistent trials from 2s before image onset until image offset. Solid lines: Motivation Consistent trials. Dashed lines: Motivation Inconsistent trials. *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$.

**Face and scene selective neural activity is associated with perceptual bias**

Face and scene selective activity in the ventral occipito-temporal cortex provided a proxy measure of participants' perception. We thus examined whether motivation affected perception by assessing if the motivation to see faces or scenes modulated this activity. We applied multivariate pattern analysis to the BOLD data to quantify the level of face and scene selective activity on each trial. Specifically, we trained a logistic regression classifier to estimate the probability that participants were seeing a scene rather than a face based on the pattern of activity in the ventral occipito-temporal cortex (see Methods).

As the proportion of scene in an image increased, the classifier predicted that the participants were seeing a scene with higher probability, indicating that the classifier tracked the amount of scene in the presented image (b = 0.121, SE = 0.005, $t(4756) = 25.8, p = < 0.001$). There was a significant Bet x Condition interaction on classifier probability, such that the classifier was more likely to predict that participants were seeing a scene when they were motivated to see a scene than when they were motivated to see a face (b = 0.04, SE = 0.02, $t(4756) = 2.05, p = 0.040$; Fig. S7), indicating that the motivation to see a category increased the level of sensory evidence for that category in the visual pathway. In other words, motivation not only biased participants' categorization of an image, it also biased their neural representation of the image.

Next, we examined how the bias in category-selective activity relates to the bias in participants' categorical judgments. When we analyzed High and Low Bias participants separately, we found that motivation biased the classifier probability of High Bias participants (b = 0.07, SE = 0.03, $t(2378) = 2.96, p = 0.003$), but not Low Bias participants (b = -0.002, SE = 0.03, $t(2373) = -0.06, p = 0.953$; Fig. 6A). We then extracted the random slopes of the Bet x Condition interaction on classifier probability to obtain a measure of the extent to which motivation biased face and scene selective activity in each participant. The bias in participant's face and scene selective activity correlated strongly with their behavioral bias (r = 0.69, p < 0.001, Fig. 6B).

We then sought to relate the bias in face and scene selective activity to response and perceptual biases more specifically. A linear regression analysis indicated the bias in face and scene selective activity was associated with participants' perceptual bias ($\beta = 0.47$, SE = 0.16, $t(27) = 2.98, p = 0.006$), but not their response bias ($\beta = 0.25$, SE = 0.16, $t(27) = 1.58, p = 0.127$; Fig. 6C).

Together with our earlier analyses on NAcc activity, these results suggest distinct neural contributions to participants' biased categorizations. While the NAcc was associated with a response bias, the modulation of face and scene selective activity in visual areas was associated with a perceptual bias. By combining computational modeling with neuroimaging, we identified two dissociable neurocomputational components underlying motivational biases in perceptual judgments.

**Figure 6. Motivation biases face and scene selective neural activity during visual categorization. A.** Classifier probability that the presented image was a scene rather than a face based on the BOLD response in the ventral visual stream, separately for participants with high and low behavioral bias. Blue dots: teammate or opponent betting that the next image will be more scene; Red dots: teammate or opponent betting that the next image will be more face. For High Bias participants, scene probability was higher when participants were motivated to see a scene (i.e. teammate bets scene or opponent bets face) than when participants were motivated to see a face (i.e. teammate bets face or opponent bets scene). There was no effect of motivation in Low Bias participants. **B.** The effect of motivation on classifier probability (*Neural Bias*) was correlated with the extent to which a participant was biased in his or her categorizations (*Motivational Bias*). **C.** Regression coefficients of the response bias ($\beta_z$) and perceptual bias ($\beta_v$) when both were entered into the same model to predict participants' neural bias. Only the perceptual bias was significantly associated with participants' neural bias.

## Discussion

This study combines computational modeling of behavior and fMRI to examine whether and why people exhibit biases towards seeing what they want to see. In a novel behavioral paradigm, we demonstrated that people indeed make biased perceptual judgments, more often labeling ambiguous images as corresponding to a reward-associated category. This motivational bias was

maladaptive, in that participants who exhibited a stronger motivational bias earned less money in the experiment. Evidence from computational modeling suggests that the motivational bias could be attributed to both a response bias and a bias in perceptual processing. Each bias was associated with a distinct neural correlate. While the response bias was associated with anticipatory activity in the nucleus accumbens (NAcc), the bias in perceptual processing was associated with the modulation of category-selective neural activity in the ventral visual stream. These results provide evidence for two distinct contributions to motivational biases in perceptual judgments, and shed light on the neurocomputational mechanisms underlying each bias.

