

Social learning strategies regulate the wisdom and madness of interactive crowds

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Abstract

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Why groups of individuals sometimes exhibit collective ‘wisdom’ and other times maladaptive ‘herding’ is an enduring conundrum. Here we show that this conflict is regulated by the social learning strategies deployed. We examined the patterns of human social learning through an interactive online experiment with 699 participants, varying both task uncertainty and group size, then used hierarchical Bayesian model-fitting to identify the individual learning strategies exhibited by participants. Challenging tasks elicit greater conformity amongst individuals, with rates of copying increasing with group size, leading to high probabilities of maladaptive herding amongst large groups confronted with uncertainty. Conversely, the reduced social learning of small groups, and the greater probability that social information would be accurate for less-challenging tasks, generated ‘wisdom of the crowd’ effects in other circumstances. Our model-based approach provides novel evidence that the likelihood of swarm intelligence versus herding can be predicted, resolving a longstanding puzzle in the literature.

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Keywords:

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swarm intelligence, herding, social learning, computational modelling, web-based experiment, hierarchical Bayesian approach

18 Understanding the mechanisms that account for accurate collective decision-making amongst
19 groups of animals has been a central focus of animal behaviour research (Bonabeau et al., 1999;
20 Camazine et al., 2001; Sumpter, 2010). There are a large number of biological examples showing
21 that collectives of poorly informed individuals can achieve a high performance in solving cog-
22 nitive problems under uncertainty (Krause et al., 2010). Examples of such ‘swarm intelligence’
23 – the emergent wisdom of interactive crowds – have been found in a broad range of biological
24 systems (Table 1). Although these findings suggest fundamental cognitive benefits of grouping
25 (Krause and Ruxton, 2002), there is also a long-standing recognition, especially for humans, that
26 interacting individuals may sometimes be overwhelmed by the ‘*extraordinary popular delusions*
27 *and madness of crowds*’ (Mackay, 1841). Herd behaviour (i.e. an alignment of thoughts or be-
28 haviours of individuals in a group) occurs because individuals imitate each others (Kameda and
29 Hastie, 2015; Le Bon, 1896; Raafat et al., 2009), and it is thought to be a cause of financial
30 bubbles (Chari and Kehoe, 2004; Mackay, 1841), ‘groupthink’ (Janis, 1972) and volatility in
31 cultural markets (Muchnik et al., 2013; Salganik et al., 2006). More generally, herding is known
32 to undermine the wisdom of crowds effect (Lorenz et al., 2011), whilst maladaptive aspects of
33 information transfer are well-recognised in the biological literature (e.g. Giraldeau et al., 2002).
34 It seems that information transmission among individuals, and making decisions collectively, is
35 a double-edged sword: combining decisions may provide the benefits of swarm intelligence, but
36 at the same time, increase the risk of maladaptive herding. Collectively, an understanding of
37 whether and, if so, how it is possible to prevent or reduce the risk of maladaptive herd behaviour,
38 while concurrently keeping or enhancing swarm intelligence, is largely lacking.

39 A balance between using individual and social information may play a key role in determining

Table 1

Examples of swarm intelligence in diverse biological systems

Taxonomic families	Examples and references
Slime moulds	Finding conditions favorable to spore survival and dispersal (Reid and Latty, 2016)
Social insects	Collective foraging (Seeley et al., 1991; Shaffer et al., 2013) and nest-site selection (Franks et al., 2003; Sasaki and Pratt, 2012; Sasaki et al., 2013; Seeley and Visscher, 2004)
Fish	Collective sensing (Berdahl et al., 2013; Sumpter et al., 2008), predator avoidance (Ward et al., 2011) and foraging decisions (Webster et al., 2017)
Birds	Collective foraging (Liker and Bokony, 2009; Morand-Ferron and Quinn, 2011) and homing decisions (Sasaki and Biro, 2017)
Non-human primates	Group coordination in where and when to move (King and Sueur, 2011)
Humans	Decision-making in an estimation task (Krause et al., 2011; Rosenberg and Pescetelli, 2017) and in a multi-armed bandit task (Toyokawa et al., 2014)

40 the trade-off between collective wisdom and maladaptive herding (List et al., 2009). If individu-
41 als are too reliant on copying others' behaviour, any ideas, even a maladaptive one, can propagate
42 in the social group (i.e. the 'informational cascade'; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Giraldeau et al.,
43 2002; Richerson and Boyd, 2005). On the other hand, however, if individuals completely ignore
44 social information so as to be independent, they will fail to exploit the benefits of aggregating
45 information through social interactions. The extent to which individuals should use social in-
46 formation should fall between these two extremes. Theoretical models predict that the balance
47 between independence and interdependence in collective decision-making may be changeable,
48 contingent upon the individual-level flexibility and inter-individual variability associated with
49 the social learning strategies deployed in diverse environmental states (e.g. Arbilly et al., 2011;
50 Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Feldman et al., 1996; Laland, 2004).

51 Animals (including humans) are reported to increase their use of social information as re-
52 turns from asocial learning become more unreliable (e.g. Kameda and Nakanishi, 2002; Kendal
53 et al., 2004; Morgan et al., 2012; Toyokawa et al., 2017; Webster and Laland, 2008, 2011). In
54 addition, individuals are predicted to be more likely to rely on social learning larger the number
55 of individuals that share information (Boyd and Richerson, 1989; Bond, 2005; Kline and Boyd,
56 2010; Morgan et al., 2012; Muthukrishna et al., 2014; Street et al., 2017). This selectivity in the
57 predicted use of social information may have a substantial impact on collective decision-making
58 because only a slight difference in the parameter values of social information use is known to
59 be able to alter qualitatively the collective behavioural dynamics (e.g. Bonabeau et al., 1999;
60 Camazine et al., 2001; Nicolis and Deneubourg, 1999; Pratt and Sumpter, 2006). Therefore, re-
61 searchers should expect populations to exhibit a higher risk of being trapped with maladaptive

62 behaviour with increasing group size and decreasing reliability of asocial learning (and concomi-
63 tant increased reliance on social learning).

64 From the viewpoint of the classic wisdom of crowds theory, increasing group size may in-
65 crease collective accuracy (List, 2004; King and Cowlshaw, 2007; Wolf et al., 2013; Becker
66 et al., 2017; Laan et al., 2017). The relative advantage of the collective over solitary individuals
67 may also be highlighted by increased task difficulty, because there would be more room in the
68 performance to be improved compared to easier tasks in which high accuracy can already be
69 achieved by asocial learning only (Cronin, 2016). To understand the potential conflict between
70 swarm intelligence and the risk of maladaptive herding requires fine-grained quantitative studies
71 of social learning strategies and their relations to collective dynamics, linked to sophisticated
72 computational analysis.

73 The aims of this study were twofold. First, we set to test the hypothesis that the circum-
74 stances under which collective decision making will generate ‘wisdom’ can be predicted with
75 knowledge of the precise learning strategies individuals deploy, through a combination of exper-
76 imentation and theoretical modelling. The choice of an abstract decision-making task allowed
77 us to implement a computational modelling approach, which has been increasingly deployed in
78 quantitative studies of animal social learning strategies (Ahn et al., 2014; Aplin et al., 2017; Bar-
79 rett et al., 2017; McElreath et al., 2005, 2008; Toyokawa et al., 2017). In particular, computational
80 modelling allowed us to conduct a parametric description of different information-gathering pro-
81 cesses and to estimate these parameter values at an individual-level resolution. This approach
82 allows us to characterize the complex relationship between individual-level decision, learning
83 strategies and collective-level behavioural dynamics. Second, we added resolution to our analy-

84 ses by manipulating both task uncertainty and group size in our experiments with adult human
85 subjects, predicting that these factors would induce heavier use of social information in humans,
86 and thereby alter the balance between swarm intelligence and the risk of maladaptive herding.
87 To do this, we focused on human groups exposed to a simple gambling task, where both aso-
88 cial and social sources of information were available. Through development of an interactive,
89 web-based collective decision-making task (i.e. multi-player multi-armed bandit), and use of
90 hierarchical Bayesian statistical methods in fitting our computational model to the experimen-
91 tal data, we identify the individual-level learning strategies of participants as well as quantify
92 variation in different learning parameters, allowing us to conduct an informed exploration of the
93 population-level outcomes. The results provide clear evidence that the conflict between swarm
94 intelligence and maladaptive herding can be predicted with knowledge of human social learning
95 strategies.

