Deliberation gated by opportunity cost adapts to context with urgency

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Abstract

The value we place on our time impacts what we decide to do with it. Value it too little, and we obsess over all details. Value it too much, and we rush carelessly to move on. How to strike this often context-specific balance is a challenging decisionmaking problem. Average-reward, putatively encoded by tonic dopamine, serves in existing reinforcement learning theory as the stationary opportunity cost of time. However, environmental context and the cost of deliberation therein often varies in time and is hard to infer and predict. Here, we define a non-stationary opportunity cost of deliberation arising from performance variation on multiple timescales. Estimated from reward history, this cost readily adapts to reward-relevant changes in context and suggests a generalization of average-reward reinforcement learning (AR-RL) to account for non-stationary contextual factors. We use this deliberation cost in a simple decision-making heuristic called Performance-Gated Deliberation, which approximates AR-RL and is consistent with empirical results in both cognitive and systems decision-making neuroscience. We propose that deliberation cost is implemented directly as urgency, a previously characterized neural signal effectively controlling the speed of the decision-making process. We use behaviour and neural recordings from non-human primates in a non-stationary random walk prediction task to support our results. We make readily testable predictions for both neural activity and behaviour and discuss how this proposal can facilitate future work in cognitive and systems neuroscience of reward-driven behaviour.

Keywords: primate decision-making, reinforcement learning, urgency, opportunity cost

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symbol	quantity
t	within-trial time
k	trial index
S_t	within-trial state at time t
$oldsymbol{S}_t$	state sequence up to time t
R_k	reward of k th trial
T_k	duration of k th trial
$t_k^{ m dec}$	decision time of k th trial
$\mathcal{C}_t^{ ext{del}}$	within-trial opportunity cost of deliberation
$r_{\rm max}$	maximum reward acheiveable in a trial
b_t	belief of correct report given \boldsymbol{S}_t
$ar{r}_t$	expected reward for reporting at time t
$\mathcal{C}_t^{\mathrm{com}}$	within-trial opportunity cost of commitment
ho	stationary reward rate
$ ho^*$	optimal stationary reward rate
α	context parameter
$ ho_{lpha}$	context-conditioned stationary reward rate
T_{α}	context-conditioned stationary average trial duration
$\hat{ ho}_k^{ au}$	reward history filtered through a timescale, τ
$ au_{ m long}$	a long timescale over which to estimate ρ
$\tau_{\rm context}$	a context-specific timescale over which to estimate ρ_{α}
ν	tracking cost sensitivity
K	subjective reward scale factor
$T_{\rm block}$	characteristic duration of a trial block
c	auxiliary deliberation cost rate
N_t	tokens difference
p	jump probability of random walk, $p \ge 1/2$

Table I. Symbol glossary. Highlighted in gray are parameters of the PGD model presented in this paper.

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INTRODUCTION

Humans and other animals make a wide range of decisions throughout their daily lives. Any particular action usually arises out of a hierarchy of decisions involving a careful balance between resources, including one that is always limited: time. The cost of *spending* time depends on its value, a construct that relies on comparing against the alternative things an agent could potentially do with it. Estimating time's value is not straightforward for a number of reasons. There are alternative choices at multiple decision levels, e.g. moving on from a job and moving on from a career, and each level requires its own evaluation. Moreover, the value of alternatives needs to be tracked as they may change over time depending on the context in which a decision is made. For example, animals will learn to value a given food resource differently depending on whether it is encountered during times of plenty versus scarcity. The agent's knowledge of and ability to track context thus influences the value it assigns to possible alternatives.

²³ These are significant, practical complications of making decisions contingent on *opportu*-

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²⁴ nity costs [1], the formal economic concept capturing the value of the alternatives lost by
²⁵ committing a limited resource to a given use. The opportunity cost of time is neverthe²⁶ less well-studied in decision-making theory for relative definitions of value, most notably as
²⁷ the average reward in average-reward reinforcement learning (AR-RL) [2]. AR-RL focuses
²⁸ on deviations from the average reward rather than on discounted reward as in the more
²⁹ widely known discount-reward reinforcement learning formulation. In neuroscience, AR-RL
³⁰ was first proposed to extend the reward prediction error hypothesis for phasic dopamine
³¹ to account also for the observed properties of tonic dopamine levels [3]. It has since been
³² used to emphasize the relative nature of reward-based decision-making [4] in explanations
³³ of human and animal behaviour in foraging [5], free-operant conditioning [6], perceptual
³⁴ decision-making [7, 8], cognitive effort/control [8, 9], and even economic exchange [10].

AR-RL is increasingly acknowledged as the more suitable reinforcement learning formulation [11] for *continuing environments* in which there is no definite end [12], in a large part because it explicitly seeks solutions that achieve the maximum possible average reward rate. This is in contrast to traditional fixed accuracy criteria in perceptual decision-making tasks that focus on maximizing trial reward alone [13]. The solutions to AR-RL formulations of tasks of long sequence of trials are decision boundaries in the state space of a trial that typically collapse with trial time. This limits deliberation in trials with low return-on-timetimetary investment, e.g. in difficult trials for tasks in which trial difficulty is variable [7, 14].

⁴³ Up to now, however, AR-RL and most of its applications have focused on fixed context ⁴⁴ and have used the stationary average reward as the fixed opportunity cost of time, which ⁴⁵ ignores context-dependent performance variation. This is perhaps not surprising given that ⁴⁶ in psychological and neuroscientific studies of decision-making, we usually eliminate such ⁴⁷ contextual factors from the experimental design such that our models describe stationary ⁴⁸ behaviour. However, the brain mechanisms under study are adapted to a more diverse ⁴⁹ natural world in which contextual factors are often relevant, hard to infer and vary over ⁵⁰ time [4].

We pursue a theory of approximate relative-value decision-making under uncertainty in a 51 ⁵² setting relevant to decision-making neuroscience. We start by showing that value in AR-RL ⁵³ can be expressed using the opportunity costs of deliberation and commitment. Here, the 54 commitment cost is the shortfall in reward relative to the maximum possible in a trial that ⁵⁵ is expected to be lost when committing to a decision at a given time. Highlighting the risk ⁵⁶ of value representations in non-stationary environments, we propose an approximation to ⁵⁷ the AR-RL value-optimal solution, Performance-Gated Deliberation (PGD), that uses the ⁵⁸ opportunity cost directly as the collapsing decision boundary, instead of as input to a value optimization problem. PGD thus reduces decision-making to estimating two opportunity 59 60 costs: a commitment cost learned from the statistics of the environment and a deliberation ⁶¹ cost estimated from tracking one's own performance in that environment. It explains how an 62 agent, without explicitly tracking context parameters or storing a value function, can trade-63 off speed and accuracy according to performance at the typically longer timescales over which ⁶⁴ context changes. We propose that deliberation cost is then directly encoded as "urgency" $_{65}$ in the neural dynamics underlying decision-making [7, 15–17]. The theory is thus directly testable using both behaviour and neural recordings. To illustrate how PGD applies in a ⁶⁷ specific continuing decision-making task, and to make the links to a neural implementation 68 explicit, we analyze behavior and neural recordings collected over eight years from two non-⁶⁹ human primates (NHPs) [18, 19]. They performed successive trials of the "tokens task", ⁷⁰ a probabilistic guessing task in which information about the correct choice is continuously

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⁷¹ changing within each trial, and a task parameter controlling the incentive to decide early ⁷² (the context) is varied over longer timescales. Behavior in the task, in both humans [16] ⁷³ and monkeys [19], provides additional support to an existing hypothesis about how neural ⁷⁴ dynamics implements time-sensitive decision-making [15]. Specifically, neural recordings in ⁷⁵ monkeys suggest that the evidence needed to make the decision predominates in dorsolateral ⁷⁶ prefrontal cortex [20]; a growing context-dependent urgency signal is provided by the basal ⁷⁷ ganglia [21]; and the two are combined to bias and time, respectively, a competition between ⁷⁸ potential actions that unfolds in dorsal premotor and primary motor cortex [18]. Similar ⁷⁹ findings have been reported in other tasks - for example, in the frontal eye fields during ⁸⁰ decision-making mechanisms are organized in this way. As an algorithm, it serves as a ⁸² robust means to balance immediate rewards and the cost of time across multiple timescales. ⁸³ As a quantitative model, it serves to explain concurrently recorded behaviour and neural ⁸⁴ urgency in continuing decision-making tasks.

RESULTS

A. Theory of performance-gated deliberation

Opportunity costs of deliberation and commitment, and drawbacks of average-reward reinforcement learning

We consider a class of tasks consisting of a long sequence of trials indexed by k =1, 2, ... (see fig. 1a), each of which provides the opportunity to obtain some reward by choosing correctly. In each trial, a finite sequence of states, S_t , $t = 0, ..., t_{\text{max}}$, is observed that provide evidence for an evolving belief about the correct choice among a fixed set of options. To keep notation simple, we suppress denoting the trial index, k, on quantities such as trial state, S_t , that also depend on trial time, t. The time of decision, t_k^{dec} , and the chosen option determine both the reward received, R_k , and the trial duration, $T_k \geq t_k^{\text{dec}}$. Importantly, redecision timing can affect performance because earlier decisions typically lead to shorter trials (and thus more trials in a given time window), while later decisions lead to higher accuracy. Effectively balancing such speed-accuracy trade-offs is central to performing well in continuing episodic task settings. For a fixed strategy, the stationary reward rate (see 101 slope of dashed line in fig. 1a(right)) is

$$\rho := \lim_{k \to \infty} \sum_{k} R_k / \sum_{k} T_k .$$
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¹⁰² For a stochastic environment, the definition of ρ includes an ensemble average. Free-operant ¹⁰³ conditioning, foraging, and several perceptual decision-making tasks often fall into this class. ¹⁰⁴ Previous work [7, 22] has studied the belief of correct report for binary rewards, $b_t = P(R_k =$ ¹⁰⁵ 1| $S_t, t^{dec} = t$), which also gives the expected trial reward, $\bar{r}_t = b_t \cdot 1 + (1 - b_t) \cdot 0 = b_t$ [7] ¹⁰⁶ (see [23] for more about the relationship between value-based and perceptual decisions). S_t ¹⁰⁷ denotes the state sequence observed so far, (S_0, \ldots, S_t) . We consider greedy strategies that ¹⁰⁸ report the choice with the largest belief at decision time. The decision problem is then about ¹⁰⁹ when to decide.

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


Figure 1. AR-RL and Performance-Gated Deliberation. (a) Task setting. Left: Within trial state, S_t evolves over trial time t in successive trials indexed by k. The decision 'A' is reported at the decision time t_k^{dec} (red cross), determining trial reward, R_k , and trial duration, T_k . Right: Sketch of cumulative reward versus cumulative duration. Context-conditioned reward rate (slope of red line), varies with alternating context (labelled 1 and 2) around average reward, ρ (dashed line). (b) Decision rules based on opportunity costs of commitment, C_t^{com} , and deliberation, C_t^{del} . The AR-RL rule (black 'x') finds t that minimizes $C_t^{\text{del}} + C_t^{\text{com}}$. The PGD rule (black cross) finds t^{dec} at which they intersect, $C_t^{\text{del}} = C_t^{\text{com}}$. (c) Schematic diagram of each algorithm's dependency. PGD computes a decision time directly from the two opportunity costs, while AR-RL uses both to first estimate a value function, whose maximum specifies the decision time. (d) Loss (error in performance with respect to the optimal policy, $(\rho^* - \rho)/\rho^*$) over learning time in a patch-leaving task (AR-RL: brown, PGD: black). The arrow indicates when the state labels were randomly permuted.