The claim that perceptual processes are influenced by motivational factors can be traced back to the "New Look" movement in psychology, which argued that the perception of external stimuli is subject to the constant influence of a perceiver's internal goals and states[25,26]. Recent evidence supporting this view includes studies demonstrating that perceptually ambiguous stimuli are more likely to be seen as the percept associated with favorable outcomes[4,27], desirable objects are judged nearer than undesirable ones[28], and desirable food items are judged as larger by dieters than non-dieters[29]. Whether these results reflect a bias in subjective reports or a bias in perception remains a topic of intense debate (see open peer commentary for [7]). In particular, since these studies rely primarily on subjective reports, and participants often have an incentive to report seeing what they want to see, there is reason to suspect that subjective reports might not reflect one's underlying perceptual experience.

Our work advances this debate in several ways. Unlike earlier work that assesses *whether* motivation biases perception, we provide a neurocomputational account of *how* motivation biases perception. In both our modeling and neural analyses, we identify and quantify independent contributions of participants' response and perceptual biases. We demonstrated that motivation biases perceptual judgments even when participants were incentivized to accurately report their perceptual experience. Instead of relying solely on participants' subjective reports, we also measured participants' neural representation of the presented stimulus. We quantified face and scene-selective activity in the ventral occipito-temporal cortex as a measure of participants' perceptual experience[18,20,21], and demonstrated that this activity was indeed biased by what participants were motivated to see.

Participants' response bias was associated with activity in the nucleus accumbens (NAcc). This is consistent with behavioral neuroscience work suggesting that dopaminergic projections to the NAcc biases animals towards responses associated with greater reward[12,14]. Both human neuroimaging and animal physiology studies have also shown that the NAcc is activated in anticipation of reward[11,13]. Our results suggest a functional role for this anticipatory activity. In particular, they suggest that the NAcc increases participants' readiness to respond in a motivation consistent manner. When the motivation consistent response is aligned with task demands (e.g., pressing a lever for reward), this preparatory response facilitates faster responding for reward[30]. However, when the motivation consistent response conflicts with task demands, as was the case in our task, the preparatory response is maladaptive and impairs performance on the task (see also [31]).

On the other hand, participants' perceptual bias was associated with activity in areas involved in the neural representation of faces and scenes[20]. Perceptual judgments are thought to be computed by comparing the activity of neurons selective to different perceptual features[17,18]. Within this framework, the nervous system "reads out" the activity of face-selective and scene-selective neurons as sensory evidence for faces and scenes respectively. A perceptual judgment can then be determined by comparing the activity of face-selective and scene-selective neurons. Our results indicate that motivation can bias this comparison by enhancing the activity of the neurons selective to the category participants were motivated to see. This enhancement could in turn reflect the biased processing of incoming sensory information, with the biasing signal originating from frontoparietal attention regions[32].

Indeed, we found that the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and frontal eye fields (FEF) were more active when participants made motivationally consistent judgments. The IPS and FEF are part of the dorsal attention network associated with the top-down control of attention[33,34]. Their involvement in our task suggest that the bias in perceptual processing might be in part mediated by dynamic changes in the focus of attention[35]. In addition to the frontoparietal activations, the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and insula were also more active on Motivation Consistent trials. The dACC and insula are part of a salience network involved in the detection of motivationally salient stimuli[36,37]. In particular, the dACC has been recently implicated in determining what stimulus feature to attend to in a perceptual decision-making task[38]. The increased activity in the salience network on Motivation Consistent trials might be responsible for the selection of motivationally relevant features for enhanced processing. However, this interpretation is speculative, and future studies will be needed to clarify the role of each region in biasing perceptual judgments.

At a broader level, this work provides a novel bridge between social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Using tools and analytical techniques from cognitive neuroscience, we examine the neurocomputational mechanisms underlying an age-old phenomenon of interest in social psychology. In doing so, we offer a fresh perspective on a classic debate. Our results also add to the rich literature on perceptual decision-making in cognitive neuroscience, in particular by dissociating motivation from optimal task performance. Previous studies have examined the effects of asymmetric rewards on perceptual decision-making[39–42]. In these studies, correctly categorizing a stimulus as one category was associated with a larger reward. As the reward was contingent on participants' responses, biasing responses towards the category associated with larger reward would result in greater cumulative reward over the course of the experiment. These studies generally find that participants exhibit a response bias towards the category associated with larger reward, which has been interpreted as an optimal shift in choice strategy to maximize reward on the task[39,43].