96 Below, we firstly described our experimental task and summarise the computational model.
97 Then, we deploy agent-based simulation to illustrate how the model parameters relating to social
98 learning can in principle affect the collective-level behavioural dynamics. The simulation pro-
99 vides us with precise, quantitative predictions on the complex relationship between individual
100 behaviour and group dynamics. Finally, we present the findings of a multi-player web-based ex-
101 periment with human participants that utilises the gambling task framework. Applying a hierar-
102 chical Bayesian statistical method, we estimated the model's parameters for each of 699 different
103 individuals, allowing us to (i) examine whether and, if so, how social information use is affected
104 by different group size and task uncertainty, and (ii) whether and how social-information use
105 affects the balance between swarm intelligence and maladaptive herding.

106 **Task overview:** To study the relationship between social information use and collective
107 behavioural dynamics, we focused on a well-established learning-and-decision problem called
108 a ‘multi-armed bandit’ task, represented here as repeated choices between three slot machines
109 (Figure S1, Video 1, for detail see Materials and methods). Individuals play the task for 70
110 rounds. The slots paid off money noisily, varying around two different means during the first 40
111 rounds such that there was one ‘good’ slot and two other options giving poorer average returns.
112 From the round 41st, however, one of the ‘poor’ slots abruptly increased its mean payoff to
113 become ‘excellent’ (i.e. superior to ‘good’). The purpose of this environmental change was
114 to observe the effects of maladaptive herding by potentially trapping groups in the out-of-date
115 suboptimal (good) slot, as individuals did not know whether or how an environmental change
116 would occur. Through making choices and earning a reward from each choice, individuals could
117 gradually learn which slot generated the highest rewards.

118 In addition to this asocial learning, we provided social information for each member of the
119 group specifying the frequency with which group members chose each slot. All group mem-
120 bers played the same task with the same conditions simultaneously, and all individuals had been
121 instructed that this was the case, and hence understood that the social information would be in-
122 formative.

123 Task uncertainty was experimentally manipulated by changing the difference between the
124 mean payoffs for the slot machines. In the task with the least uncertainty, the distribution of
125 payoffs barely overlapped, whilst in the task with the greatest uncertainty the distribution of
126 payoffs overlapped considerably (Figure S3).

127 **Overview of the computational learning-and-decision-making model:** We modelled in-

128 individual behavioural processes by assuming that individual i makes a choice for option m at
129 round t , in accordance with the choice-probability $P_{i,t}(m)$ that is a weighted average of social and
130 asocial influences:

$$P_{i,t}(m) = \sigma_{i,t} \times \text{Social influence}_{i,m,t} + (1 - \sigma_{i,t}) \times \text{Asocial influence}_{i,m,t}, \quad (1)$$

131 where $\sigma_{i,t}$ is the *social learning weight* ($0 \leq \sigma_{i,t} \leq 1$).

132 For the social influence, we assumed a frequency-dependent copying strategy by which an
133 individual copies others' behaviour in accordance with the distribution of social frequency infor-
134 mation (McElreath et al., 2005, 2008; Aplin et al., 2017; Barrett et al., 2017):

$$\text{Social influence}_{i,m,t} = \frac{\left(\text{frequency}_{m,t-1}\right)^{\theta_i}}{\sum_{k \in \text{options}} \left(\text{frequency}_{k,t-1}\right)^{\theta_i}}, \quad (2)$$

135 where $\text{frequency}_{m,t-1}$ is a number of choices made by other individuals for the option m in the
136 preceding round $t - 1$ ($t \geq 2$). The exponent θ_i is individual i 's *conformity exponent* ($-\infty \leq$
137 $\theta_i \leq +\infty$). When this exponent is larger than zero ($\theta_i > 0$), higher social influence is afforded to
138 an option chosen by more individuals (i.e. positive frequency bias), with conformity bias arising
139 when $\theta_i > 1$, such that disproportionately more social influence is given to the most common
140 option (Boyd and Richerson, 1985). When $\theta_i < 0$, on the other hand, higher social influence is
141 afforded to the option that fewest individuals chose in the preceding round $t - 1$ (i.e. negative
142 frequency bias). Note, there is no social influence when $\theta_i = 0$ because in this case the 'social
143 influence' favours an uniformly random choice, i.e., $\text{Social influence}_{i,m,t} = f_m^0 / (f_1^0 + f_2^0 + f_3^0) =$
144 $1/3$, independent of the social frequency distribution.

145 For the asocial influence, we used a standard ‘softmax’ choice rule well-established in the
146 reinforcement-learning literature (Sutton and Barto, 1998) and widely applied in human social
147 learning studies (e.g. McElreath et al., 2005, 2008; Toyokawa et al., 2017).

148 In summary, the model has two key social learning parameters, the *social learning weight* $\sigma_{i,t}$
149 and the *conformity exponent* θ_i , with $\sigma_{i,t}$ a time-dependent variable (i.e. individuals could modify
150 their reliance on social learning as the task proceeded). Varying these parameters systematically,
151 we conducted an individual-based simulation so as to establish quantitative predictions concern-
152 ing the relationship between social information use and collective behaviour. We then fitted this
153 model to our experimental data using a hierarchical Bayesian approach. This method allows
154 us to specify with precision how each individual subject learns (i.e. which learning strategy or
155 strategies they deploy), and thereby to describe the range and distribution of learning strategies
156 deployed across the sample, and to investigate their population-level consequences.

157 **1 Results**

158 **1.1 The relationship between social information use and the collective behaviour**

159 Figure 1 shows the relationship between the average decision accuracy and individual-level social
160 information use obtained from our individual-based model simulations. Figure 1a and 1c show
161 that individuals in larger groups perform better both before and after the environmental change
162 when the mean conformity exponent $\bar{\theta}$ is small (i.e. $\bar{\theta} = (\sum_i \theta_i)/individuals = 1$). In the
163 absence of conformity, even when the average social learning weight is very high (i.e. $\bar{\sigma} =$
164 $(\sum_i \sum_t \sigma_{i,t})/(individuals \times rounds) = 0.9$), larger groups are still able to recover the decision

165 accuracy after the location of the optimal option has been switched.