Average-reward reinforcement learning (AR-RL), first proposed in artificial intelli-¹¹⁰ gence [24], was later incorporated into reward prediction error theories of dopamine sig-¹¹² nalling [3] and employed to account for the opportunity cost of time [6]. AR-RL was ¹¹³ subsequently used to study reward-based decision-making in neuroscience and psychol-¹¹⁴ ogy [7, 8, 25, 26]. AR-RL centers around the average-adjusted future return, which penalizes ¹¹⁵ the passage of time according the average reward. A reporting decision is associated with a ¹¹⁶ return that for trial-based tasks combines the remainder of the current trial and all future

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¹¹⁷ trials, $\bar{r}_t - \rho(T_k - t) + \sum_{k'>k} (R_{k'} - \rho T_{k'})$, where ρ (c.f. eq. (1)) is either estimated online ¹¹⁸ or obtained self-consistently (see Methods for details). Value is defined as the future return ¹¹⁹ averaged over trial sequence realizations. This average of a sum of reward deviations into ¹²⁰ the future converges on account of the decaying effects of the state at which the decision is ¹²¹ made. The AR-RL algorithms we consider aim to achieve the highest ρ by also maximizing ¹²² the average-adjusted value. We now provide an alternative, but equivalent definition of ¹²³ average-adjusted trial return in terms of opportunity costs incurred by the agent.

We denote the opportunity cost of committing at time t within a trial as C_t^{com} , defined 125 as the difference

$$\mathcal{C}_t^{\rm com} = r_{\rm max} - \bar{r}_t , \qquad (2)$$

¹²⁶ where r_{max} is the maximum trial reward possible *a priori*. Within a trial, an agent lowers ¹²⁷ its commitment cost towards zero by accumulating more evidence, i.e. by waiting. Waiting, ¹²⁸ however, incurs another opportunity cost: the reward lost by not acting. We denote this ¹²⁹ opportunity cost of deliberation incurred up to a time t in a trial as C_t^{del} . In AR-RL, the ¹³⁰ constant opportunity cost rate of time is integrated so that for $T_k = t_k^{\text{dec}}$,

$$\mathcal{C}_t^{\text{del}} = \rho t \ . \tag{3}$$

¹³¹ With these definitions, the average-adjusted trial return for deciding at a time t can be ¹³² expressed as $r_{\text{max}} - (C_t^{\text{com}} + C_t^{\text{del}})$. It is maximized by jointly minimizing C_t^{del} and C_t^{com} (fig. 1b), ¹³³ giving the AR-RL optimal solution (see Methods for a formal statement and solution of the ¹³⁴ AR-RL problem). Expressed in this way, the average-adjusted trial return emphasizes the ¹³⁵ more general perspective that an agent's solution to the speed-accuracy trade-off is about ¹³⁶ how it balances the decaying opportunity cost of commitment and the growing opportunity ¹³⁷ cost of deliberation.

Despite their utility, value representations such as the average-adjusted trial return can 138 ¹³⁹ be a liability in real world tasks where task statistics are non-stationary. To illustrate this, ¹⁴⁰ we consider the following foraging task. An foraging agent feeds among a fixed set of food $_{141}$ (e.g. berry) patches. Total berries consumed in a patch saturates with duration t according ¹⁴² to a given saturation profile, shared across patches, as the fewer berries left are harder to ¹⁴³ find. Patches differ in their richness (e.g. berry density), which is randomly sampled and 144 fixed over the task. Denoting patch identity (serving as context) by s, the food return is ¹⁴⁵ directly observed and deterministic given s. To perform well, the agent needs to decide when to move on from depleting the current patch. Further details about the task and its solution are given in the Methods. For a broad class of online AR-RL algorithms, the agent learns the average-adjusted trial return as a function of state and time. For a given patch, it then leaves when this return is at its maximum (c.f. fig. 1b). In fig. 1d, we show how the performance (brown line) approaches that of the optimal policy in time as the estimation of the AR-RL trial return improves with experience (see Methods for implementation details). However, if 151 ¹⁵² the agent's environment undergoes a significant disturbance (e.g. a forest fire due to which the patch locations are effectively re-sampled), the performance of this AR-RL algorithm can ¹⁵⁴ drop back to where it started. We implement such a disturbance via random permutation ¹⁵⁵ of the state labels at the time indicated by the arrow in fig. 1d. This is true over a range of ¹⁵⁶ learning rates and the number of patches (fig. S8). More generally, any approach that relies ¹⁵⁷ on estimating state-value associations shares this drawback, including those approaches that ¹⁵⁸ implicitly learn those associations by directly learning a policy instead [27]. Could context-¹⁵⁹ dependent decision times be obtained without having to associate value or action to state? ¹⁶⁰ A means to do so is presented in the next section.

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2. Performance-Gated Deliberation

We propose that instead of maximizing value as in AR-RL, which minimizes the sum of the two opportunity costs, $C_t^{\text{del}} + C_t^{\text{com}}$, the agent simply takes as its decision criterion when they intersect (shown as the black cross in fig. 1b).

$$t^{\text{dec}} := \min_{t} \left\{ t \mid \mathcal{C}_{t}^{\text{del}} \ge \mathcal{C}_{t}^{\text{com}} \right\} \quad (\text{PGD decision rule}) \tag{4}$$

¹⁶⁵ We call this heuristic rule at the center of our results *Performance-Gated Deliberation* ¹⁶⁶ (PGD). Plotted alongside the AR-RL performance in fig. 1d for our example foraging task, ¹⁶⁷ PGD (black line) achieves better performance than AR-RL overall. It is also insensitive to ¹⁶⁸ the applied disturbance since PGD uses C_t^{del} and C_t^{com} directly when deciding, rather than ¹⁶⁹ as input to problem of optimizing average-adjusted value as in AR-RL (fig. 1c).

¹⁷⁰ We constructed the above task so that PGD is the AR-RL optimal solution. In general, ¹⁷¹ however, PGD is a well-motivated approximation to the optimal strategy, so we call it a ¹⁷² heuristic. In the more general stochastic setting where there is residual uncertainty in trial ¹⁷³ reward at decision time, the PGD agent will have to learn the association between state ¹⁷⁴ and expected reward, \bar{r}_t . This association is learned from within-trial correlations only. In ¹⁷⁵ contrast, the opportunity cost of time as the basis for the deliberation cost depends on ¹⁷⁶ across-trial correlations that together determine the overall performance. It is thus more ¹⁷⁷ susceptible to non-stationarity. A typical task setting is when the value of the same low-level ¹⁷⁸ action plan differs across context. From hereon, we will assume the agent has learned the ¹⁷⁹ stationary opportunity cost of commitment and so focus on resolving the remaining problem: ¹⁸⁰ how to learn and use an opportunity cost of deliberation that exhibits non-stationarity on ¹⁸¹ the longer timescales over which context varies.

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3. Reward filtering for a dynamic opportunity cost of deliberation

The state disturbance in the toy example above altered task statistics at only a single time point. In general, however, changes in task statistics over time can occur throughout the task experience. A broader notion of deliberation cost beyond the static average reward is thus needed—one that can account for extended timescales over which performance varies. Such a cost serves as a dynamic reference in a relative definition of value based on a nonstationary opportunity cost of time. We first address how performance on various timescales can be estimated.

As a concrete example, we make use of the task that we will present in detail in the following section. This task has a context parameter, α , that can vary in time on characteristic timescales longer than the moment-to-moment and can serve as a source of non-stationarity in performance. Here, the context sequence, α_k , varies on a single timescale, e.g. through periodic switching between two values. The resulting performance (fig. 2a(top)) varies around the stationary average, ρ (purple), with context variation due to the switching (orange), as well as context-conditioned trial-to-trial variation (blue). The decomposition of time-varying performance into these multiple, timescale-specific components can be achieved by passing the reward signal through parallel filters, each designed to retain the signal variation specific to that timescale (fig. 2a(bottom)). There are multiple approaches to this decomposition.

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


Figure 2. Non-stationary opportunity cost. (a) Top: Dynamics of trial performance ($\rho_k^{\text{trial}} := R_k/T_k$; blue) with its distribution as well as dynamics of between context-conditioned averages of performance ($\rho_{\alpha} = \langle \rho_k^{\text{trial}} \rangle_{k|\alpha}$; orange), and the effectively stationary average performance ($\rho \sim \langle \rho_k^{\text{trial}} \rangle_k$; purple). Bottom: these are decomposed into a hierarchy by filtering reward history on trial, context, and long timescales, respectively. (b) Two hypothetical forms for context-specific trial opportunity cost. Top: Trial-unaware cost in which context varies the slope around ρ . Bottom: Trial-aware cost in which context varies the slope around ρ .

This filter is defined by an integration time, τ , tuned to trade off the bias and variance of the estimate in order to best capture the variation on the desired timescale (e.g. how performance varies over different contexts). We denote such an estimate $\hat{\rho}_k^{\tau}$, and show in the Methods that it approximates the average reward over the last τ time units. We discuss the question of biological implementation in the discussion, but note here that the number and values of τ needed to represent performance variation in a given task could be learned or selected from a more complete set in an online fashion during task learning. In an experimental setting, these learned values can in principle be inferred from observed behaviour and we developed such an approach in the analysis of data that we present in the following settion.

Applying this heuristic decomposition here, the stationary reward rate, ρ , can be esti-²¹³ mated to high precision by using a long integration time, τ_{long} , to the reward sequence R_k , ²¹⁴ producing the estimate $\hat{\rho}_k^{\tau_{\text{long}}}$. If $\boldsymbol{\alpha}_k$ were a constant sequence, $C_t^{\text{del}} = \hat{\rho}_k^{\tau_{\text{long}}} t$, the station-²¹⁵ ary opportunity cost of deliberation eq. (3) of AR-RL. However, in this example context ²¹⁶ varies on a specific timescale, to which the former is insensitive. Thus, a second filtered ²¹⁷ estimate $\hat{\rho}_k^{\tau_{\text{context}}}$ is needed to estimate performance on this timescale. Unlike $\hat{\rho}_k^{\tau_{\text{long}}}$, this es-²¹⁸ timate tracks the effective instantaneous, context-specific performance, ρ_{α_k} . Its estimation ²¹⁹ error arises from a trade-off, controlled by the integration time, τ_{context} , between its speed ²²⁰ of adaptation and its finite memory.