By contrast, in our task, the additional reward associated with the motivationally consistent category was independent of participants' responses. For example, if the teammate bet that the next image would have more face, participants would receive the bonus if the upcoming image indeed had more face, regardless of how they responded on the trial. In this case, a bias

towards the motivationally consistent category would lower participants' earnings by hurting their accuracy on the categorization task. Thus, the biases observed in our task cannot be explained by existing normative models of judgment and decision-making that assume organisms adjust their choice strategies to maximize expected reward. Instead, they highlight a motivational component to perceptual judgments – wanting an outcome to be true can impinge on one's perceptual judgment, even when doing so could lead to lower rewards in the long run. Our results suggest that this bias reflects not only a response bias, but also a perceptual bias.

Desires and wants exert a powerful influence over how people make sense of the world. Recent studies have examined the neural mechanisms underlying motivational biases across a variety of human reasoning and evaluative processes[44], including how the brain learns more from positive outcomes than negative ones[45], forms overly positive evaluations about the self[46], and generates unrealistically optimistic expectations about future events[47]. Here, we demonstrate that motivation biases human cognition as early as visual perception, and provide a neurocomputational account of this effect. The current work extends our understanding of motivational biases and provides a starting point to explore how motivation acts on different neural systems at different stages of information processing to influence human cognition.


**Methods**

**Participants.** Thirty-three participants were recruited from the Stanford community, and provided written, informed consent prior to the start of the study. All experimental procedures were approved by the Stanford Institutional Review Board. Participants were paid between $30-$50 depending on their performance on the task. Data from three participants were discarded because of excessive head motion (> 3mm) during one or more scanning sessions, yielding an effective sample size of thirty participants (17 male, 13 female, ages 18-43, mean age = 22.3).


**Stimuli.** For each participant, seven sets (one for the practice task and six for the experimental task) of composite stimuli were created. Each stimulus set consists of 40 grey-scale images, each comprising a mixture of a face image and a scene image in varying proportions (1 x 100% scene, 3 x 65% scene, 5 x 60% scene, 7 x 55% scene, 8 x 50% scene, 7 x 45% scene, 5 x 40% scene, 3 x 35% scene, 1 x 0% scene). Scene images comprised of half indoor scenes and half outdoor scenes, while face images comprised of half male faces and half female faces. All faces were frontal photographs posing a neutral expression, and were taken from the Chicago Face Database[48]. Stimuli were presented using MATLAB software (MathWorks) and the Psychophysics Toolbox[49].


**Practice Task.** Participants first performed 40 practice trials in which they were presented with composite Face/Scene images (see *Stimuli*). Each image was presented for four seconds, during which participants had to judge whether the image contained a greater proportion of face ("more face") or a greater proportion of scene ("more scene"). Participants earned 10 cents for each correct categorization. They then indicated how confident they were in their classification on a 1

to 5 scale. If they did not respond within four seconds, the trial timed out and they would not earn a bonus on that trial. After a variable inter-trial interval (ITI, 2s-4s), they moved on to the next trial. We collected participants' anatomical scans while they performed the practice task.

**Experimental Task.** The experimental task consists of four fMRI runs, each approximately 8 minutes long. Participants performed two runs of the Cooperation condition and two runs of the Competition condition (interleaved order, counterbalanced across participants, Fig. 1A). Each run consisted of 40 trials. In the Cooperation condition, participants were told that they would perform a visual categorization task with a teammate. At the start of each trial, their teammate would make a bet on the image type of the upcoming image ("more face" or "more scene", presented for 4 seconds). Participants were then presented with a composite image created by averaging a face image and a scene image in different proportions (see *Stimuli*). If the teammate's bet was correct, both the teammate and participants would earn 40 cents. If the teammate's bet was wrong, both the teammate and participants would lose 40 cents.

Participants then had four seconds to make a categorization on whether the image contained "more face" or "more scene" (see also *Practice Task*). Participants earned 10 cents for each correct categorization. They then indicated how confident they were in their classification on a 1 to 5 scale. If they did not respond within four seconds, the trial timed out and they would not earn a bonus on that trial (though the bet would still be implemented). After a variable ITI (2s-4s), they moved on to the next trial. In the Competition condition, participants performed the task with an opponent. The trial structure was identical to the Cooperation condition, except that if the opponent's bet was correct, the opponent would earn 40 cents while participants lose 40 cents. If the opponent's bet was wrong, the opponent loses 40 cents while participants earn 40 cents. As such, participants were motivated to see the image type their teammate bet on, and to see the image type opposite of what their opponent bet on.