166 On the other hand, when the mean conformity exponent is large (i.e. $\bar{\theta} = 3$; strong confor-
167 mity bias), the group dynamics become less flexible, and become vulnerable to getting stuck on
168 a suboptimal option after environmental change. Here, the recovery of performance after envi-
169 ronmental change takes more time in larger compared to smaller groups (Figure 1b). When both
170 the conformity exponent $\bar{\theta}$ and the social learning weight $\bar{\sigma}$ are large (Figure 1d), performance
171 is no longer monotonically improving with increasing group size, and it is under these circum-
172 stances that the strong herding effect becomes prominent. Figure 2c and 2d indicate that when
173 both $\bar{\theta}$ and $\bar{\sigma}$ are large the collective choices converged either on the good option or on one of the
174 poor options almost randomly, regardless of the option's quality, and that once individuals start
175 converging on an option the population gets stuck. As a result, the distribution of the groups'
176 average performance over the replications becomes a bimodal 'U-shape'. Interestingly, however,
177 the maladaptive herding effect remains relatively weak in smaller groups (see Figure 2c; the black
178 histograms). This is because the majority of individuals in smaller groups (i.e. two individuals
179 out of three) are more likely to break the cultural inertia by simultaneously exploring for another
180 option than the majority in larger groups (e.g. six out of ten). As expected, herding does not
181 occur in the absence of conformity (Figure 2a, 2b).

182 In summary, the model simulation suggests an interaction between social learning weight $\bar{\sigma}$
183 and conformity exponent $\bar{\theta}$ on decision accuracy and the risk of maladaptive herding: When the
184 conformity exponent is not too large, swarm intelligence is prominent across a broad range of
185 the mean social learning weights (i.e. increasing group size can increase decision accuracy while
186 concurrently retaining decision flexibility). When the conformity bias becomes large, however,

187 the risk of maladaptive herding arises, and, when both social learning parameters are large, swarm

188 intelligence is rare and maladaptive herding dominates.




Figure 1: Findings of the individual-based model showing the effects of social information use on the average decision accuracy over replications. The x-axis gives the round and y-axis gives the proportion of individuals expected to choose the optimal slot (i.e. decision accuracy) averaged over all replications. The vertical dashed line indicates the timing of environmental (i.e. payoff) change (at $t = 41$). Different group sizes are shown by different styles (black (dotted): $n = 3$, orange (dashed): $n = 10$, red (solid): $n = 30$). We set the average slopes for the *social learning weight* to be equal to zero for the sake of simplicity; namely, $\mu_\delta = 0$. Other free parameter values (i.e. μ_α , $\mu_{\beta_0^*}$, μ_ϵ , v_α , $v_{\beta_0^*}$, v_ϵ , v_σ , v_δ and v_θ) are best approximates to the experimental fitted values (see Table 2 and Table S1).




Figure 2: Results from the individual-based model simulations showing the distribution of each group's mean accuracy before environmental change. The x-axis gives the mean decision accuracy over the first 40 rounds (i.e. the environment 1) for each replication. Different group sizes are shown by different styles (black (dotted): $n = 3$, orange (dashed): $n = 10$, red (solid): $n = 30$). Again, $\mu_\delta = 0$, and other free parameter values (i.e. μ_α , $\mu_{\beta_0^*}$, μ_ϵ , ν_α , $\nu_{\beta_0^*}$, ν_ϵ , ν_σ , ν_δ and ν_θ), we approximated using experimental data (see Table 2 and Table S1).

189 **1.2 Estimation of human social information use**

190 Table 2 reveals how the *social learning weight* $\sigma_{i,t}$ and *conformity exponent* θ_i were influenced
191 by task uncertainty in our behavioral experiment. It gives posterior estimation values for each of
192 the global means of the learning model parameters, obtained by the hierarchical Bayesian model
193 fitting method applied to the experimental data (see the Materials and methods). The fitted global
194 variance parameters (i.e. v) are shown in the Supporting Table S1.

Table 2

The mean and the 95% Bayesian credible intervals of the posterior global means for the parameter values. The number of participants (N) for each experimental condition are also shown.

Parameters	Group condition						Solitary condition			
	Uncertainty			Uncertainty			Uncertainty			
	Low	Moderate	High	Low	Moderate	High	Low	Moderate	High	
μ_{α^*} (learning rate)	0.99 [0.34, 1.73]	0.90 [0.43, 1.44]	0.61 [0.21, 1.03]	0.85 [-0.07, 1.95]	-0.17 [-1.27, 0.89]	0.46 [-0.39, 1.36]				
$\mu_{\beta_0^*}$ (inv. temp.)	1.84 [1.15, 2.70]	1.68 [1.25, 2.18]	1.38 [1.16, 1.62]	1.10 [0.69, 1.54]	1.44 [0.80, 2.07]	0.85 [0.46, 1.22]				
μ_{ϵ} (inv. temp.)	3.70 [1.98, 5.71]	3.01 [1.88, 4.27]	2.97 [2.37, 3.60]	2.39 [1.46, 3.53]	2.81 [1.64, 4.07]	2.27 [1.40, 3.31]				
$\mu_{\sigma_0^*}$ (soc. wight)	-1.55 [-2.71, -0.71]	-2.37 [-4.12, -1.01]	-2.16 [-2.81, -1.63]	-	-	-				
μ_{δ} (soc. wight)	-1.39 [-2.66, -0.03]	-1.55 [-4.29, 0.91]	-1.87 [-3.04, -0.81]	-	-	-				
μ_{θ} (conformity coeff.)	1.65 [0.83, 2.82]	3.00 [1.57, 4.85]	2.67 [1.80, 3.73]	-	-	-				
N	77	98	398	36	34	56				

195 We were able to categorize the participants as deploying three different learning strategies
196 based on their fitted conformity exponent values; namely, the ‘positive frequency-dependent
197 copying’ strategy ($\theta_i \gg 0$), the ‘negative-frequency dependent copying’ strategy ($\theta_i \ll 0$) and
198 the ‘random choice’ strategy ($\theta_i \approx 0$). Note that we could not reliably detect the ‘weak positive’
199 frequency-dependent strategy ($0 < \theta_i \leq 1$) due to the limitation of statistical power (Figure S10
200 and S17). Some individuals whose ‘true’ conformity exponent fell between zero and one would
201 have been categorised as exhibiting a random choice strategy (Figure S10). Individuals identi-
202 fied as exhibiting a positive frequency-dependent copiers were mainly those whose conformity
203 exponent was larger than one ($\theta_i > 1$).

204 Figure 3a-c show the estimated frequencies of different learning strategies. Generally speak-
205 ing, participants were more likely to utilize a positive frequency-dependent copying strategy
206 than the other two strategies (the 95% Bayesian CI of the intercept of the GLMM predicting the
207 probability to use the positive frequency-dependent copying strategy is above zero, [1.05, 2.50];
208 Table S2). We found that positive frequency-dependent copying decreased with increasing task
209 uncertainty (the 95% Bayesian CI of task uncertainty effect is below zero, [-1.88, -0.25]; Table
210 S2). We found no clear effects of either the group size, age or gender on adoption of the positive
211 frequency-dependent copying strategy, except for the negative interaction effect between age and
212 task uncertainty (the 95% Bayesian CI of the age \times uncertainty interaction = [-1.46, -0.15]; Table
213 S2).

214 We also investigated the effects of group size and task uncertainty on the fitted individual
215 parameter values. We found that the individual mean *social learning weight* parameter (i.e.
216 $\bar{\sigma}_i = (\sum_t \sigma_{i,t})/70$) increased with group size (the 95% Bayesian CI = [0.15, 0.93]; Figure 3d-f;

217 Table S3), and decreased with uncertainty (the 95% Bayesian CI = [-0.98, -0.22]), and age of
218 subject (the 95% Bayesian CI = [-0.36, -0.02]). However, the negative effects of task uncertainty
219 and age disappeared when we focused only on $\bar{\sigma}_i$ of the positive frequency-dependent copying
220 individuals, and only the positive effect of the group size was confirmed (Table S4; Figure S16).
221 It is worth noting that the meaning of the social learning weight is different between these three
222 different strategies: The social learning weight regulates positive reactions to the majorities' be-
223 haviour for positive frequency-dependent copiers, whereas it regulates avoidance of the majority
224 for negative-frequency dependent copiers, and determines the probability of random decision-
225 making for the random choice strategists.