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We consider two distinct hypotheses for how to extend AR-RL to settings where performance varies over context. The first hypothesis, $C_t^{\text{del}} = \rho_{\alpha} t$, is the straightforward, *trialunaware* extension of eq. (3), shown in fig. 2b(top). Here, performance is tracked only on a timescale sufficient to capture context variation and the corresponding cost estimate, $\hat{\rho}_{k-1}^{\text{context}}$, is incurred moment-to-moment, neglecting the trial-based task structure. However, this incorrectly lumps together two distinct opportunity costs: those incurred by momentby-moment decisions and those incurred as a result of the effective planning implied by performance that varies over context. In particular, context is defined over trials not momonage ments, and thus the context-specific component of opportunity cost of a trial is a sunken cost paid at the outset of a trial. This inspires a second *trial-aware* hypothesis

$$\mathcal{C}_t^{\text{del}} = \rho t + (\rho_\alpha - \rho) T_\alpha \,. \quad \text{(trial-aware opportunity cost)} \tag{5}$$

231 Equation (5) is plotted over trial time t in fig. 2b(bottom). Its first term is the AR-RL ²³² contribution from the stationary opportunity cost of moment-to-moment decisions using 233 the stationary reward rate, ρ estimated with $\hat{\rho}_k^{\tau_{\text{long}}}$. The second, novel term in eq. (5) is a 234 context-specific trial cost deviation incurred at the beginning of each trial and computed as 235 the average deviation in opportunity cost accumulated over a trial from that context (T_{α} $_{236}$ is the average duration of a trial in context α). This deviation fills the cost gap made by $_{237}$ using the stationary reward rate ρ in the moment-to-moment opportunity cost instead of 238 the context-specific average reward, ρ_{α} . This baseline cost derived from the orange time 239 series in fig. 2a(bottom) vanishes in expectation, as verified through the mixed-context ²⁴⁰ ensemble average reward (e.g. $\rho \equiv \sum_{\alpha} \rho_{\alpha} T_{\alpha} / \sum_{\alpha} T_{\alpha}$ when the context is distributed evenly ²⁴¹ among trials such that $\sum_{\alpha} (\rho_{\alpha} - \rho) T_{\alpha} = 0$). Thus, this opportunity cost reduces to that 242 used in AR-RL when ignoring context, and suggests a generalization of average-adjusted ²⁴³ value functions to account for non-stationary context. We estimate this baseline cost using ²⁴⁵ $(\hat{\rho}_{k-1}^{\tau_{\text{context}}} - \hat{\rho}_{k-1}^{\tau_{\text{long}}})T_{k-1}$, where we have used the sample T_{k-1} in lieu of the average T_{α} . See fig. S1 ²⁴⁵ for a signal filtering diagram that produces this estimate of eq. (5) from reward history. A ²⁴⁶ main difference between the cost profiles from the two hypotheses is the cost at early times. ²⁴⁷ Both the behaviour and neural recordings we analyze below seem to favor the second, trial-²⁴⁸ aware hypothesis eq. (5). We hereon employ that version in the main text, and show the ²⁴⁹ results for the trial-unaware hypothesis in fig. S7.

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B. Neuroscience application: PGD in the tokens task

In this section, we apply the PGD algorithm to the "tokens task" [16]. We first give a simulated example with periodic context dynamics. We then present an application to a set of non-human primate experiments in which context variation was non-stationary [19]. For the latter, we used the decision time dynamics over trials to fit a model for each of the stwo subjects. We then validated the models by assessing their ability to explain (1) the neural activity in premotor cortex (PMd) via the temporal profile of the underlying neural urgency signals.

In the tokens task, the subject must guess as to which of two peripheral reaching targets will receive the majority of tokens that randomly jump, one by one every 200ms, from a central pool initialized with a fixed number of tokens. Importantly, after the subject reports, the interval between remaining jumps contracts to once every 150ms (the "slow" condition)

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²⁶³ or once every 50ms (the "fast" condition), giving the subject the possibility to save time by ²⁶⁴ taking an early guess. The interval contraction factor, $1 - \alpha$, for slow ($\alpha = 1/4$) and fast ²⁶⁵ ($\alpha = 3/4$) condition is parametrized $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, the incentive strength to decide early, which ²⁶⁶ then serves as the task context.

In contrast to the patch leaving task example from Section A, the tokens task has many within-trial states and the state dynamics is stochastic. With the t^{th} jump labelled $S_t \in$ $\{-1,1\}$ serving as the state, for the purposes of prediction, the history of states can be compressed into the tokens difference, $N_t = \sum_{i=1}^t S_i$, between the two peripheral targets with $N_0 = 0$. The dynamics of N_t is an unbiased random walk (see fig. 3a), with its current value sufficient to determine the belief of a correct report, b_t (computed in Methods). Since opportunity cost of commitment, C_t^{com} (eq. (2)). We display this commitment cost dynamics in fig. 3b. It evolves on a lattice (gray), always starting at 0.5 (for p = 1/2) and ending at 0 report for all p. We assume the agent has learned to track this commitment cost. The PGD agent determine when to stop deliberating and report its guess.

1. A simulated example for a regularly alternating context sequence

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We first show the behaviour of the PGD algorithm in the simple case where α switches back and forth every 300 trials (see fig. 3). We call such segments of constant α 'trial blocks', with context alternating between slow ($\alpha = 1/4$) and fast ($\alpha = 3/4$) blocks. The decision space in PGD is a space of opportunity costs, equivalent to the alternative decision space formulated using beliefs [7]. In particular, one can think of the deliberation cost as the decision boundary (fig. 3b). This boundary is dynamic (see Supplemental video), depending error on performance history via the estimates, $\hat{\rho}_k^{\tau_{context}}$ and $\hat{\rho}_k^{\tau_{long}}$, of the context-conditioned and stationary average reward, respectively. The result of these dynamics is effective context planning: the PGD algorithm sacrifices accuracy to achieve shorter trial duration in trials of the fast block, achieving a higher context-conditioned reward rate compared to decisions understood by analyzing the dynamics of $\hat{\rho}_k^{\tau_{context}}$ and $\hat{\rho}_k^{\tau_{long}}$, and their effect on the dynamics of the decision time ensemble.

The two performance estimates behave differently from one another solely because of 294 their distinct integration times. Ideally, an agent would choose τ_{context} to be large enough that it serves to average over trial-to-trial fluctuations in a context, but short enough to ²⁹⁷ not average over context fluctuations. In contrast, the value of τ_{long} would be chosen large ²⁹⁸ enough to average over context fluctuations. We apply those choices in this simulated ²⁹⁹ example, with rounded values chosen squarely in the range in which the values inferred 300 from the behaviour in the following application will lie. As a result of this chosen values, 301 the context estimate $\hat{\rho}_k^{\tau_{\text{context}}}$ relaxes relatively quickly after context switches to the context-302 conditioned stationary average performance (dashed lines in fig. 3d), but exhibits stronger ³⁰³ fluctuations as a result. The estimate of the stationary reward, $\hat{\rho}_k^{\tau_{\text{long}}}$, on the other hand has ³⁰⁴ relatively smaller variance. This variance results from the residual zigzag relaxation over the ³⁰⁵ period of the limit cycle. Given the characteristic block duration, T_{block} , we can more more 306 precise. In particular, when T_{block} is much less than τ_{long} $(T_{\text{block}}/\tau_{\text{long}} \ll 1)$, the within-block 307 exponential relaxation is roughly linear. Thus, the average unsigned deviation between $\hat{\rho}_k^{\tau_{\text{long}}}$ 308 and the actual stationary reward, ρ , can be approximated using $1 - \exp\left[-T_{\text{block}}/\tau_{\text{long}}\right] \approx$

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


Figure 3. PGD agent performs the tokens task for periodic context switching. (a) A tokens task trial. Left: Tokens jump from a center to a peripheral region (gray circles). Right: The tokens difference, N_t , evolves as a random walk that accelerates according to α (here 3/4) post-decision time, t^{dec} . The trial duration is T, which includes an inter-trial interval. (b) Decision dynamics in cost space obtained from evidence dynamics in (a). Commitment cost trajectories (gray lattice; thick gray: trial-averaged) start at $C_{t=0}^{\text{com}}$ and end at 0. Trajectory from (a) shown in black. t^{dec} (black cross) is determined by the crossing of the commitment and deliberation cost. (c) Incentive strength switches between two values every 300 trials. (d) Expected rewards filtered on τ_{long} ($\hat{\rho}_k^{\tau_{\text{long}}}$, purple) and τ_{context} ($\hat{\rho}_k^{\tau_{\text{context}}}$, green). Black dashed lines from bottom to top are $\rho_{\alpha=1/4}$, ρ , and $\rho_{\alpha=3/4}$.

 $T_{\rm block}/\tau_{\rm long} \ll 1$. This scaling fits the simulated data well (fig. S2d: inset).

The dynamics of these two performance estimates drives the dynamics of the k-conditioned ³¹¹ decision time ensemble via how they together determine the deliberation cost (eq. (5); Sup-³¹² plemental video). For example, the mean component of this ensemble relaxes after a context ³¹³ switch to the context-conditioned average, while the fluctuating component remains strong ³¹⁴ due to the sequence of random walk realizations (fig. S2c). In the case of periodic context, ³¹⁵ the performance estimates and thus also the decision time ensemble relax into a noisy peri-³¹⁶ odic trajectory over the period of a pair of fast and slow blocks (fig. 3d). Over this period, ³¹⁷ they exhibit some stationary bias and variance relative to their corresponding stationary ³¹⁸ averages (distributions shown in fig. S2e).

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2. Fit to behavioural data from non-human primates and model validation

Next, we fit a PGD agent to each of the two non-human primates' behaviour in the tokens task experiments reported in [19]. As with the above example (*c.f.* fig. 3), trials were structured in alternating blocks of two values of α . We used the actual context-switching α -sequence from these experiments, which, in contrast to the above example. exhibits large, structurations in block size, primarily as a result of the experimenter adapting to fluctuations in motivation of the subject (see fig. 5a)[29].

So far, PGD has only two free parameters: the two filtering time constants, τ_{long} and 326 $\tau_{\rm context}$. We anticipated only a weak dependence of the fit on the $\tau_{\rm long}$, so long as it exceeded ³²⁸ the average duration of a handful of trial blocks enabling a sufficiently precise estimate of $_{329} \rho$. In contrast, the context filtering timescale, τ_{context} , is a crucial parameter as it dictates ³³⁰ where the PGD agent lies on a bias-variance trade-off in estimating ρ_{α_k} , the value of which $_{331}$ determines the context-specific contribution to the deliberation cost (eq. (2)). To facilitate ³³² the model's ability to fit individual differences, we introduce a subjective reward bias factor, $_{333}$ K, that scales the rewards fed into the performance filters. We also added a tracking- $_{334}$ cost sensitivity parameter, ν , that controls τ_{context} to avoid wasting adaptation speed (see ³³⁵ Methods for details). The latter made it possible to fit the asymmetric switching behaviour 336 observed in the average decision time dynamics. With these four parameters, we could ³³⁷ quantitatively match the average decision time dynamics around the two context switches 339 (fig. 4a,b; see Methods for fitting details). A comparison of the best-fitting parameter values ³⁴⁰ over the two monkeys (fig. 4c-e) suggests that the larger the reward bias (fig. 4d), the more hasty the context-conditioned performance estimate (the smaller $\hat{\tau}_{\text{context}}$), and the lower the ³⁴² sensitivity to the tracking cost (fig. 4e). This is consistent with the hypothesis that subjects ³⁴³ withhold cognitive effort in contexts of higher perceived reward [8]. Inspecting the shape of ³⁴⁴ the basins around the best-fitting values, we confirmed our expectation that the fitting error $_{345}$ along the τ_{long} dimension was relatively flat above a soft lower bound (around 5000 time ³⁴⁶ steps in fig. 4c; the upper bound for visually acceptable fits was imposed by the duration of ³⁴⁷ the experiment). Indeed, this error basin was much wider in this dimension than along the $_{348}$ $\tau_{\rm context}$ -dimension. Along with the correspondence in temporal statistics of the behaviour ₃₄₉ (e.g. fig. S6), the fitted model parameters for the two subjects provides a basis on which 350 to interpret the subject differences in the results of the next section, in particular their ₃₅₁ separation on a speed-accuracy trade-off, as originating in the distinct reward sensitivity 353 shown here.