Crucially, the outcome of the bets was contingent on whether the image objectively contained more face or more scene, and was not contingent on participants' subjective categorization. Hence, the reward maximizing strategy was to ignore the bets and categorize the images as accurately as possible (Fig. 1B). Bets by both the teammate and the opponent were pseudo-randomized such that they were accurate on exactly 50% of the trials. As such, participants' earnings in the experiment depended solely on their performance on the categorization task. We computed participants' performance as the average number of correct categorizations.

**Localizer Task**. To identify BOLD activation associated with viewing faces or scenes, we had participants perform a localizer task at the end of the experiment. Participants viewed 5 blocks of 15 Faces and 5 blocks of 15 Scenes (blocks were interleaved, and order was counterbalanced across participants). In Face blocks, participants were sequentially presented with face images, and had to indicate whether each face was male or female. In Scene blocks, participants were sequentially presented with scene images, and had to indicate whether each scene was indoors or

outdoors. Each image was presented for 2 seconds, with a 2-second ITI. Participants took a self-timed break between blocks. The localizer task was split into 2 scans.

**fMRI data acquisition and preprocessing.** MRI data were collected using a 3T General Electric MRI scanner. Functional images were acquired in interleaved order using a T2*-weighted echo planar imaging (EPI) pulse sequence (46 transverse slices, TR=2s, TE=25ms, flip angle=77°, voxel size 2.9 mm$^3$). Anatomical images were acquired at the start of the session with a T1-weighted pulse sequence (TR = 7.2ms, TE = 2.8ms, flip angle=12°, voxel size 1 mm$^3$). Image volumes were preprocessed using FSL/FEAT v.5.98 (FMRIB software library, FMRIB, Oxford, UK). Preprocessing included motion correction, slice-timing correction and removal of low-frequency drifts using a temporal high-pass filter (100ms cutoff). For multivoxel classification analyses, we trained and tested our classifier in each participant's native space. For all other analyses, functional volumes were first registered to participants' anatomical image (Boundary-Based Registration) and then to a template brain in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space (affine transformation with 12 degrees of freedom).

**Psychometric functions.** We modeled participants' behavioral data using generalized linear mixed effects models (GLMM), which allows for the modeling of all of the data in one step rather than fitting a separate model for each participant[50]. The models included random intercepts and random slopes for the effects of Condition (Cooperation/Competition), Bet (Scene/Face) and Condition x Bet interaction to account for the random variability across participants. Models were estimated using the glmer function in the lme4 package in R[51], with p-values computed from t-tests with Satterthwaite approximation for the degrees of freedom as implemented in the lmerTest package[52]. The estimates of the random slope of the interaction term reflected the extent to which each participant's categorizations were biased by the motivation manipulation. We performed a median split on the magnitude of the random slopes to divide participants into those with a high motivational bias and those with a low motivational bias.

**Robust Regression Analysis.** To examine the relationship between motivational bias and task performance, we fit a linear model by robust regression. Model fitting was performed using the rlm function from the "MASS" package in R. Robust regression is an alternative to linear regression that is less sensitive to outliers[53]. Statistical significance of the regression coefficient was assessed by performing a robust F test.

**Drift Diffusion Model.** The drift diffusion model assumes that decisions are made by accumulating evidence over time until it crosses one of two decision bounds[9] (Fig. 3A). The starting point and rate of evidence accumulation were determined by free parameters $z$ and $v$ respectively. As $v$ depends on the amount of sensory evidence, we assumed a different $v$ for each level of percentage scene. This value was then averaged across the different levels of percentage scene, weighted by the proportion of trials at each percentage scene, to compute an overall $v$. The

distance between the two boundaries depended on free parameter $a$, while time not related to decision process (e.g., stimulus encoding, motor response) was modeled by the free parameter $t$.

Model parameters were estimated from participants' categorizations and RT distributions using hierarchical Bayesian estimation as implemented by the HDDM toolbox[22]. Parameters for individual participants were assumed to be randomly drawn from a group-level distribution. In the fitting procedure, each participant's parameters both contributed to and were constrained by the estimates of group-level parameters. Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling methods were used to estimate the joint posterior distribution of all model parameters (100,000 samples; burn-in = 10,000 samples; thinning = 2). We estimated both group-level parameters as well as parameters for each individual participants, which allowed us to examine biases in both the entire sample and in each individual participant. To account for outliers generated by a process other than that assumed by the model (e.g., lapses in attention, accidental button press), we estimated a mixture model where 5% of trials were assumed to be distributed according to a uniform distribution.