226 The individual *conformity exponent* parameter θ_i increased with task uncertainty (the 95%
227 Bayesian CI = [0.38, 1.41]), but we found no significant effects of group size, age, gender or
228 interactions (Figure 3g-i; Table S5). These results were qualitatively unchanged when we focused
229 only on the positive frequency-dependent copying individuals (Table S6; Figure S16).

230 We observed extensive individual variation in social information use. The greater the task's
231 uncertainty, the larger were individual variances in both the mean social learning weight and the
232 conformity exponent (the 95% Bayesian CI of the GLMM's variation parameter for $\bar{\sigma}_i$ was [1.11,
233 1.62] (Table S3) and for θ_i was [1.07, 1.54] (Table S5)). This was confirmed when focusing only
234 on the positive frequency-dependent copying individuals: The Bayesian 95% CIs were [1.14,
235 1.80] (Table S4) and [0.71, 1.10] (Table S6), respectively.

236 The manner in which individual variation in social-information use of positive frequency-
237 dependent copying individuals changes over time is visualised in Figure 4a-c. The social learn-
238 ing weights generally decreased with experimental round. However, some individuals in the

239 Moderate- and the High-uncertain conditions accelerated rather than decreased their reliance on
240 social learning over time. Interestingly, those accelerating individuals tended to have a larger
241 conformity exponent (Figure S18). In addition, the time-dependent $\theta_{i,t}$ in our alternative model
242 generally increased with experimental round in the Moderate- and the High-uncertainty condi-
243 tions (see the appendix; Figure S26), although the fitting of $\theta_{i,t}$ in the alternative model was
244 relatively unreliable (Figure S20). These findings suggest that conformists tended to use asocial
245 learning at the outset but increasingly started to conform as the task proceeded.

246 Extensive variation in the temporal dynamics of the social learning weight $\sigma_{i,t}$ was also found
247 for the negative-frequency dependent copying individuals but not found for the random choice
248 individuals (Figure S14). Individuals deploying a random choice strategy exhibited a $\sigma_{i,t}$ that ap-
249 proached to zero, indicating that their decision-making increasingly relied exclusively on asocial
250 reinforcement learning as the task proceeded.

251 No significant fixed effects were found in other asocial learning parameters such as the learn-
252 ing rate α_i and the mean inverse temperature $\bar{\beta}_i = (\sum_t \beta_{i,t})/70$ (Table S7, Table S8 and Figure
253 S15).

254 In summary, our experiments on adult humans revealed asymmetric influences of increasing
255 task uncertainty and increasing group size on the social learning parameters. The conformity
256 exponent increased with task uncertainty on average but the proportion of positive frequency-
257 dependent copying individuals showed a corresponding decrease, due to the extensive individual
258 variation emerging in the High-uncertain condition. Conversely, group size had a positive effect
259 on the mean social learning weight, but did not affect conformity (Figure 3, 4a-c).




Figure 3: Model fitting for the three different task's uncertain conditions (the Low-, Moderate- and High-uncertainty) and the different group size. Three different learning strategies are shown in different styles (red-triangle: positive frequency-dependent learning, blue-circle: negative frequency-dependent learning; grey-circle: nearly random choice strategy). (a-c) Frequencies of three different learning strategies. Note that a sum of the frequencies of these three strategies in the same group size does not necessarily equal to 1, because there are a small number of individuals eliminated from this analysis due to insufficient data. (d-f) Estimated social learning weight, and (g-i) estimated conformity exponent, for each individual shown for each learning strategy. The 50% Bayesian CIs of the fitted GLMMs are shown by dashed lines and shaded areas. The horizontal lines in (g-i) show a region $-1 < \theta_i < 1$.




Figure 4: (a-c) Change in fitted values (i.e. median of the Bayesian posterior distribution) of the social learning weight $\sigma_{i,t}$ with time for each individual, for each level of task uncertainty. Thick dashed lines are the median values of $\sigma_{i,t}$ across the subjects for each uncertainty condition. Individual conformity exponent values θ_i are shown in different colours (higher θ_i is darker). (d-f) Change in average decision accuracy of the individual-based post-hoc model simulations using the experimentally fit parameter values (main panels). The inner panels show the average decision accuracies of the experimental participants. Each line indicates different group-size categories (red-solid: large groups, orange-halfdashed: small groups, grey-dashed: lone individuals). All individual performances were averaged within the same size category. The large or small groups were categorised using the median sizes for each experimental condition, i.e. small groups were: $n \leq 9$, $n \leq 6$ and $n \leq 11$ for the Low-, Moderate- and High-uncertain conditions, respectively.

260 **1.3 A balance between the collective decision accuracy and the herding effect**

261 Figure 4d-f show the change over time in performance with different group sizes and different
262 uncertainty conditions, generated by the post-hoc simulations of the parameter-fitted model. The
263 mean decision accuracies of the experimental groups are shown in the inner windows. Because
264 the post-hoc simulations were run for 5,000 replications for each group size, which should gen-
265 erate more robust pattern than the raw experimental data basing only on a limited number of
266 experimental replications, and given the correspondence between simulations and data, below
267 we concentrate our interpretation on the simulated results.

268 Prior to the environmental change (Round 1 to 40), larger groups performed better on average
269 than did both smaller groups and lone individuals across all the uncertainty levels, suggesting
270 swarm intelligence was operating. However, after the environmental change (i.e. from Round 41)
271 performance differed between the conditions. In the Low-uncertain condition, where we found
272 that the participants were most likely to have a relatively weak positive frequency-dependence
273 (i.e. $\bar{\theta} = 1.65$), large groups again made more accurate decisions than small groups (Figure 4d,
274 from Round 41). However, in the Moderate- and the High-uncertain condition, where we found
275 that participants were most likely to have strong positive frequency dependence ($\bar{\theta} = 3.00$ and
276 2.67, c.f. 1.65 in the Low-uncertainty condition), the large groups seemed to get stuck on the
277 suboptimal option after the change (Figure 4e and 4f, from Round 41), although the decision
278 accuracy did not substantially differ with group size in the High-uncertain condition.

279 Lone individuals in the Low-uncertain condition recovered performance more quickly than
280 did both the small and large groups even though the lone individuals performed worse in the first-
281 half of the task (Figure 4d), suggesting that asocial learners are more capable of detecting the

282 environmental change than individuals in groups. This might be due to the higher exploration rate
283 of lone individuals (both $\mu_{p_0^*}$ and μ_e of solitary individuals were smaller than those of grouping
284 individuals; Table 2).

285 Overall, the pattern of results was broadly consistent with our predictions (Figure 1). We
286 confirmed that in the Low-uncertainty condition, where individuals have weaker positive fre-
287 quency bias, larger groups were more accurate than smaller groups while retaining flexibility
288 in their decision-making (i.e. swarm intelligence dominates). However, in the Moderate- and
289 the High-uncertain conditions, larger groups performed better prior to environmental change but
290 were vulnerable to getting stuck with an out-dated maladaptive option due to the larger estimated
291 conformity exponent, thereby generating the conflict between swarm intelligence and maladap-
292 tive herding.