With the models fit, we then tested them on the state-dependence of their decisions. A ³⁵⁵ robust and rich representation of the behavioural statistics is the state and time-conditioned ³⁵⁶ survival probability that a decision has not yet occurred. It serves as a summary of the ³⁵⁷ action policy associated with a stationary strategy (see Methods for its calculation from ³⁵⁸ response times). Applied equally to the decision times of both model and data, it can ³⁵⁹ provide a means of comparison even in this non-stationary setting. We give this conditional ³⁶⁰ probability for each of the two contexts for subject 1 in fig. 5b-e. We left the many possible ³⁶¹ noise sources underlying the behaviour out of the model in order to more clearly demonstrate ³⁶² the PGD algorithm. However, such noise sources would be necessary to quantitatively match ³⁶³ the variability in the data (e.g. added noise in the performance estimates leads to larger ³⁶⁴ variability in the location of the decision boundary and thus also to larger spread in these ³⁶⁵ survival probability functions (not shown)). In the absence of these noise sources, we see the ³⁶⁶ model underestimates the spread of probability over time and tokens state. Nevertheless,

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


Figure 4. Model fit. (a,b) decision times (dots) aligned on the context-switching event type (fast-toslow in gray; slow-to-fast in color) and averaged. Shaded regions are the standard error bounds of the models' average decision times. (c) Error evaluated on a $(\hat{\tau}_{\text{context}}, \hat{\tau}_{\text{long}})$ -plane cut through the parameter space at the best-fitting $\nu = \hat{\nu}^*$ and $K = \hat{K}^*$ (gray area indicates timescales within an order of magnitude of the end of the experiment). Contours show the first 10 contours incrementing by 0.01 error from the minimum (shown as a circle marker). Colors refer to subject, as in (a) and (b). (d) Same for $(\hat{\tau}_{\text{context}}, \hat{K})$ at $\hat{\tau}_{\text{long}} = \hat{\tau}^*_{\text{long}}$ and $\nu = \hat{\nu}^*$. (e) Same for $(\hat{\tau}_{\text{context}}, \hat{\nu})$ at $\hat{\tau}_{\text{long}} = \hat{\tau}^*_{\text{long}}$ and $K = \hat{K}^*$.

the remarkably smooth average strategy is well captured by the model (white dashed lines in fig. 5c-e). Specifically, policies approximately decide once either of the peripheral targets receive a certain number of tokens. Comparing results across context, we find that fast block strategies (fig. 5d,e) exhibit earlier decision times relative to slow block strategies (fig. 5d,e) in both model and data. The strategies for subject 2 are qualitatively similar, but shifted to earlier times relative to subject 1 (fig. S3). Our model explains this subject difference as resulting from subject 2's larger reward bias and faster context integration (*c.f.* fig. 4d). The correspondence between model and data over the many token states in fig. 5b-e results is remarkable given that the model has essentially only a single, crucial degree of freedom to how decision times depend on token state.

To better understand where both the data and the PGD agent lie in the space of strategies for the tokens task, we computed reward-rate (AR-RL) optimal solutions for a given fixed

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


Figure 5. Comparison of PGD to NHP data for non-stationary α -dynamics from Ref. [19]. (a) Block length sequence used in the experiment (c.f. fig. 3c). (b-e) Interpolated state-conditioned survival probabilities, $P(t^{dec} = t|N_t, t)$, over slow (b,c) and fast (d,e) blocks. White dotted lines show the $P(t^{dec} = t|N_t, t) = 0.5$ contour. (f) Shown is the reward rate as a function of incentive strength, α (wait-for-certainty strategy shown in blue; one-and-done strategy shown in orange). We additionally show the slow and fast context-conditioned reward rates for the two primates as well as a reference expert human, and the PGD solution (black line). Reward rates for the human and non-human primates are squarely in between the best (brown) and uniformily random (gray) strategy. (g,h) State-conditioned decision time frequencies (cross size) from AR-RL optimal decision boundaries across different values of the auxiliary deliberation cost (colored crosses) for slow (g) and fast (h) conditions. Only samples with $N_t < 0$ and $N_t > 0$, respectively, are shown. The reflected axes shows as gray crosses the subject's state-conditioned decision time frequencies for comparison.

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³⁷⁹ context, α (here $\alpha \in [0, 1]$), using the same approach as [7]. Iterating Bellman's equation ³⁸⁰ for this decision problem backwards from the end of the trial provides the optimal value ³⁸¹ functions from which the optimal policy and its reward rate can be obtained (see Methods for ³⁸² details). The optimal reward rate as a function α is shown in fig. 5f. The optimal strategies ³⁸³ generating these reward rates interpolate from the wait-for-certainty strategy at low α to ³⁸⁴ the one-and-done strategy [30] at high α . The α -conditioned reward rates achieved by the ³⁸⁵ two primates and a reference human [31] are also shown in fig. 5f. They fall conspicuously ³⁸⁶ below the optimal strategy, and, as expected, above the strategy that picks one of the three ³⁸⁷ actions (report left, report right, and wait) at random. Given the good match in behaviour ³⁸⁸ between the PGD model and data (*c.f.* fig. 5b,e), this intermediate performance is shared ³⁸⁹ by PGD's solution (black line).

What are the differences in decision times that underlie these performance differences? 390 ³⁹¹ Both the fitted PGD model and the primate behaviour resolve residual ambiguity ($N_t \approx 0$) at intermediate trial times (fig. 5b-e). In contrast, the optimal strategies give no intermediate decision times at ambiguous $(N_t \approx 0)$ states, invariably waiting until the ambiguity resolves (see fig. 5g,h). To assess the extent of this difference, and for comparison with previous 394 work [7], we added to the reward objective a constant auxiliary deliberation cost rate, c_{i} incurred up to the decision time in each trial. We find that the resulting optimal strategies lack intermediate decision times at ambiguous states for all c > 0 and in fact over the entire 397 (α, c) -plane (see fig. S9 for the complete dependence). This holds also under the addition of 398 a movement cost, i.e. a constant cost incurred by either of the reporting actions (data not 400 shown). Thus, whereas optimal policies shift around the edges of the relevant decision space $_{401}$ as α or c is varied, the PGD policy lies squarely in the bulk, tightly overlaying the policy 402 extracted from the data. We conclude that the context-conditioned strategies of the non-⁴⁰³ human primates in this task are well-captured by PGD, while having little resemblance to the 404 behaviour that would maximize reward rate with or without a fixed auxiliary deliberation 405 cost rate.

406

3. Neural urgency and context-dependent opportunity cost

So far, we have fit and analyzed the PGD model with respect to recorded behaviour. Here, 407 we take a step in the important direction of confronting the above theory of behaviour with 409 the neural dynamics that we propose drive it. The proposal for the tokens task mentioned ⁴¹⁰ at the end of the introduction has evidence strength and urgency combining in PMd, whose 411 neural dynamics implements the decision process. In fig. 6a, we restate in a schematic ⁴¹² diagram an implementation of this dynamics that includes a collapsing decision boundary. $_{413}$ In the one-dimensional belief space for the choice (fig. 6a(top)) [7, 32], the rising belief ⁴¹⁴ collides with the collapsing boundary to determine the decision time. In the equivalent commitment and deliberation cost formulation developed here (fig. 6a(middle)), the falling 416 commitment cost collides with the rising deliberation cost. The collapsing boundary in 417 belief space can be parametrized as $C - u_t$, where C is the initial strength of belief, e.g. 418 some desired confidence, that is lowered by a growing function of trial time $u_t > 0$. The 419 decision criterion is then $b_t > C - u_t$, where b_t is the belief, i.e. the probability of a correct $_{420}$ report. For AR-RL optimal policies, u_t emerges from value maximization and thus has a ⁴²¹ complicated dependence on the opportunity cost sequence, $\mathcal{C}_t^{\text{del}}$. For PGD, in contrast, C 422 is interpreted as the maximum reward r_{max} and u_t is identically $\mathcal{C}_t^{\text{del}}$. For a linear neural ⁴²³ encoding model in which belief, rather than evidence, is encoded in neural activity, the sum

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⁴²⁴ of the encoded belief \tilde{b}_t and the encoded collapsing boundary, \tilde{u}_t , evolve on a one-dimensional ⁴²⁵ choice manifold. According to the proposal, when this sum becomes sufficiently large (e.g. ⁴²⁶ $\tilde{b}_t + \tilde{u}_t > \tilde{C}$ for some threshold \tilde{C}), PMd begins to drive the activity in downstream motor ⁴²⁷ areas towards the associated response.

Neural urgency was computed from the PMd recordings of [19] in [33]. This computation 428 429 relies on the assumption that while a single neuron's contribution to \tilde{b}_t will depend on 430 its selectivity for choice (left or right report), the urgency \tilde{u}_t is a signal arising from a 431 population-level drive to all PMd neurons, irrespective of their selectivity. Thus, \tilde{u}_t can $_{432}$ be extracted from neural recordings by conditioning on zero-evidence states ($b_t = 0$) and ⁴³³ averaging over cells. In [33], error bars were computed at odd times via bootstrapping; data ⁴³⁴ at even times was obtained by interpolating between $N_t = \pm 1$; and data was pooled from 435 both subjects. We have excluded times at which firing rate error bars exceed the range ⁴³⁶ containing predictions from both blocks. To assess the correspondence of the components ⁴³⁷ of the deliberation cost developed here and neural urgency, in fig. 6b we replot their result $_{438}$ (c.f. fig.8b of [33]). We overlay the mean (+/- standard deviation) of the opportunity cost ⁴³⁹ sequence, $\mathcal{C}_t^{\text{del}}$ (shaded area in fig. 4; averaged over all trials produced by applying the two 440 fitted PGD models on the data sequence and conditioning the resulting average within-⁴⁴¹ trial deliberation cost on context). To facilitate our qualitative comparison, we convert 442 cost to spikes/step simply by adjusting the y-axis of the deliberation cost. The observed ⁴⁴³ urgency signals then lie within the uncertainty of the context-conditioned deliberation cost 444 signals computed from the fitted PGD models. There are multiple features of the qualitative $_{445}$ correspondence exhibited in fig. 6b: (1) the linear rise in time; (2) the same slope across 446 both fast and slow conditions; and (3) the baseline offset between conditions, where the fast 447 condition is offset to higher values than the slow condition. Such features would remain 448 descriptive in the absence of a theory. With the theory we have presented here, however, 449 each has their respective explanations via the interpretation of urgency as the opportunity 450 cost of deliberation: (1) the subject uses a constant cost per token jump, (2) this cost rate ⁴⁵¹ refers to moment-to-moment decisions, irrespective of context, that is reflective of the use ⁴⁵² of the context-agnostic stationary reward, and (3) trial-aware planning over contexts leads 453 to an opportunity cost baseline offset with a sign given by the reward rate deviation $\rho_{\alpha} - \rho$ with respect to the stationary average, ρ . 454

⁴⁵⁵ Up to now, the computational and neural basis for urgency has remained largely un-⁴⁵⁶ explored in normative approaches, which also typically say little about adaptation effects ⁴⁵⁷ (see [34] for a notable exception). In summary, we exploited the adaptation across context ⁴⁵⁸ switches to learn the model and explained earlier responses in high reward rate contexts ⁴⁵⁹ as the result of a higher opportunity cost of deliberation. While this qualitative effect is ⁴⁶⁰ expected, we go beyond existing work by quantitatively predicting the average dependence ⁴⁶¹ on both time and state (fig. 5b-e) as well as the qualitative form of urgency signal (fig. 6b). ⁴⁶² Taken together, the data is thus consistent with our interpretation that neural activity un-⁴⁶³ derlying context-conditioned decisions is gated by opportunity costs reflective of a trial-aware ⁴⁶⁴ timescale hierarchy computed using performance estimation on multiple timescales.