In the $z$ & $v$ model, we fitted separate values for $z$ and $v$ depending on the category participants were motivated to see. The bias in starting point, or $z$ bias, was computed as the difference in $z$ when participants were motivated to see scene and when they were motivated to see face. The bias in drift rate, or $v$ bias, was computed as the difference in $v$ when participants were motivated to see scene and when they were motivated to see face. Bayesian hypothesis testing was used to assess if the estimate of $z$ bias and $v$ bias were credibly different from zero. For each parameter, we assessed if more than 95% of the probability mass of the group mean posterior was greater than 0 (Fig. 3C and E). To examine if either of the biases were sufficient for explaining the data, we fit two additional comparison models in which only $z$ ($z$ model) or only $v$ ($v$ model) varied by motivation. We then compared the three models using deviance information criterion (DIC), which is a measure of model performance that appropriately penalizes for model complexity in hierarchical models[23].

**GLM.** We implemented a linear model (GLM 1) to contrast BOLD activity on Motivation Consistent trials and that on Motivation Inconsistent trials. A Motivation Consistent trial was defined as a trial on which participant categorized an image as the category they were motivated to see. This contrast would thus identify voxels in the brain which were significantly more active when participants reported seeing what they wanted to see, versus what they did not want to see. Stimulus onset, reaction time and head movement parameters were included as nuisance regressors. With the exception of head movement parameters, all regressors were convolved with a hemodynamic response function. The GLM was estimated throughout the whole brain using FSL/FEAT v.5.98 available as part of the FMRIB software library (FMRIB). Correction for multiple comparisons was performed using threshold free cluster enhancement (TFCE) with an alpha of 0.05, as implemented by the *randomise* tool in FSL[52].

We implemented a second linear model (GLM 2) in which the onset of each trial was modeled as a separate regressor. This model allowed us estimate a separate statistical map for

each trial (i.e. single trial activation patterns). We then used these maps for the trial-by-trial ROI analyses, and as inputs to the multivoxel pattern analyses (see below). As was the case in GLM 1, reaction time and head movement parameters were included as nuisance regressors.

**Region of interest analyses.** We defined independent regions of interest (ROI) from publicly available atlases. The nucleus accumbens and insula ROIs were defined using the Harvard-Oxford subcortical structural atlas, while the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), frontal-eye-fields (FEF) and intraparietal sulcus (IPS) were taken from an atlas defined using resting-state connectivity[54]. All ROIs can be downloaded from the following NeuroVault collection: https://neurovault.org/collections/EAAXGDRJ/.

For each ROI, we extracted the average z-statistic of the Motivation Consistent > Motivation Inconsistent contrast (GLM 1). This average z-statistic reflects the extent to which an ROI is more reliably active on Motivation Consistent trials than on Motivation Inconsistent trials. To examine if the ROI response to Motivation Consistent trials depended on participants' behavioral bias, we computed the average z-statistic separately for participants who exhibited high behavioral bias (i.e. above median) and for participants who exhibited a low behavioral bias (i.e. below median). We then assessed if the two means were significantly different from each other using a two-sample t-test (two-tailed).

To examine the trial-by-trial relationship between ROI activity and participants' categorizations, we extracted the mean z-statistic from the single trial activation maps (GLM2) for each ROI. We then fit a generalized linear mixed effects model to predict participants' categorizations from mean ROI z-statistic, the motivation consistent category and the percentage scene in the image on each trial. The model included random intercepts and random slopes for each of the predictor variables to account for the random variability across participants, and was fitted separately for High Bias and Low Bias participants.

**Timecourse analyses.** For each participant, we extracted and z-scored the mean timecourse in the NAcc ROI from each run. Each timecourse was shifted by 2 TRs (4 seconds) to correct for hemodynamic lag. We extracted the data from 8 seconds before stimulus onset to 8 seconds after stimulus onset to obtain the timecourse of a single trial, and computed the average timecourse of activity separately for Motivation Consistent trials and Motivation Inconsistent trials. At each time point, we assessed if activity was different between motivation consistent trials and motivation inconsistent trials using a two-tailed paired sample t-test. This analysis was done separately for High Bias and Low Bias participants.