293 **2 Discussion**

294 We investigated whether and how human social learning strategies regulate the conflict between
295 swarm intelligence and herding behaviour using a collective learning-and-decision-making task
296 combined with simulation and model fitting. We examined whether manipulating the reliability
297 of asocial learning and group size would affect the use of social information, and thereby alter the
298 collective decision dynamics, as suggested by our computational model simulation. Although a
299 theoretical study has suggested that reliance on social learning and conformity bias would play a
300 role in collective dynamics (Kandler and Laland, 2013), thus far no empirical studies have quan-
301 titatively investigated the population-level consequences of these two different social learning
302 processes. Our high-resolution, model-based behavioural analysis using a hierarchical Bayesian

303 statistics enabled us to identify individual-level patterns and variation of different learning pa-
304 rameters and to explore their population-level outcomes. The results provide strong support for
305 our hypothesis that the conflict between the swarm intelligence effect and maladaptive herding
306 can be predicted with knowledge of human social learning strategies.

307 Consistent with previous empirical findings (e.g., Morgan et al., 2012; Muthukrishna et al.,
308 2014), adult human participants were increasingly likely to make a conformity-biased choice as
309 the uncertainty of the task went up (i.e. as it became more difficult to determine the best option.
310 Figure 3g-i). The fitted global mean values of the conformity exponent parameters were 3.0 and
311 2.7 in the Moderate- and the High-uncertain conditions, respectively (Table 2), and these values
312 were sufficiently high to cause larger populations to get stuck on a suboptimal option following
313 environmental change (Figure 1b; Figure 4e, 4f). Conversely, in the Low-uncertain condition
314 individuals exhibited relatively weak conformity (i.e. $\bar{\theta} \approx 1.65$), allowing larger groups to escape
315 the suboptimal option, and retain their swarm intelligence (Figure 1a; Figure 4d). Although
316 the social learning weight was also found to be contingent upon the environmental factors, the
317 estimated mean value was $\bar{\sigma}_i = 0.3$ (Figure 3d-f; Figure S14). This implies a weaker social
318 than asocial influence on decision-making as reported in several other experimental studies (e.g.
319 Efferson et al., 2008; McElreath et al., 2005; Mesoudi, 2011; Toyokawa et al., 2017). Thanks to
320 this relatively weak reliance of social learning, the kind of herding that would have blindly led a
321 group to any option regardless of its quality (like the ‘symmetry breaking’ known in social insect
322 collective foraging systems. Figure 2c,d; Camazine et al., 2001; Sumpter, 2010), did not occur.
323 Research that explores the factors that can induce higher social learning weights in humans,
324 in order to understand under which circumstances herd behaviour would dominate, would be

325 valuable.

326 Individual differences in exploration might also play a crucial role in shaping collective de-
327 cision dynamics. Although a majority of participants adopted a positive frequency-dependent
328 copying strategy, some individuals exhibited negative frequency dependent or random decision-
329 making strategy (Figure 3a-c). It is worth noting that the random choice strategy was associated
330 with more exploration than the other strategies, because it led to an almost random choice at a
331 rate σ_i , irrespective of the options' quality. In addition, negative-frequency dependent copying
332 individuals could also be highly exploratory. These individuals tended to avoid choosing an op-
333 tion upon which the other people had converged and would explore the other two 'unpopular'
334 options. Interestingly, in the High-uncertain condition the mean social learning weights of the
335 negative-frequency dependent copying individuals ($\bar{\sigma}_i \approx 0.5$) were larger than that of the other
336 two strategies ($\bar{\sigma}_i \approx 0.1$, Figure S14), indicating that these individuals engaged in such majority-
337 avoiding exploration relatively frequently. Such high exploratory tendencies would prevent in-
338 dividuals from converging on a better option, leading to a diminishing of swarm intelligence in
339 high-uncertainty circumstances (Figure 4f).

340 Individual differences have received increasing attention in both collective behaviour and
341 animal social learning studies (e.g. Jolles et al., 2018; Michelena et al., 2010; Planas-sitja et al.,
342 2015), and across the human behavioural sciences (e.g. Gray et al., 2017; Mesoudi et al., 2016).
343 Our finding that the effects of individual variation depend on uncertainty implies that human
344 subjects' use of social learning strategies is deployed plastically, and is not a fixed propensity (i.e.
345 personality trait), that differs rigidly between individuals (Dingemanse et al., 2010; Toyokawa
346 et al., 2017). Our approach of combining with individual-based simulation and experimentation

347 could potentially prove a powerful tool with which to explore decision-making in other animals.

348 Another methodological advantage of using computational models to study social learn-
349 ing strategies is its explicitness of assumptions about the temporal dynamics of behaviour. It
350 has been argued that just observing the final frequencies of learned behaviour does not provide
351 enough information to determine what asocial and/or social learning processes might have been
352 used because multiple learning-and-decision mechanisms are equally likely to produce the same
353 population-level patterns (Barrett, 2018; Hoppitt and Laland, 2013). For example, very exploita-
354 tive asocial reinforcement learners (i.e. exploitation parameter $\beta_{i,t}$ is large and the social learning
355 weight $\sigma_{i,t}$ is nearly zero) and conformity-biased social learners (conformity exponent θ_i is large
356 and $\sigma_{i,t}$ is positive) would eventually converge on the same option, resulting in the same final
357 behavioural steady state. However, how they explored the environment, as well as how they re-
358 acted to the other individuals in the same group, are significantly different and they could produce
359 qualitatively different collective temporal dynamics. A time-depth perspective is crucially im-
360 portant in order to model the relationship between individual behavioural mechanisms and group
361 behavioural dynamics (Biro et al., 2016).

362 The Internet-based experimentation allowed us to conduct a real-time interactive behavioural
363 task with larger subject pools than a conventional laboratory-based experiment. This enabled us
364 not only to quantify the individual-level learning-and-decision processes (e.g. Ahn et al., 2014;
365 Daw et al., 2006) but also to map these individual-level processes on to the larger-scale collec-
366 tive behaviour (Raafat et al., 2009; Salganik et al., 2006; Sumpter, 2010). Although there are
367 always questions about the validity of participants' behaviour when deploying the web-based
368 method, we believe that the computational modelling approach coupled with higher statistical

369 power due to the large sample size, compensates for any drawbacks. The fact that our learning
370 model could approximate the participants' decision trajectories effectively suggest that most of
371 the participants engaged seriously with solving the task. An increasing body of evidence sup-
372 ports the argument that web-based behavioural experiments are as reliable as results from the
373 laboratory (e.g. Dandurand et al., 2008; Hergueux and Jacquemet, 2015).

374 The diverse effects of social influence on the collective wisdom of a group has been drawing
375 substantial attention (e.g. Becker et al., 2017; Jayles et al., 2017; Lorenz et al., 2011; Lorge et al.,
376 1958; Muchnik et al., 2013). The bulk of this literature, including many jury models and elec-
377 tion models (Hastie and Kameda, 2005; List, 2004), has focused primarily on the static estimation
378 problem, where the 'truth' is fixed from the outset. However, in reality, there are many situations
379 under which the state of the true value is changing over time so that monitoring and tracking
380 the pattern of change is a crucial determinant of decision performance (Payzan-Lenestour and
381 Bossaerts, 2011). In such temporally dynamic environments, decision-making and learning are
382 coordinated to affect future behavioural outcomes recursively (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Our
383 experimental task provides a simple vehicle for exploring collective intelligence in a dynamic
384 situation, which encompasses this learning-and-decision-making feedback loop. Potentially, in-
385 tegrating the wisdom of crowds with social learning and collective dynamics research will facil-
386 itate the more tractable use of swarm intelligence in a temporary changing world.