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DISCUSSION

We have proposed PGD, a heuristic decision-making algorithm for continuing tasks that der gates deliberation based on performance. We constructed a foraging example for which

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


Figure 6. Comparing neural urgency and collapsing decision boundaries. (a) Top: Rising belief (blue) meets collapsing decision boundary (black dashed) in belief space. Middle: Falling commitment cost (blue) meets rising deliberation cost (black-dashed) in cost space. Bottom: Belief/commitment cost is encoded (blue) into a low-dimensional neural manifold, with the addition of an urgency signal (orange) (c.f. fig.8 in [7]). The decision (red circle) is taken when the sum passes a fixed threshold (black-dashed). (b) Deliberation cost maps onto the urgency signal extracted from zero-evidence conditioned cell-averaged firing rate in PMd.

⁴⁶⁸ PGD is the optimal strategy with respect to the average-adjusted value function of average-⁴⁶⁹ reward reinforcement learning (AR-RL). While this will not be true in general, PGD does ⁴⁷⁰ strike a balance between strategy complexity and return. The PGD decision rule does not ⁴⁷¹ depend on task specifics and exploits the stationarity of the environment statistics while 472 simultaneously hedging against longer term non-stationarity in reward context. It does 473 so by splitting the problem into two separate components—learning the statistics of the 474 environment in order to form the opportunity cost of commitment, and tracking one's own performance in that environment in order to form the opportunity cost of deliberation. Within our current understanding of how the cortico-basal ganglia system supports higherlevel decision-making [35], this latter cost is proposed as arising from performance estimated on multiple, behaviourally-relevant timescales that are broadcast to multiple, lower-level 478 decision-making areas to gate the speed of their respective attractor-based decision-making dynamics (models of the latter are well-studied [32, 36, 37]). Consistent with this picture, PGD's explanatory power was borne out at both the behavioural and neural levels for the 481 ⁴⁸² tokens task data we analyzed. In particular, a deliberation cost constructed from trial-aware planning was supported independently by both modalities. We used behavioural data to ⁴⁹⁴ fit and validate the theory, and neural recordings to provide evidence of one of the neural ⁴⁸⁵ correlates it proposes: the temporal profile of neural urgency.

Scientific and clinical implications In our proposal, we have linked two important and tas related, but often disconnected fields: the systems neuroscience of the neural dynamics of decision-making and the cognitive neuroscience of opportunity cost and reward sensitivity. The view that tonic dopamine encodes average reward is two decades old [3]. However, the existence of a reward representation decomposed by timescale has received increasing equipart empirical support in recent years, from cognitive results [38–40] to a recent unified view of

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⁴⁹² how dopamine encodes reward prediction errors using multiple discount factors [41, 42] and $_{493}$ of dopamine as encoding both value and uncertainty [43]. Dopamine's effect on time per- $_{494}$ ception has been proposed [44] and has empirical support [45], but the mechanism by which 495 its putative effect on decision speed is implicated in the neural dynamics of the decisionmaking areas driving motor responses was unknown. Our theory fills this explanatory gap ⁴⁹⁷ by considering dynamic evidence tasks and parametrizing urgency using a multiple-timescale ⁴⁹⁸ representation of performance. One candidate for the latter's neural implementation is in the complex spatio-temporal filtering of dopamine via release-driven tissue diffusion and integration via DR1 and DR2 binding kinetics [46]. Subsequent neural filtering and computation by striatal network activity could also play a role [47]. The study of spatiotemporal filtering 501 of dopamine is increasingly accessible experimentally [48, 49] and provides an exciting direction for multi-scale analysis of behaviour. Our proposal that urgency is the means by which the neural representation of reward ultimately affects neural dynamics in decision-making 504 areas frames a timely research question on which these questions could shed light. 505

While we applied PGD to decisions playing out in PMd, a decision-making area relevant 506 507 to arm movements, PGD may also be relevant to other kinds of decisions. For instance, a large body of work has studied decisions playing out in lateral intraparietal cortex using random dot motions tasks. One seminal study identified an urgency signal with the same 509 properties: a linear dependence at early trial times and an offset with sign given by the 510 ⁵¹¹ reward rate deviation across two and four-choice trials, which serve as the two contexts [17]. In contrast to the tokens task, however, context was sampled randomly and thus its dynamics ⁵¹³ lacked temporal correlation. In this case, we might expect that a pair of performance filters, ⁵¹⁴ one for each context, to track the reward history in two parallel streams, each updated only ⁵¹⁵ when in their respective context. In this case, our theory would predict that the ratio of ⁵¹⁶ slopes of urgency reflect the ratio of context-conditioned reward rates. An estimation given ⁵¹⁷ in the Methods for this data [17] agrees to within 20% error, providing preliminary support for our theory. Testing the generality of our theory using tailored experiments in this other 518 ⁵¹⁹ setting is an important next step.

⁵²⁰ Urgency may play a role in both decision and action processes, potentially providing a ⁵²¹ transdiagnostic indicator of a wide range of cognitive and motor impairments in Parkinson's ⁵²² disease and depression [50]. Our theory offers a means to ground these diverse results in ⁵²³ neural dynamics by formulating opportunity cost estimation as the underlying causal factor ⁵²⁴ linking vigor impairments (e.g. in Parkinson's disease) and dysregulated dopamine signalling ⁵²⁵ in the reward system [50–52]. We provide a concrete proposal for a signal filtering system ⁵²⁶ that extracts a context-sensitive opportunity cost from a reward prediction error sequence ⁵²⁷ putatively encoded by dopamine. Neural recordings of basal ganglia provide a means to ⁵²⁸ identify the neural substrate for this system.

Commitment cost estimation Beyond the estimation of the opportunity cost of deliberation, we assumed that the agent had a precise estimate of the expected reward, which it used to compute the within-trial commitment cost. For the tokens task, a recorded signal in dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex of non-human primates correlates strongly with belief [20], are equivalent to the expected reward for binary rewards). How this quantity is computed by neural systems is not currently known. However, for a general class of tasks, a generic, neurally plausible means to learn the expected reward is via distributional value codes [43]. For example, the Laplace code is a distributional value representation that uses an ensemble of units over a range of temporal discount factors and reward sensitivities [53]. The authors show that expected reward is linearly decodeable from this representation.

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Experimental predictions A feature of our decision-making theory is that it is highly vulnerable to falsification. First, with regards to behaviour via the shape of the action policy using our survival probability representation (*c.f.* fig. 5b-e,g,h), PGD varies markedly with reward structure and thus provides a wealth of predictions for how observed behaviour statistical should be altered by it. For example, a salient feature of the standard tokens task is its reflection symmetry in the tokens difference, N_t . We can break this symmetry for which the theory predicts a distinctly asymmetric shape (fig. S10; for details see Methods). Our theory fais also prescriptive for neural activity via the temporal profile of neural urgency. The slope of C_t^{del} remained fixed across blocks for relatively short block lengths used in the data analyzed here. In the opposite limit, $T_{\text{block}}/\tau_{\text{long}} \gg 1$, $\rho_k^{\tau_{\text{long}}}$ approaches ρ_{α} except when undergoing large, transient excursions after context switches. Thus, the deliberation cost is given by the first component in eq. (5) most of the time, with the context specific reward rate as the slope. One simple prediction is that the slope of urgency should exhibit increasing variation station of the blocks increases.

Reinforcement learning theory Our work impacts reinforcement learning theory by sug-554 gesting how to generalize average-adjusted value functions to time-varying opportunity cost 555 of time in a way that reduces to AR-RL when context is not tracked. This further develops 556 episodic AR-RL in the continuing task setting, which has received relatively little attention 557 from AR-RL machine learning research, and yet is central to experimental neuroscience. 558 The epistemic perspective entailed in the estimation of these costs parallels a recent epis-559 temic interpretation of the discount-reward formulation as encoding knowledge about the 560 volatility of the environment [54].

Our work also suggests a new class of reinforcement learning algorithms between model-⁵⁶² based and model-free: only parts of the algorithm need adjustment upon task structure ⁵⁶³ variation. This is reminiscent of how the effects of complex state dynamics are decoupled ⁵⁶⁴ from reward when using a successor representation [55], but tailored for the average-reward ⁵⁶⁵ rather than the discount-reward formulation. We have left a detailed algorithmic analysis of ⁵⁶⁶ PGD to future work, but expect performance improvements, as with successor representa-⁵⁶⁷ tions, in settings where decoupling the learning of environment statistics from the learning ⁵⁶⁸ of reward structure is beneficial.

Comparison with humans In the space of strategies, PGD lies in a regime between fully 569 exploiting assumed task knowledge (average-case optimal) and assumption-free adaptation 570 (worst-case optimal). Highly incentivized human behaviour is likely to be more structured 571 than PGD because of access to more sophisticated learning. While some humans land on 572 the optimal one-and-done policy in the fast condition when playing the tokens task [56], most do not. The human brain likely has all the components needed to implement PGD. 575 Nevertheless, the situations in which we actually exploit PGD, if any, are as yet unclear. In ⁵⁷⁶ particular, how PGD and AR-RL relate to existing behavioural models tailored to explain relative-value, context-dependent decision-making in humans [4], such as scale and shift adaptation 57, is an open question. Whether or not PGD is built into our decision-making, ⁵⁷⁹ the question remains if PGD is optimal with respect to some bounded rational objective. ⁵⁵⁰ In spite of the many issues with the latter approach [58], using it to further understand the computational advantages of PGD is an interesting direction for future work. 581

Despite our putative access to sophisticated computation, humans still exhibit measurable bias in how we incorporate past experience [59]. One simple example is the win-stay/losestat shift strategy, a more rudimentary kind of performance-gated decision-making than PGD, ses which explains how humans approach the rock-paper-scissors game [60]. In that work,

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⁵⁹⁶ numerical experiments demonstrated that this strategy outperforms at a population level the ⁵⁹⁷ optimal Nash equilibrium for this game, demonstrating that the use of such seemingly sub-⁵⁹⁸ optimal strategies can confer a surprising evolutionary advantage. This example supports ⁵⁸⁹ the claim that relatively simple and nimble strategies such as PGD make for attractive ⁵⁹⁰ candidates when acknowledging that a combination of knowledge and resource limitations ⁵⁹¹ over task, development, and evolutionary timescales have shaped decision-making in non-⁵⁹² stationary environments.