**Multivoxel pattern analyses.** Multivoxel pattern analyses were performed using tools available as part of the *nilearn* Python module[55]. An L1-regularized logistic regression model (C = 1) was trained on BOLD data from the localizer task to classify the image category participants were seeing on each localizer trial. Analysis was restricted to voxels in a ventral visual stream mask consisting of the bilateral occipital lobe and ventral temporal cortex. The ventral occipito-

temporal regions of the brain are thought to be important in perceiving object categories such as faces and scenes[20]. The mask was created in MNI space using anatomical masks defined by the Harvard-Oxford Cortical Structural Atlas. The mask was then transformed into each participant's native space using FSL's FLIRT implementation, and classification was performed in participants' native space.

The trained model was then applied to the single trial activation patterns in the experimental task (GLM 2). On each trial, the classifier returned the probability that the participant was seeing a scene rather than a face based on activity in the ventral visual stream mask. We then modeled classifier probability on each trial using a linear mixed effects model with the percentage scene of an image, the task Condition (Cooperation/Competition), the teammate or opponent's Bet (Face/Scene) and the interaction between Condition and Bet as predictor variables. The models included random intercepts and random slopes for each of the predictor variables to account for the random variability across participants. The estimate of the random slope of the interaction term of a participant reflected the extent to which classifier probability was biased by the motivation manipulation for that particular participant. This estimate was taken as a measure of *neural bias*, that is, the extent to which category-selective activity in the ventral visual stream for that particular participant was modulated by motivation.

**Relating model parameters to behavior and neural measures.** We used linear regression to examine the relationship between model parameters and neural activity. We entered participant-level estimates of the starting point bias ($z$ bias) and the drift bias ($v$ bias) as predictor variables in regression models. The first model was used to predict participants' NAcc response to the Motivation Consistent – Motivation Inconsistent contrast (GLM 1), and assessed the extent to which each bias was associated with NAcc activity. The second model was used to predict participants' neural bias, and assessed the extent to which each bias contributed to the modulation of category-selective activity in the ventral visual stream.

**Data and code availability.** Behavioral data of both the reported experiment as well as the in-lab replication are available at: https://github.com/ycleong/MotivatedPerception. Custom code for modeling and neuroimaging analyses are available at the same repository. Unthresholded p-map of the Motivation Consistent – Motivation Inconsistent contrast is available at: https://neurovault.org/collections/EAAXGDRJ/images/62743/. Raw neuroimaging data available on request.

**Author contributions**

Y.C.L., B.L.H., and J.Z. designed the study; Y.C.L. and Y.W. collected and analyzed the data; Y.C.L. and J.Z. wrote the manuscript, with revisions from Y.W. and B.L.H.

**References**

1. Bruner, J. S. & Goodman, C. C. Value and need as organizing factors in perception. *J. Abnorm. Soc. Psychol.* **42,** 33–44 (1947).
2. Dunning, D. & Balcetis, E. Wishful Seeing: How Preferences Shape Visual Perception. *Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci.* **22,** 33–37 (2013).
3. Hastorf, A. H. & Cantril, H. They saw a game; a case study. *J. Abnorm. Soc. Psychol.* **49,** 129–134 (1954).
4. Balcetis, E. & Dunning, D. See what you want to see: Motivational influences on visual perception. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **91,** 612–625 (2006).
5. Kunda, Z. The case for motivated reasoning. *Psychol. Bull.* **108,** 480–498 (1990).
6. Blanchette, I. & Richards, A. The influence of affect on higher level cognition: A review of research on interpretation, judgement, decision making and reasoning. *Cogn. Emot.* **24,** 561–595 (2010).
7. Firestone, C. & Scholl, B. J. Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for 'top-down' effects. *Behav. Brain Sci. N. Y.* **39,** (2016).
8. Forstmann, B. U., Ratcliff, R. & Wagenmakers, E.-J. Sequential Sampling Models in Cognitive Neuroscience: Advantages, Applications, and Extensions. *Annu. Rev. Psychol.* **67,** 641–666 (2016).
9. Ratcliff, R. & McKoon, G. The Diffusion Decision Model: Theory and Data for Two-Choice Decision Tasks. *Neural Comput.* **20,** 873–922 (2008).
10. Berridge, K. C. The debate over dopamine's role in reward: the case for incentive salience. *Psychopharmacology (Berl.)* **191,** 391–431 (2007).
11. Knutson, B., Adams, C. M., Fong, G. W. & Hommer, D. Anticipation of Increasing Monetary Reward Selectively Recruits Nucleus Accumbens. *J. Neurosci.* **21,** RC159–RC159 (2001).
12. Floresco, S. B. The Nucleus Accumbens: An Interface Between Cognition, Emotion, and Action. *Annu. Rev. Psychol.* **66,** 25–52 (2015).
13. Ikemoto, S. & Panksepp, J. The role of nucleus accumbens dopamine in motivated behavior: a unifying interpretation with special reference to reward-seeking. *Brain Res. Rev.* **31,** 6–41 (1999).
14. Nicola, S. M. The nucleus accumbens as part of a basal ganglia action selection circuit. *Psychopharmacology (Berl.)* **191,** 521–550 (2007).
15. Gold, J. I. & Shadlen, M. N. The Neural Basis of Decision Making. *Annu. Rev. Neurosci.* **30,** 535–574 (2007).
16. Heekeren, H. R., Marrett, S. & Ungerleider, L. G. The neural systems that mediate human perceptual decision making. *Nat. Rev. Neurosci.* **9,** 467–479 (2008).