387 In summary, a powerful combination of experimentation and theoretical modeling sheds new
388 light on when groups of individuals will exhibit the wisdom of the crowds and when maladapt-
389 tive herding. Our analysis implies that herding is most likely amongst individuals in large groups
390 exposed to challenging tasks. That is because challenging tasks lead to greater uncertainty and

391 thereby elicit greater conformist learning amongst individuals, whilst rates of copying increase
392 with group size. Difficult tasks, by definition, render identification of the optimal behavior more
393 challenging, allowing groups sometimes to converge on maladaptive outcomes. Conversely, the
394 reduced conformity levels of individuals in small groups, and the greater probability that social
395 information would be accurate for less-challenging tasks, generated ‘wisdom of the crowd’ ef-
396 fects in most other circumstances. Our findings provide clear evidence that the conflict between
397 swarm intelligence and maladaptive herding can be predicted with knowledge of human social
398 learning strategies.

399 **3 Material and methods**

400 **3.1 Computational learning-and-decision model**

401 We modelled a learning and decision process based on standard reinforcement-learning theory
402 (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Following previous empirical studies of social learning strategies in
403 humans (e.g. McElreath et al., 2005, 2008; Toyokawa et al., 2017), our model consists of two
404 steps. First, an individual i updates the estimated average reward associated with an option m at
405 round t , namely Q-value ($Q_{i,t}(m)$), according to the Rescorla-Wagner rule (Trimmer et al., 2012)
406 as follows:

$$Q_{i,t+1}(m) = Q_{i,t}(m) + \alpha_i \mathbb{1}(m, m_{i,t}) (r_{i,t}(m) - Q_{i,t}(m)), \quad (3)$$

407 where α_i ($0 \leq \alpha_i \leq 1$) is a *learning rate* parameter of individual i determining the weight given to
408 new experience and $r_{i,t}(m)$ is the amount of monetary reward obtained from choosing the option

409 m in round t . $\mathbb{1}(m, m_{i,t})$ is the binary action-indicator function of individual i , given by

$$\mathbb{1}(m, m_{i,t}) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } m_{i,t} = m \text{ or } t = 1, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

410 Therefore, $Q_{i,t}(m)$ is updated only when the option m was chosen; when the option m was not
 411 chosen, $Q_{i,t}(m)$ is not updated (i.e. $Q_{i,t+1}(m) = Q_{i,t}(m)$). Note that, only in the first round $t = 1$,
 412 all Q-values are updated by using the chosen option's reward $r_{i,1}(m)$, so that the individual can
 413 set a naive 'intuition' about the magnitude of reward values she/he would expect to earn from a
 414 choice in the task; namely, $Q_{i,t=2}(1) = Q_{i,t=2}(2) = Q_{i,t=2}(3) = \alpha_i r_{i,t=1}(m)$. In practical terms,
 415 this prevents the model from being overly sensitive to the first experience. Before the first choice,
 416 individuals had no prior preference for either option (i.e. $Q_{i,1}(1) = Q_{i,1}(2) = Q_{i,1}(3) = 0$).

417 Second, a choice is made for an option m by individual i at the choice probability $P_{i,t}(m)$ that
 418 is determined by a weighted average of social and asocial influences:

$$P_{i,t}(m) = \sigma_{i,t} S_{i,t}(m) + (1 - \sigma_{i,t}) A_{i,t}(m), \quad (5)$$

419 where $\sigma_{i,t}$ is the *social learning weight* ($0 \leq \sigma_{i,t} \leq 1$), and $S_{i,t}(m)$ and $A_{i,t}(m)$ are social and
 420 asocial influences on the choice probability, respectively ($0 \leq S_{i,t}(m) \leq 1$ and $0 \leq A_{i,t}(m) \leq 1$).
 421 Note that the sum of choice probabilities, the sum of social influences and the sum of asocial
 422 influences are all equal to 1; namely, $\sum_{k \in \text{options}} P_{i,t}(k) = 1$, $\sum_k S_{i,t}(k) = 1$ and $\sum_k A_{i,t}(k) = 1$.

423 As for the asocial influence $A_{i,t}$, we assumed the so-called softmax (or logit choice) function,

424 which is widely used in the reinforcement-learning literature:

$$A_{i,t}(m) = \frac{\exp(\beta_{i,t} Q_{i,t}(m))}{\sum_{k \in \text{options}} \exp(\beta_{i,t} Q_{i,t}(k))}, \quad (6)$$

425 where $\beta_{i,t}$, called *inverse temperature*, manipulates individual i 's sensitivity to the Q-values (in
426 other words, controlling the proneness to explore). As $\beta_{i,t}$ goes to zero, asocial influence approx-
427 imates to a random choice (i.e. highly explorative). Conversely, if $\beta_{i,t} \rightarrow +\infty$, the asocial influ-
428 ence leads to a deterministic choice in favour of the option with the highest Q-value (i.e. highly
429 exploitative). For intermediate values of $\beta_{i,t}$, individual i exhibits a balance between exploration
430 and exploitation (Daw et al., 2006; Toyokawa et al., 2017). We allowed for the possibility that
431 the balance between exploration-exploitation could change as the task proceeds. To depict such
432 time dependence in exploration, we used the equation: $\beta_{i,t} = \beta_{i,0}^* + \epsilon_i t / 70$. If the slope ϵ_i is
433 positive (negative), asocial influence $A_{i,t}$ becomes more and more exploitative (explorative) as
434 round t increases. For a model fitting purpose, the time-dependent term $\epsilon_i t$ is scaled by the total
435 round number 70.

436 We modelled the social influence (i.e. the frequency-dependent copying) on the probability
437 that individual i chooses option m at round t as follows (McElreath et al., 2005, 2008; Aplin et al.,
438 2017; Barrett et al., 2017):

$$S_{i,t}(m) = \frac{\left(F_{t-1}(m) + 0.1\right)^{\theta_i}}{\sum_{k \in \text{options}} \left(F_{t-1}(k) + 0.1\right)^{\theta_i}}, \quad (7)$$

439 where $F_{t-1}(m)$ is a number of choices made by other individuals (excluding her/his own choice)
440 for the option m in the preceding round $t - 1$ ($t \geq 2$). θ_i is individual i 's *conformity exponent*,

441 $-\infty \leq \theta_i \leq +\infty$. When this exponent is larger than zero, higher social influence is given to
442 an option which was chosen by more individuals (i.e. positive frequency bias). When $\theta_i < 0$,
443 on the other hand, higher social influence is given to an option that fewer individuals chose in
444 the preceding round $t - 1$ (i.e. negative frequency bias). To implement the negative frequency
445 dependence, we added a small number 0.1 to F so that an option chosen by no one (i.e. $F_{t-1} = 0$)
446 could provide the highest social influence when $\theta_i < 0$. Note, there is no social influence when
447 $\theta_i = 0$ because in this case the ‘social influence’ favours a uniformly random choice, $S_{i,t}(m) =$
448 $1/(1 + 1 + 1) = 1/3$, independent of the social frequency distribution. Note also that, in the
449 first round $t = 1$, we assumed that the choice is only determined by the a-social softmax function
450 because there is no social information available.

451 We considered that the social learning weight $\sigma_{i,t}$ could change over time as assumed in the
452 inverse temperature $\beta_{i,t}$. To let $\sigma_{i,t}$ satisfy the constraint $0 \leq \sigma_{i,t} \leq 1$, we used the following
453 sigmoidal function:

$$\sigma_{i,t} = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-(\sigma_{i,0}^* + \delta_i t/70))}. \quad (8)$$

454 If the slope δ_i is positive (negative), the social influence increases (decreases) over time. We
455 set the social learning weight equal to zero when group size is one (i.e. when an individual
456 participated in the task alone and/or when $\sum_{k \in \text{options}} F_{t-1}(k) = 0$).