METHODS

⁵⁹⁴ Code for simulations and main figure generation (written in Python 3) is publicly acces-⁵⁹⁵ sible as a online repository: https://github.com/mptouzel/dyn_opp_cost/.

Patch leaving task

⁵⁹⁷ We devised a mathematically tractable patch leaving task for which PGD learning is ⁵⁹⁸ optimal with respect to the average-adjusted value function. Here the value is simply the ⁵⁹⁹ return from the patch. This value function is related, but not equivalent to the marginal ⁶⁰⁰ value of optimal foraging, for which the decision rule is $C_t^{\text{del}} > r_{\text{max}} - C_t^{\text{com}} = \bar{r}_t$ [5]). This ⁶⁰¹ choice of task allowed us to compare PGD's convergence properties relative to conventional ⁶⁰² AR-RL algorithms that make use of value functions. In contrast to PGD, the latter requires ⁶⁰³ exploration. For a comparison generous to the AR-RL algorithm, we allowed it to circumvent ⁶⁰⁴ exploration by estimating the value function from off-policy decisions obtained from the ⁶⁰⁵ PGD algorithm using the same learning rate. We then compared them to PGD using their ⁶⁰⁶ on-policy, patched-averaged reward. This made for a comparison based solely between the ⁶⁰⁷ parameters of the respective models. If we did not allow for this, the

⁶⁰⁸ ar-RL algorithms would have to find good learning signals by exploring. In any form, this ⁶⁰⁹ exploration would lead them converge substantially slower. This setting thus provides a ⁶¹⁰ lower bound on the convergence times of the AR-RL algorithm.

In this task, the subject randomly samples (with replacement) d patches, each of a distinct, fixed, and renewable richness defined by the maximum return conferred. These maximum returns are sampled before the task from a richness distribution, $p(r_{\text{max}})$, with $r_{\text{max}} > 0$ and are fixed throughout the experiment. The trials of the task are temporally extended periods during which the subject consumes the current patch. After a time t in a patch, the return is defined $r(t) = r_{\text{max}}(1 - (\lambda t)^{-1})$. This patch return profile, $1 - (\lambda t)^{-1}$, is shared across all patches and saturates in time with rate λ , a parameter of the environment that sets the reference timescale. The return diverges negatively for vanishing patch leaving times for mathematical convenience, but also evokes situations where leaving a patch soon after a leaving time, t_s , for each of d patches, where the s-subscript indexes the patch. Given any policy, the stationary reward rate for uniformly random sampling of patches is then defined as

$$\rho = \sum_{s=1}^{d} r_s(t_s) \bigg/ \sum_{s=1}^{d} t_s \,. \tag{6}$$

⁶²⁴ We designed this task to (1) emphasize the speed-return trade-off typical in many delibera-

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⁶²⁵ tion tasks, and (2) have a tractable solution with which to compare convergence properties ⁶²⁶ of PGD and AR-RL value function learning algorithms.

A natural optimal policy is the one that maximizes the average-adjusted trial return, 627 ₆₂₈ $Q(r,t) = r - \rho t$. Given the return profile we have chosen, the corresponding optimal decision 629 time, t_s^* , in the sth patch obtained by maximizing $r - \rho t$ is $t_s^* = \sqrt{r_{\max,s}/(\lambda \rho)}$, which scales 630 inversely with the reward rate so that decision times are earlier for larger reward rates, ⁶³¹ because consumption (or more generally deliberation) at larger reward rates costs more. We 632 chose this return profile such that stationary PGD learning gives exactly the same decision ⁶³³ times: the condition $C_t^{\text{del}} = C_t^{\text{com}}$ for patch *s* here takes the form $\rho t_s = r_{\max,s}/(\lambda t_s)$. Thus, ⁶³⁴ they share the same optimal reward rate, ρ^* . Using t_s^* for each patch in eq. (6) gives a 635 self-consistency equation for ρ with solution $\rho^* = \lambda \mu_1^2 / 4 \mu_{1/2}^2$, where $\mu_n = \langle r_{\max}^n \rangle_{p(r_{\max})}$ (we $_{636}$ have assumed d is large here to remove dependence on s). Described so far in continuous 637 time, the value function was implemented in discrete time such that the action space is a finite set of decision times selected using the greedy policy, $t^* = \operatorname{argmax}_t Q(r, t)$, where ₆₃₉ $\hat{Q}(r,t)$ is the estimated trial return. As a result, there is a finite lower bound on the 640 performance gap, i.e. the relative error, $\epsilon = (\rho^* - \rho)/\rho^* > 0$ for the AR-RL algorithm. ⁶⁴¹ Approaching this bound, convergence time for both PGD and AR-RL learning is limited ₆₄₂ by the integration time τ of the estimate $\hat{\rho}_k^{\tau}$ (c.f. eq. (8)) of ρ . We note that PGD learns ⁶⁴³ faster in all parameter combinations tested. To demonstrate the insensitivity of PGD to the ₆₄₄ state space representation, at 5×10^5 time steps into the experiment we shuffled the labels 645 of the states. PGD is unaffected, while the value function-based AR-RL algorithm is forced 646 to relearn and in fact does so slower than in the initial learning phase, due to the much ₆₄₇ larger distance between two random samples, than between the initial values (chosen near ⁶⁴⁸ the mean) and the target sample.

Filtering performance history

For unit steps of discrete time, the step-wise update of the performance estimate, $\hat{\rho}_t^{\tau}$, is

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$$\hat{\rho}_t^{\tau} = (1 - \beta)\hat{\rho}_{t-1}^{\tau} + \beta R_t , \qquad (7)$$

with $\beta = 1/(1+\tau)$ called the learning rate, and τ the characteristic width of the exponential ⁶⁵¹ window of the corresponding continuous time filter over which the history is averaged. We ⁶⁵³ add τ as a superscript when denoting the estimate to indicate this. Exceptionally, here t ⁶⁵⁴ indexes absolute time rather than trial time. Note that a continuous-time formulation of ⁶⁵⁵ the update is possible via an event-based map given the decision times in which the reward ⁶⁵⁶ event sequence is given as a sum of delta functions. In either case, to leading order in β , ⁶⁵⁷ $\hat{\rho}_t^{\tau} \approx \beta \sum_i^t R_i$, i.e. the filter sums past rewards. Thus, when $\tau \sim \mathcal{O}(t) \gg 1$, $\beta \sim \mathcal{O}(1/t) \ll 1$ ⁶⁵⁸ and so $\hat{\rho}_t^{\tau} \approx \beta \sum_i^t R_i \to \rho$ when t is large.

The rewards in this task are sparse: $R_t = 0$ except when a trial ends and the binary frial reward R_k (1 or 0) is received. A cumulative update of eq. (7) that smooths the freward uniformly over the trial duration and is applied once at the end of each trial is frial thus more computationally efficient. Resolving a geometric series leads to the cumulative for update [8, 28]

$$\hat{\rho}_{k}^{\tau} = (1 - \beta)^{T_{k}} \hat{\rho}_{k-1}^{\tau} + (1 - (1 - \beta)^{T_{k}}) \rho_{k}^{\text{trial}} , \qquad (8)$$

where the smoothed reward, $\rho_k^{\text{trial}} = R_k/T_k$, can be interpreted as a trial-specific reward rate. The initial estimate, $\hat{\rho}_0^{\tau}$, is set to 0. Exceptionally, $\hat{\rho}_1^{\tau} = R_1/T_1$, after which eq. (8) is used.

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Using the first finite sample as the first finite estimate is both more natural and robust than ⁶⁶⁶ having to adapt from zero. We will reuse this filter for different τ and denote the filtered ⁶⁶⁸ estimate from its application with a τ -superscript, $\hat{\rho}_k^{\tau}$. For example, the precision of $\hat{\rho}_k^{\tau_{\text{long}}}$ ⁶⁶⁹ as an estimate of a stationary reward rate ρ is set by how many samples it averages over, ⁶⁷⁰ which is determined by the effective length of its memory given by τ_{long} . Since we assume ⁶⁷¹ the subject has learned the expected reward, \bar{r}_t , we use it instead of R_k when computing ⁶⁷² ρ_k^{trial} .

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Tokens task: a random walk formulation

The tokens task is a continuing task of episodes (here trials), which can be formulated ⁶⁷⁵ using the token difference, N_t . Each trial effectively presents to the agent a realization ⁶⁷⁶ of a finite-length, unbiased random walk, $N_{t_{\text{max}}} = (N_0, \ldots, N_{t_{\text{max}}})$ with $N_t = \{-t, \ldots, t\}$ ⁶⁷⁷ and $N_0 = 0$. We express time in units of these steps. The agent observes the walk and ⁶⁷⁸ reports its prediction of the sign of the final state, $\operatorname{sign}(N_{t_{\max}}) = \pm 1$ (t_{\max} is odd to exclude ⁶⁷⁹ the case it has no sign). The time at which the agent reports is called the decision time, ⁶⁸⁰ $t^{\operatorname{dec}} \in \{0, 1, \ldots, t_{\max}\}$. For a greedy policy, $\operatorname{sign}(N_t)$ can be used as the prediction (and ⁶⁸¹ the reporting action selected randomly if $N_{t^{\operatorname{dec}}} = 0$). The decision-making task then only ⁶⁸² involves choosing when to decide. In this case, the subject receives reward $R = \Theta(N_{t_{\max}}N_{t^{\operatorname{dec}}})$ ⁶⁸³ at the end of the random walk, i.e. a unit reward for a correct prediction, otherwise nothing ⁶⁸⁴ (Θ is the Heaviside function: $\Theta(x) = 1$ if x > 0, zero otherwise).

An explicit action space beyond decision time is not necessary for the case of greedy actions. It can nevertheless be specified for illustration in an Markov decision process (MDP) for formulation: the agent waits ($a_t = 0$ for $t < t^{dec}$) until it reports its prediction, $a_{t^{dec}} = \pm$, after which actions are disabled and the prediction is stored in an auxiliary state variable used to determine the reward at the end of the trial. A MDP formulation for a general class of perceptual decision-making tasks, including the tokens and random dots task, is given in Methods).