17. Shadlen, M. N., Britten, K. H., Newsome, W. T. & Movshon, J. A. A computational analysis of the relationship between neuronal and behavioral responses to visual motion. *J. Neurosci.* **16,** 1486–1510 (1996).

18. Heekeren, H. R., Marrett, S., Bandettini, P. A. & Ungerleider, L. G. A general mechanism for perceptual decision-making in the human brain. *Nature* **431,** 859 (2004).

19. Summerfield, C. & Egner, T. Expectation (and attention) in visual cognition. *Trends Cogn. Sci.* **13,** 403–409 (2009).

20. Grill-Spector, K. The neural basis of object perception. *Curr. Opin. Neurobiol.* **13,** 159–166 (2003).

21. Hasson, U., Hendler, T., Bashat, D. B. & Malach, R. Vase or Face? A Neural Correlate of Shape-Selective Grouping Processes in the Human Brain. *J. Cogn. Neurosci.* **13,** 744–753 (2001).

22. Wiecki, T. V., Sofer, I. & Frank, M. J. HDDM: Hierarchical Bayesian estimation of the Drift-Diffusion Model in Python. *Front. Neuroinformatics* **7,** (2013).

23. Spiegelhalter, D. J., Best, N. G., Carlin, B. P. & Van Der Linde, A. Bayesian measures of model complexity and fit. *J. R. Stat. Soc. Ser. B Stat. Methodol.* **64,** 583–639 (2002).

24. Smith, S. M. & Nichols, T. E. Threshold-free cluster enhancement: Addressing problems of smoothing, threshold dependence and localisation in cluster inference. *NeuroImage* **44,** 83–98 (2009).

25. Allport, F. H. *Theories of perception and the concept of structure: A review and critical analysis with an introduction to a dynamic-structural theory of behavior.* (John Wiley & Sons Inc, 1955). doi:10.1037/11116-000

26. Bruner, J. S. On perceptual readiness. *Psychol. Rev.* **64,** 123–152 (1957).

27. Balcetis, E., Dunning, D. & Granot, Y. Subjective value determines initial dominance in binocular rivalry. *J. Exp. Soc. Psychol.* **48,** 122–129 (2012).

28. Balcetis, E. & Dunning, D. Wishful Seeing: More Desired Objects Are Seen as Closer. *Psychol. Sci.* **21,** 147–152 (2010).

29. van Koningsbruggen, G. M., Stroebe, W. & Aarts, H. Through the eyes of dieters: Biased size perception of food following tempting food primes. *J. Exp. Soc. Psychol.* **47,** 293–299 (2011).

30. Niv, Y., Daw, N. D., Joel, D. & Dayan, P. Tonic dopamine: opportunity costs and the control of response vigor. *Psychopharmacology (Berl.)* **191,** 507–520 (2007).

31. Krebs, R. M., Boehler, C. N., Egner, T. & Woldorff, M. G. The Neural Underpinnings of How Reward Associations Can Both Guide and Misguide Attention. *J. Neurosci.* **31,** 9752–9759 (2011).

32. Serences, J. T. Value-Based Modulations in Human Visual Cortex. *Neuron* **60,** 1169–1181 (2008).

33. Corbetta, M. & Shulman, G. L. Control of goal-directed and stimulus-driven attention in the brain. *Nat. Rev. Neurosci.* **3,** 201 (2002).