457 We modelled both the inverse temperature $\beta_{i,t}$ and the social learning weight $\sigma_{i,t}$ as a time
458 function since otherwise it would be challenging to distinguish different patterns of learning in
459 this social learning task (Barrett, 2018). The parameter recovery test confirmed that we were
460 able to differentiate such processes under these assumptions (Figure S8-S12). While we also

461 considered the possibility of the conformity exponent being time-dependent (i.e. $\theta_{i,t} = \theta_{i,0}^* +$
462 $\gamma_i t/70$), the parameter recovery test suggested that the individual slope parameter γ_i was not
463 reliably recovered (Figure S20 and S21), and hence we concentrated our analysis on the time-
464 independent θ_i model. We confirmed that instead using the alternative model where both social
465 learning parameters were time-dependent (i.e. $\sigma_{i,t}$ and $\theta_{i,t}$) did not qualitatively change our results
466 (Figure S25 and S26).

467 In summary, the model has six free parameters that were estimated for each individual human
468 participant; namely, α_i , $\beta_{i,0}^*$, ϵ_i , $\sigma_{i,0}^*$, δ_i , and θ_i . To fit the model, we used a hierarchical Bayesian
469 method (HBM), estimating the global means (μ_α , $\mu_{\beta_0^*}$, μ_ϵ , $\mu_{\sigma_0^*}$, μ_δ , and μ_θ) and the global vari-
470 ations (ν_α , $\nu_{\beta_0^*}$, ν_ϵ , $\nu_{\sigma_0^*}$, ν_δ , and ν_θ) for each of the three experimental conditions (i.e. the Low-,
471 Moderate- and High-uncertain condition), which govern overall distributions of individual pa-
472 rameter values. It has become recognised that the HBM can provide more robust and reliable
473 parameter estimation than conventional maximum likelihood point estimation in complex cogni-
474 tive models (e.g. Ahn et al., 2014), a conclusion with which our parameter recovery test agreed
475 (Figure S10-S12).

476 3.2 Agent-based model simulation

477 We ran a series of individual-based model simulations assuming that a group of individuals play
478 our three-armed bandit task (under the Moderate-uncertainty condition) and that individuals be-
479 have in accordance with the computational learning-and-decision model. We varied the group
480 size ($n \in \{3, 10, 30\}$), the mean social learning weight ($\bar{\sigma} \in \{0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, \dots, 0.9\}$) and
481 the mean conformity exponent ($\bar{\theta} \in \{0.5, 1, 3, 6\}$), running 10,000 replications for each of the

482 possible parameter \times group size combinations. As for the other parameter values (e.g. the aso-
483 cial reinforcement learning parameters; α , β_0^* , ϵ), here we used the experimentally fitted global
484 means (Table 2 and Table S1). Relaxation of this assumption (i.e. using a different set of aso-
485 cial learning parameters) does not qualitatively change our story (e.g. Figure S4-S7). Note that
486 each individual's parameter values were randomly drawn from the distributions centred by the
487 global mean parameter values fixed to each simulation run. Therefore, the actual composition
488 of individual parameter values were different between individuals even within the same social
489 group.

490 **3.3 Participants in the online experiment**

491 A total of 755 subjects (354 females, 377 males, 2 others and 22 unspecified; mean age (1 *s.d.*) =
492 34.33 (10.9)) participated in our incentivised economic behavioural experiment (Figure S2). The
493 experimental sessions were conducted in December 2015 and in January 2016. We excluded
494 subjects who disconnected to the online task before completing at least the first 30 rounds from
495 our learning model fitting analysis, resulted in 699 subjects (573 subjects entered the group (i.e.
496 $n \geq 2$) condition and 126 entered the solitary (i.e. $n = 1$) condition). The task was advertised
497 using Amazon's Mechanical Turk (AMT; <https://www.mturk.com>; see Video S1; Video S2),
498 so that the participants could enter anonymously through their own internet browser window.
499 Upon connecting to the experimental game web page, the participants might be required to wait
500 on other participants at the virtual 'waiting room' for up to 5 minutes or until the requisite number
501 of participants arrived, whichever was sooner, before the task starts. The participants were payed
502 25 cents for a show-up fee plus a waiting-bonus at a rate of 12 cents per minute (i.e. *pro rata*

503 to 7.2 USD per hour) and a game bonus ($mean \pm 1s.d. = 1.7 \pm 0.79$ USD) depending on their
504 performance in the task. The total time, including net time spent in the waiting room, tended to
505 be less than 10 minutes.

506 **3.4 The online three-armed bandit task**

507 The participants performed a three-armed bandit task for 70 rounds. Each round started with the
508 choice stage at which three slot machines appeared on the screen (Figure S1; Video 1). Partic-
509 ipants chose a slot by clicking the mouse pointer (or tapping it if they used a tablet computer).
510 Participants had a maximum of 8 seconds to make their choices. If no choice was made during
511 the choice stage, a ‘TIME OUT’ message appeared in the centre of the screen without a monetary
512 reward (average number of missed rounds per participant was 0.18 out of 70 rounds). Partici-
513 pants were able to know the rest of the choice time by seeing a ‘count-down bar’ shown at the
514 top of the experimental screen.

515 Each option yielded monetary rewards randomly drawn from a normal probability distribu-
516 tion unique to each slot, rounded up to the next integer, or truncated to zero if it would have been a
517 negative value (Figure S3). The standard deviations of the probabilistic payoff distributions were
518 identical for all slots and did not change during the task (the $s.d. = 0.55$; although it actually was
519 slightly smaller than 0.55 due to the zero-truncation). The mean values of the probabilistic pay-
520 off were different between the options. ‘Poor’, ‘good’ and ‘excellent’ slots generated the lowest,
521 intermediate and the highest rewards on average, respectively. In the first 40 rounds, there were
522 two poor and one good options. After the round 40th, one of the poor option abruptly changed to
523 an excellent option (i.e. environmental change), and from the 41st round there were poor, good

524 and excellent options.

525 Once all the participants in the group made a choice (or had been time-outed), they proceeded
526 to the feedback stage in which they could see their own payoff from the current choice for two
527 seconds ('0' was shown if they had been time-outed), while they could not see others' reward
528 values. After this feedback stage, subjects proceeded to the next round's choice stage. From the
529 second round, a distribution of choices made by all participants in the group at the preceding
530 round (i.e. the social frequency information) was shown below each slot.

531 Before the task started, participants had read an illustrated instruction which told them that
532 they would play 70 rounds of the task, that the payoff would be randomly generated per choice
533 but associated with a probability distribution unique to each slot machine, i.e. the profitability
534 of the slot might be different from each other, that the environment might change during the
535 task so that the mean payoff from the slots might secretly change during the task, and that their
536 total payout were decided based on the sum of all earnings they achieved in the task. We also
537 explicitly informed subjects that all participants in the same group played the identical task so
538 that they could infer that the social information was informative. However, we did not specify
539 either the true mean payoff values associated with each option, or when and how the mean payoff
540 would actually change. After reading these instructions, participants proceeded to a 'tutorial task'
541 without any monetary reward and without the social frequency information, so as to become
542 familiar with the task.

543 After they completed the behavioural task or were excluded from the task due to a bad internet
544 connection or due to opening another browser window during the task (see the 'Reducing the risk
545 of cheating' section in the appendix), subjects proceeded to a brief questionnaire page asking

546 about demographic information, which were skippable. Finally, the result screen was shown,
547 informing the total monetary reward she/he earned as well as a confirmation code unique for each
548 participant. Participants could get monetary reward through AMT by inputting the confirmation
549 code into the form at the AMT's task page.