Perfect accuracy in this task is possible if the agent reports at t_{max} since $R = \Theta(N_{t_{\text{max}}}^2) =$ ⁶⁹³ 1. The task was designed to study reward rate maximizing policies. In particular, the task ⁶⁹⁴ has additional structure that allows for controlling what this optimal policy is through the ⁶⁹⁵ incentive to decide early, α , incorporated into the trial duration for deciding at time t in the ⁶⁹⁶ trial,

$$T(t) = t + (1 - \alpha)(t_{\max} - t) + T_{\text{ITI}}.$$
(9)

⁶⁹⁷ Here, a dead time between episodes is added via the inter-trial interval, $T_{\rm ITI}$, to make ⁶⁹⁸ suboptimal the strategy of predicting randomly at the trial's beginning. We emphasize that ⁶⁹⁹ it is through the trial duration that α serves as a task parameter controlling the strength ⁷⁰⁰ of the incentive to decide early. When α is fixed, we denote the corresponding optimal ⁷⁰¹ stationary reward rate, ρ_{α} , obtained from the reward rate maximizing policy. This policy ⁷⁰² shifts from deciding late to deciding early as α is varied from 0 to 1 (*c.f.* fig. S9f,g).

We consider a version of the task where α is variable across two episode types, a slow ($\alpha = 1/4$) and fast ($\alpha = 3/4$) type. The agent is aware that the across-trial α dynamics are responsive (maybe even adversarial), whereas the within-trial random walk dynamics (controlled by the positive jump probability, here p = 1/2) can be assumed fixed (see the nor next section for how p factors into the expression for the expected reward, \bar{r}_t .

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Expected trial reward for the tokens task

We derived and used an exact expression for the expected reward in a trial of the tokens task. We derive that expression here as well as a simple approximation. The state sequence task. We derive that expression here as well as a simple approximation. The state sequence T_{11} is formulated as a t_{max} -length sequence of random binary variables, $S_{t_{\text{max}}} = (S_1, \ldots, S_{t_{\text{max}}})$, $T_{12} S_t = \pm 1, i = 1, 2, \ldots, t_{\text{max}}$. Consider a simple case in which each is an independent and T_{13} identically distributed Bernoulli sample, $P(s) = p^{\frac{1+s}{2}}(1-p)^{\frac{1-s}{2}}$, for jump probability $p \ge 1/2$. T_{14} The distribution of $S_{t_{\text{max}}}$ is then

$$P(\boldsymbol{s}_{t_{\max}}) = \prod_{i=1}^{t_{\max}} P(s_i) .$$
(10)

⁷¹⁵ We will use this distribution to compute expectations of quantities over this space of trajec-⁷¹⁶ tories, namely the sign of $N_t = \sum_{i=1}^t S_i$, for some $0 \le t \le t_{\max}$ and in particular the sign of ⁷¹⁷ the final state, $\xi := \operatorname{sgn}(N_{t_{\max}}) \in \{+, -\}$ given $N_t = n$. Note that N_t is even if t is even and ⁷¹⁸ same with odd values. We remove the case of no sign in $N_{t_{\max}}$ by choosing t_{\max} to be odd. ⁷¹⁹ First, consider predicting $\operatorname{sgn}(N_t)$ with no prior information. The token difference, $-t \le$ ⁷²⁰ $N_t \le t$, appears directly in $P(\mathbf{s}_{t_{\max}})$. Marginalizing (here just integrating out) the additional ⁷²¹ degrees of freedom leads to a binomial distribution in the number of S_i for $i \le t$ for which ⁷²² $S_i = +1$, $N_t^+ = \sum_{i=1}^t \Theta(s_i) = (t + N_t)/2$,

$$P(N_t^+ = n) = {\binom{t}{n}} p^n (1-p)^{t-n} , \qquad (11)$$

⁷²³ with $n \in \{0, \ldots, t\}$ and $N_t = 2N_t^+ - t$. Thus, the probability that $N_t > 0$, i.e. $N_t^+ > t/2$, is

$$P(N_t > 0) = \sum_{n=0}^{t} {t \choose n} p^n (1-p)^{t-n} \Theta(n-t/2) .$$
(12)

Now consider predicting $\xi = \operatorname{sgn}(N_{t_{\max}})$, given the observation $N_t = n$. Define $t' = t_{\max} - t_{725}$ as the remaining time steps to the predicted time and $N_{t'} = \sum_{i=t+1}^{t_{\max}} s_i$, i.e. the total count reference in the remaining part of the realization. Then the probability of $\xi = +$ conditioned on the regrestrate $N_t = n$, denoted $p_{n,t}$, is defined in the same way as $P(N_t > 0)$,

$$p_{n,t}^{+} := P(\xi = +|N_t = n) = \sum_{n'=0}^{t'} {t' \choose n'} p^{n'} (1-p)^{t'-n'} \Theta(n' - (t'-n)/2) .$$
(13)

where $N_{t'}^+ = n'$ is the number of positive jumps in the remaining $t' = t_{\text{max}} - t$ steps and we replace used $N_{t_{\text{max}}} = N_t + N_{t'} = N_{t'}^+ - (t' - N_t)/2$. The $\Theta(n' - (t' - n)/2)$ factor effectively changes root the lower bound of the sum to max $\{0, \lceil (t' - n)/2 \rceil\}$, where $\lceil \cdot \rceil$ rounds up. If $\lceil (t' - n)/2 \rceil \leq 0$ rounds $p_{n,t}^+ = 1$ since the sum is over the domain of the distribution, which is normalized. root the lower bound is $\lceil (t' - n)/2 \rceil$, and the probability of $\xi = +1$ is

$$p_{n,t}^{+} = \sum_{n' = \lceil (t'-n)/2 \rceil}^{t'} {t' \choose n'} p^{n'} (1-p)^{t'-n'} .$$
(14)

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⁷³³ For odd t_{max} , the probability that $\xi = -$ is denoted $p_{n,t}^- = 1 - p_{n,t}^+$. For the symmetric case, ⁷³⁴ p = 1/2,

$$p_{n,t}^{+} = \frac{1}{2^{t'}} \sum_{n' = \lceil (t'-n)/2 \rceil}^{t'} \binom{t'}{n'} , \qquad (15)$$

⁷³⁵ when $\lceil (t'-n)/2 \rceil > 0$ and 1 otherwise. This expression is equivalent to equation 5 in [16], ⁷³⁶ which was instead expressed using $N_{t'}^-$.

The space of trajectories, i.e. of $\dot{s}_{t_{\text{max}}}$, maps to a space of trajectories for $p_{n,t}^+$ defined on Table an evolving lattice in belief space. The expected reward in this case is,

$$\bar{r}_t := \langle r | N_t = n \rangle = \mathbb{E} \left[\Theta(N_{t_{\max}} N_t) | N_t = n \right]$$
(16)

$$= \max\{p_{n,t}^+, 1 - p_{n,t}^+\}$$
(17)

$$=b_t avertee aver$$

⁷³⁹ where the belief of correct report $b_t := \max\{p_{n,t}^+, 1 - p_{n,t}^+\}$. The commitment cost $C_t^{\text{com}} =$ ⁷⁴⁰ $r_{\max} - \bar{r}_t$, then also evolves on a lattice (see fig. 3(b)). More generally, $\bar{r}_t = \Delta r b_t + r_{\text{incorrect}}$ ⁷⁴¹ for Δr the difference of correct r_{correct} (here 1) and incorrect $r_{\text{incorrect}}$ (here 0) rewards. Since ⁷⁴² $r_{\max} = r_{\text{correct}}$, we have $C_t^{\text{com}} = \Delta r(1 - b_t)$. For p = 1/2 and $\Delta r = 1$, $C_{t=0}^{\text{com}} = 1/2$. ⁷⁴³ The shape of $p_{n,t}^+$ is roughly sigmoidal, admitting the approximation,

$$p_{n,t}^+ \approx \frac{1}{1 + \exp\left[-(at+b)n\right]}$$
 (19)

⁷⁴⁴ where fitting constants a and b depend on t_{max} . For $t_{\text{max}} = 15$, a = 0.03725 and b = 0.3557. ⁷⁴⁵ We demonstrate the quality of this approximation in fig. S5. Approximation error is worse ⁷⁴⁶ at t near t_{max} . More than 95% of decisions times in the data we analyzed occur before ⁷⁴⁷ 12 time steps, where the approximation error in probability is less than 0.05. A similar ⁷⁴⁸ approximation without time dependence was presented in [16]. We nevertheless used the ⁷⁴⁹ exact expression eq. (15) in all calculations.

⁷⁵⁰ PGD implementation and fitting to relaxation after context switches

We identified the times of the context switches in the data and their type (slow-to-fast r52 and fast-to-slow). Taking a fixed number of trials before and after each event, we averaged r53 the decision times over the events to create two sequences of average decision times around r54 context switches (the result is shown in fig. 4a,b). We used a uniformly weighted squaredr55 error objective, minimized with the standard (Nelder-Mead) simplex routine in python's r56 scientific computing library's optimization package.

Survival probabilities over the action policy

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Behavioural analyses typically focus on response time distributions. From the perspective r59 of reinforcement learning, this is insufficient to fully characterize the behaviour of an agent. r60 Instead, the full behaviour is given by the action policy. In this setting, a natural represenr61 tation of the policy is the probability to report as a function of both the decision time and r62 the environmental state (see fig. 5). These are computed from the histograms of (N_{tdec}, t^{dec}) ,

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⁷⁶³ over trials. However, the histograms themselves do not reflect the preference of the agent ⁷⁶⁴ to decide at a particular state and time because they are biased by the different frequencies ⁷⁶⁵ with which the set of trajectories visit each state and time combination. While there are ⁷⁶⁶ obviously the same number of trajectories at early and late times, they distribute over many ⁷⁶⁷ more states at later times and so each state at later times is visited less on average than states ⁷⁶⁸ at earlier times. We can remove this bias by transforming the data ensemble to the ensemble ⁷⁶⁹ of two random variables: the state conditioned on time $(N_t|t)$, and the event that $t = t^{\text{dec}}$. ⁷⁷⁰ Conditioning this ensemble on the state gives $P(t = t^{\text{dec}}|N_t, t) = p(N_t, t = t^{\text{dec}}|t)/p(N_t|t)$. To ⁷⁷¹ reduce estimator variance, we focus on the corresponding survival function, $P(t < t^{\text{dec}}|N_t, t)$. ⁷⁷² So, $P(t < t^{\text{dec}}|N_t, t) = 1$ when t = 0 and decays to 0 as t and $|N_t|$ increase. Unlike the ⁷⁷⁴ and time. This justifies the use of the interpolated representations displayed in fig. 5b-e. ⁷⁷⁵ Note that to simplify the analysis, we have binned decision times by the 200 ms time step ⁷⁷⁶ between token jumps. This is justified by the small deviations from uniformity of decision ⁷⁷⁷ times modulo the time step shown in fig. S11.

⁷⁷⁸ Episodic decision-making and dynamic programming solutions of value iteration

⁷⁷⁹ We generalize the mathematical notation and description of an existing AR-RL formu-⁷⁸⁰ lation and dynamic programming solution of the random dots task [7], a binary perceptual ⁷⁸¹ evidence accumulation task extensively studied in neuroscience. To align notation with ⁷⁸² convention in reinforcement learning theory, exceptionally here s denotes the belief state ⁷⁸³ variable, i.e. a representation of the task state sufficient to make the decision (e.g. the to-⁷⁸⁴ kens difference, N_t , in the case of the tokens task). We connect this extended formulation to ⁷⁸⁵ account for a dynamic deliberation cost. We write it in discrete time, though the continuous ⁷⁸⁶ time version is equally tractable.