34. Petersen, S. E. & Posner, M. I. The Attention System of the Human Brain: 20 Years After. *Annu. Rev. Neurosci.* **35,** 73–89 (2012).

35. Leong, Y. C., Radulescu, A., Daniel, R., DeWoskin, V. & Niv, Y. Dynamic Interaction between Reinforcement Learning and Attention in Multidimensional Environments. *Neuron* **93,** 451–463 (2017).

36. Menon, V. Salience Network. in *Brain Mapping* (ed. Toga, A. W.) 597–611 (Academic Press, 2015). doi:10.1016/B978-0-12-397025-1.00052-X

37. Sridharan, D., Levitin, D. J. & Menon, V. A critical role for the right fronto-insular cortex in switching between central-executive and default-mode networks. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.* **105,** 12569–12574 (2008).

38. Shenhav, A., Straccia, M. A., Musslick, S., Cohen, J. D. & Botvinick, M. M. Dissociable neural mechanisms track evidence accumulation for selection of attention versus action. *Nat. Commun.* **9,** 2485 (2018).

39. Feng, S., Holmes, P., Rorie, A. & Newsome, W. T. Can Monkeys Choose Optimally When Faced with Noisy Stimuli and Unequal Rewards? *PLOS Comput. Biol.* **5,** e1000284 (2009).

40. Mulder, M. J., Wagenmakers, E.-J., Ratcliff, R., Boekel, W. & Forstmann, B. U. Bias in the Brain: A Diffusion Model Analysis of Prior Probability and Potential Payoff. *J. Neurosci.* **32,** 2335–2343 (2012).

41. Rorie, A. E., Gao, J., McClelland, J. L. & Newsome, W. T. Integration of Sensory and Reward Information during Perceptual Decision-Making in Lateral Intraparietal Cortex (LIP) of the Macaque Monkey. *PLOS ONE* **5,** e9308 (2010).

42. Summerfield, C. & Koechlin, E. Economic Value Biases Uncertain Perceptual Choices in the Parietal and Prefrontal Cortices. *Front. Hum. Neurosci.* **4,** (2010).

43. Bogacz, R., Brown, E., Moehlis, J., Holmes, P. & Cohen, J. D. The physics of optimal decision making: A formal analysis of models of performance in two-alternative forced-choice tasks. *Psychol. Rev.* **113,** 700–765 (2006).

44. Hughes, B. L. & Zaki, J. The neuroscience of motivated cognition. *Trends Cogn. Sci.* **19,** 62–64 (2015).

45. Lefebvre, G., Lebreton, M., Meyniel, F., Bourgeois-Gironde, S. & Palminteri, S. Behavioural and neural characterization of optimistic reinforcement learning. *Nat. Hum. Behav.* **1,** 0067 (2017).

46. Hughes, B. L. & Beer, J. S. Medial orbitofrontal cortex is associated with shifting decision thresholds in self-serving cognition. *NeuroImage* **61,** 889–898 (2012).

47. Sharot, T., Korn, C. W. & Dolan, R. J. How unrealistic optimism is maintained in the face of reality. *Nat. Neurosci.* **14,** 1475–1479 (2011).

48. Ma, D. S., Correll, J. & Wittenbrink, B. The Chicago face database: A free stimulus set of faces and norming data. *Behav. Res. Methods* **47,** 1122–1135 (2015).

49. Brainard, D. H. The Psychophysics Toolbox. *Spat. Vis.* **10,** 433–436 (1997).

50. Knoblauch, K. & Maloney, L. T. *Modeling Psychophysical Data in R.* (Springer Science & Business Media, 2012).

51. Bates, D., Mächler, M., Bolker, B. & Walker, S. Fitting Linear Mixed-Effects Models Using lme4. *J. Stat. Softw. Artic.* **67,** 1–48 (2015).

52. Kuznetsova, A., Brockhoff, P. B. & Christensen, R. H. B. *lmerTest: Tests in Linear Mixed Effects Models.* (2016).

53. Venables, W. N. & Ripley, B. D. *Modern Applied Statistics with S.* (Springer Science & Business Media, 2003).

54. Shirer, W. R., Ryali, S., Rykhlevskaia, E., Menon, V. & Greicius, M. D. Decoding Subject-Driven Cognitive States with Whole-Brain Connectivity Patterns. *Cereb. Cortex* **22,** 158–165 (2012).

55. Abraham, A. *et al.* Machine learning for neuroimaging with scikit-learn. *Front. Neuroinformatics* **8,** (2014).