550 **3.5 Manipulating the group size and uncertainty**

551 To manipulate the size of each group, we varied the capacity of the waiting room from 10 to 30.
552 Because the task was being advertised on the Worker website at AMT for approximately 2 hours,
553 some participants occasionally arrived after the earlier groups had already started. In that case
554 the participant entered the newly opened waiting room which was open for the next 5 minutes.
555 The number of participants arriving declined with time because newly posted alternative tasks
556 were advertised on the top of the task list, which decreased our task's visibility. This meant that
557 a later-starting session tended to begin before reaching maximum room capacity, resulting in the
558 smaller group size. Therefore, the actual size differed between groups.

559 To investigate the effect of the task uncertainty, we manipulated the closeness of each option's
560 mean payoff value, setting three different conditions in a between-group design. The three condi-
561 tions were: Low-uncertainty condition (differences between mean payoffs were 1.264; $N = 113$),
562 Moderate-uncertainty condition (differences between mean payoffs were 0.742; $N = 132$) and
563 High-uncertainty condition (differences between mean payoffs were 0.3; $N = 454$). The mean
564 payoff associated with the 'excellent' slot in all three conditions was fixed to 3.1 cents (Figure
565 S3). These conditions were randomly assigned for each experimental session. However, we re-
566 cruited more participants in the High-uncertainty condition compared to the other two because

567 we expected that larger group sizes would be needed to generate the collective wisdom in noisier
568 environments.

569 **3.6 Statistical analysis**

570 We used a hierarchical Bayesian method (HBM) to estimate the free parameters of our statis-
571 tical models, including the computational learning-and-decision-making model. The HBM al-
572 lows us to estimate individual differences, while ensures these individual variations are bounded
573 by the group-level global parameters. The HBM was performed under Stan 2.16.2 ([http:](http://mc-stan.org)
574 [//mc-stan.org](http://mc-stan.org)) in R 3.4.1 (<https://www.r-project.org>) software. The models contained
575 at least 4 parallel chains and we confirmed convergence of the MCMC using both the Gelman-
576 Rubin statistics and the effective sample sizes. Full details of the model fitting procedure and
577 prior assumptions are shown in the appendix.

578 **3.6.1 Parameter recovery test**

579 To check the validity of our model-fitting method, we conducted a ‘parameter recovery test’
580 so as to examine how well our model fitting procedure had been able to reveal true individual
581 parameter values. To do this, we generated synthetic data by running a simulation with the
582 empirically fitted global parameter values, and then re-fitted the model with this synthetic data
583 using the same procedure. The parameter recovery test showed that the all true global parameter
584 values were fallen into the 95% Bayesian credible interval (Figure S8), and at least 93% of the
585 true individual parameter values were correctly recovered (i.e. 96% of α_i , 93% of $\beta_{i,0}^*$, 95% of
586 ϵ_i , 97% of $\sigma_{i,0}^*$, 96% of δ_i and 97% of θ_i values were fallen into the 95% Bayesian CI. Figure

587 S9-S12).

588 3.6.2 Categorisation of individual learning strategies

589 Based on the 50% CI of the individual *conformity exponent* parameter values θ_i , we divided
590 the participants into the following three different social learning strategies. If her/his 50% CI
591 of θ_i fell above zero ($\theta_{lower} > 0$), below zero ($\theta_{upper} < 0$) or including zero ($\theta_{lower} \leq 0 \leq$
592 θ_{upper}), she/he was categorised as a ‘positive frequency-dependent copier’, a ‘negative frequency-
593 dependent copier’, or a ‘random choice individual’, respectively. We used the 50% Bayesian CI
594 to conduct this categorisation instead of using the more conservative 95% CI because the latter
595 would cause much higher rates of ‘false negatives’, by which an individual who applied either a
596 positive frequency-dependent copying or a negative-frequency dependent copying strategy was
597 falsely labelled as an asocial random choice individual (Figure S10d). Four hundred agents out
598 of 572 ($\approx 70\%$) were falsely categorised as a random choice learner in the recovery test when we
599 used the 95% criterion (Figure S10d). On the other hand, the 50% CI criterion seemed to be much
600 better in terms of the false negative rate which was only 18.5% (i.e. 106 agents), although it might
601 be slightly worse in terms of ‘false positives’: Thirty-seven agents (6.5%) were falsely labelled
602 as either a positive frequency-dependent copier or a negative-frequency dependent copier by the
603 50% CI, whereas the false positive rate of the 95% CI was only 0.2% (Figure S10e). To balance
604 the risk of false positives and false negatives, we decided to use the 50% CI which seemed to
605 have more strategy detecting power.

606 **3.6.3 Generalised linear mixed models**

607 To examine whether increasing group size and increasing task uncertainty affected individual
608 use of the positive frequency-dependent copying strategy, we used a hierarchical Bayesian logis-
609 tic regression model with a random effect of groups. The dependent variable was whether the
610 participant used the positive frequency-dependent copying (1) or not (0). The model includes
611 fixed effects of group size (standardised), task uncertainty (0: Low, 0.5: Moderate, 1: High), age
612 (standardised), gender (0: male, 1: female, NA: others or unspecified), and possible two-way
613 interactions between these fixed effects.

614 We also investigated the effects of both group size and the task's uncertainty on the fitted
615 values of the learning parameters. We used a hierarchical Bayesian gaussian regression model
616 predicting the individual fitted parameter values. The model includes effects of group size (stan-
617 dardised), task uncertainty (0: Low, 0.5: Moderate, 1: High), age (standardised), gender (0:
618 male, 1: female, NA: others or unspecified), and two-way interactions between these fixed ef-
619 fects. We assumed that the variance of the individual parameter values might be contingent upon
620 task uncertainty because we had found in the computational model-fitting result that the fitted
621 global variance parameters (i.e. $v_{\sigma_0^*}$, v_{δ} and v_{θ}) were larger in more uncertain conditions (Table
622 S1).

623 **3.6.4 Post-hoc model simulation for Figure 4d-f**

624 So as to evaluate how accurately our model can generate observed decision pattern in our task
625 setting, we ran a series of individual-based model simulation using the fitted individual param-
626 eter values (i.e. means of the individual posterior distributions) for each group size for each

627 uncertainty condition. At the first step of the simulation, we assigned a set of fitted parameters
628 of a randomly-chosen experimental subject from the same group size and the same uncertain
629 condition to an simulated agent, until the number of agents reaches the simulated group size. We
630 allowed duplicate choice of experimental subject in this parameter assignment. At the second
631 step, we let this synthetic group of agents play the bandit task. We repeated these steps 5,000
632 times for each group size, task uncertainty.

633 **3.7 Code and data availability**

634 The browser based online task was built by Node.js (<https://nodejs.org/en/>) and socket.io
635 (<https://socket.io>), and the code are available on a GitHub repository ([https://github.](https://github.com/WataruToyokawa/MultiPlayerThreeArmedBanditGame)
636 [com/WataruToyokawa/MultiPlayerThreeArmedBanditGame](https://github.com/WataruToyokawa/MultiPlayerThreeArmedBanditGame)). Analyses were conducted in
637 R (<https://www.r-project.org>) and simulations of individual based models were conducted
638 in Mathematica (<https://www.wolfram.com>), both of which including data are available on an
639 online repository (<https://github.com/WataruToyokawa/ToyokawaWhalenLaland2018>).

640 **4 Ethics statement**

641 This study was approved by University of St Andrews (BL10808).

642 **5 Competing interest**

643 We have no competing interest.

644 **6 Authors' contributions**

645 WT, AW and KNL planned the study and built the computational model. WT ran simulations.

646 WT and AW made the experimental material, ran the web-base experiment, and collected the

647 experimental data. WT, AW and KNL analysed the data and wrote the manuscript.

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