The problem is defined by a recursive optimality equation for the value function V(s|t)787 in which the highest of the action values, Q(s, a|t), is selected. We formalize the non-788 stationarity within episodes by conditioning on the trial time, t, where t = 0 is the trial start time. Q(s, a|t) is the action-value function of average-reward reinforcement learning [11], i.e. the expected sum of future reward deviations from the average when selecting action a when 791 $_{792}$ in state s, at possible decision time t within a trial, and then following a given action policy π thereafter. The action set for these binary decision tasks consists of report left (-), report right(+), and wait. When wait is selected, time increments and beliefs are updated with 794 response representation representatio representation representation representation representati with $a = \pm$, that denotes the reward expected to be received at the end of the trial after having reported \pm in state s at time t during the trial. Note that r(s, a|t) can be defined in terms of a conventional reward function r(s, a) if the reported action, decision time, and current time are stored as an auxiliary state variable so they can be used to determine the 799 non-zero reward entries at the end of the trial. 800

The average-reward formulation of Q(s, a|t) naturally narrows the problem onto determining decisions within only a single episode of the task. To see this, we pull out the contribution of the current trial,

$$Q(s,a|t) = \mathbb{E}^{\pi} \left[\sum_{t'=t}^{T} R_t - \rho \left| S_t = s, A_t = a \right] + V(s|T+1) \right]$$
(20)

where T is the (possibly stochastic) trial end time and V(s|T+1) is the state value at the start of the following trial, which does not depend on s_t and a_t for independently sampled trials. Following conventional reinforcement learning notation, the expectation \mathbb{E}^{π} is over all randomness conditioned on following the policy, π , which itself could be stochastic [11]. When trials are identically and independently sampled, the state at the trial start is the same for all trials and denoted s_0 with value V_0 . Thus, the value at the start of the trial $V(s|t=0) = V(s|T+1) = V_0$ equals that at the start of the next trial and so, by construction, the expected trial return (total trial rewards minus trial costs) must vanish (we will show this explicitly below). Note that the value shift invariance of eq. (20) can be fixed so that $V_0 = 0$.

The optimality equation for V(s|t) arises from a greedy action policy over Q(s, a|t): it selects the action of the largest of Q(s, -|t), Q(s, +|t), and Q(s, wait|t). The value expression for the wait-action is incremental, and so depends on the value at the next time step. In contrast, expression for the two reporting actions integrates over the remainder of the trial since no further decision is made and so depends on the value at the start of the following trial. The resulting optimality equation for the value function V(s|t) is then

$$V(s|t) = \max_{a} Q(s, a|t) ,$$

$$Q(s, \pm|t) = r(s, \pm|t) - \sum_{t'=t+1}^{T} c_{t'} + V(s|t = T+1) ,$$

$$Q(s, wait|t) = -c_t + \mathbb{E}_{s_{t+1}|s} \left[V(s_{t+1}|t+1) \right] ,$$

$$V(s|t = 0) = V(s|t = T+1) .$$
(21)

⁸²⁰ Here, $t = 0, 1, \ldots, t_{\text{max}}$ within the current trial and $t = T + 1, T + 2 \ldots$ in the following ⁸²¹ trial, with t_{max} the latest possible decision time in a trial, and T = T(t) the decision-time ⁸²² dependent trial duration. For inter-trial interval T_{ITI} , T satisfies $T_{\text{ITI}} \leq T \leq t_{\text{max}} + T_{\text{ITI}}$. ⁸²³ c_t is the cost rate at time t. The second term in Q(s, wait|t) uses the notation $\mathbb{E}_{x|y}[z]$, i.e. ⁸²⁴ the expectation of z with respect to p(x|y). The last line in eq. (21) is the self-consistency ⁸²⁵ criterion imposed by the AR-RL formulation, which demands that the expected value at ⁸²⁶ the beginning of the trial be the expected value at the beginning of the following trial. The ⁸²⁷ greedy policy then gives a single decision time for each state trajectory as the first time when ⁸²⁸ Q(s, -|t) > Q(s, wait|t) or Q(s, +|t) > Q(s, wait|t), with the reporting action determined ⁸²⁹ by which of Q(s, -|t) and Q(s, +|t) is larger. For given c_t , dynamic programming provides ⁸³⁰ a solution to eq. (21) [7] by recursively solving for V(s|t) by back-iterating in time from the ⁸³¹ end of the trial. For most relevant tasks, to never report is always sub-optimal, so the value ⁸³² at $t = t_{\text{max}}$ is set by the best of the two reporting (\pm) actions, which do not have a recursive ⁸³³ dependence on the value and so can seed the recursion.

We now interpret this general formulation in terms of opportunity costs. For the choice of a static opportunity cost rate of time, $c_t = \rho$. This is the AR-RL case. As in [7], a constant auxiliary deliberation cost rate, c, incurred only up to decision time can be added, $c_t = \rho + c\Theta(t^{dec} - t)$. Of course, ρ is unknown *a priori*. For this solution method, its value can be found by exploiting the self-consistency constraint, V(s|t=0) = V(s|t=T+1). This dependence can be seen formally by taking the action value eq. (20), choosing *a* according

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state value, V(s|t), and evaluating it for t = 0,

$$V(s|t=0) = \mathbb{E}_{t^{\text{dec}}}\left[\sum_{t=0}^{T} R_t - \rho\right] + V(s|t=T+1)$$
(22)

$$= \mathbb{E}_{t^{\text{dec}}} \left[r(t^{\text{dec}}) - \rho T(t^{\text{dec}}) \right] + V(s|t = T + 1)$$
(23)

$$= \bar{R} - \rho \bar{T} + V(s|t = T + 1) .$$
(24)

⁸⁴¹ Here, $\bar{R} = \mathbb{E}_{t^{\text{dec}}} \left[r(t^{\text{dec}}) \right]$ and $\bar{T} = \mathbb{E}_{t^{\text{dec}}} \left[T(t^{\text{dec}}) \right]$ denotes the expectations over the trial en-⁸⁴² semble that, when given the state sequence, transforms to an average over t^{dec} , the trial deci-⁸⁴³ sion time, defined as when V(s|t) achieves its maximum on the state sequence, $(s_0, \ldots, s_{t_{\text{max}}})$. ⁸⁴⁴ The expected trial reward function, $r(t) := \max_{a \in \{-,+\}} r(s, a|t)$ is the expected trial reward ⁸⁴⁵ for deciding at t. Imposing the self-consistency constraint on eq. (24) recovers the definition ⁸⁴⁶ $\rho = \bar{R}/\bar{T}$.

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Asymmetric switching cost model

Here, we present the model component that accounts for the asymmetric relaxation timescales after context switches. The basic assumption is that tracking a signal at a higher temporal resolution should be more cognitively costly, so that adapting from faster to slower environments should happen more quickly than the reverse, so as to not pay this cost unnecessarily. We now develop this idea formally (see fig. S4).

Let T_{track} and T_{sys} be the timescale of tracking and of the tracked system, respectively. ⁸⁵⁴ One way to interpret the mismatch ratio, $T_{\text{sys}}/T_{\text{track}}$, is via an attentional cost rate, q. ⁸⁵⁵ This rate should decay with T_{track} : the slower the timescale of tracking, the lower the ⁸⁵⁶ cognitive cost. For simplicity, we set $q = 1/T_{\text{track}}$ (fig. S4a). Integrating this cost rate over a ⁸⁵⁷ characteristic time of the system is then the tracking cost, $Q = qT_{\text{sys}} = T_{\text{sys}}/T_{\text{track}}$, which is ⁸⁵⁸ also the mismatch ratio. We propose that Q enters the algorithm via a scale factor on the ⁸⁵⁹ integration time of the reward filter for $\hat{\rho}_k^{\tau_{\text{context}}}$, τ_{context} . We redefine τ_{context} as

$$\tau_{\text{context}} \leftarrow \frac{\tau_{\text{context}}}{1+Q^{\nu}},$$
(25)

where ν is a sensitivity parameter that captures the strength of the nonlinear sensitivity of the speed up (for $\nu > 1$) or slow down (for $\nu < 1$) in adaptation with the tracking cost, Q (fig. S4a shows how this timescale varies over Q for three values of ν). A natural choice for T_{sys} is T_k , the trial duration. For T_{track} , we introduce the filtered estimate of the trial duration, $\hat{T}_k^{\tau_{\text{context}}}$ (computed using the same simple low-pass filter *c.f.* eq. (8)). Thus, the tracking timescale adapts to the system timescale. As a result of how τ_{context} is lowered by Qfor $\nu > 1$, this adaptation is faster in the fast-to-slow transition relative to the slow-to-fast transition.

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Prediction for asymmetric rewards

Given a payoff matrix, $\mathbf{R} = (r_{s,a})$, where $r_{s,a}$ is the reward for reporting $a \in \{-, +\}$ in the trial realization leading to s, here the sign of $N_{t_{\text{max}}}$, and the probability that the rightward

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⁸⁷¹ choice is correct, $p_{n,t}^+$, the expected reward for the two reporting actions in a trial is given ⁸⁷² by the matrix equation

$$\left[\langle r|a = +, n, t \rangle \ \langle r|a = -, n, t \rangle \right] = \left[p_{n,t}^+ \ 1 - p_{n,t}^+ \right] \left[\begin{matrix} r_{++} & r_{+-} \\ r_{-+} & r_{--} \end{matrix} \right]$$

⁸⁷³ Here, the corresponding reported choice is $a^* = \operatorname{argmax}_{a \in \{-,+\}} \langle r | a, n, t \rangle$. In this paper and ⁸⁷⁴ in all existing tokens tasks, \mathbf{R} was the identity matrix. In this case, and for all cases where ⁸⁷⁵ \mathbf{R} is a symmetric matrix, $\mathbf{R} = \mathbf{R}^{\top}$, an equivalent decision rule is to decide based on the sign ⁸⁷⁶ of N_t . When \mathbf{R} is not symmetric, however, this is no longer a valid substitute. Asymmetry ⁸⁷⁷ can be introduced through the actions and the states.

Using an additional parameter γ , we introduce asymmetry via a bias for + actions that ⁸⁷⁹ leaves the total reward unchanged by replacing the payoff matrix with

$$\boldsymbol{R}_{\text{asym}} = \begin{bmatrix} r_{++}(1+\gamma) & r_{+-}(1-\gamma) \\ r_{-+}(1+\gamma) & r_{--}(1-\gamma) \end{bmatrix} ,$$

The result for $\gamma = -0.6, 0$, and 0.6 is shown in fig. S10. For $\gamma > 0$ the decision boundary for a = + shifts up proportional to γ . For $\gamma < 0$ the decision boundary for a = - shifts down proportional to $-\gamma$. The explanation is that the components are set and exchange where the decision is exchanged, $N_t = 0$ for the symmetric case. This changes to $N_t \propto \pm \gamma$ for the asymmetric $\gamma \neq 0$ case.

Comparing reward rates and slopes of urgency

Reference [17] parametrize urgency with the saturation value, u_{∞} , and the half-maximum, $\tau_{1/2}$. The initial slope is given by their ratio. We used the context-conditioned values published in Table 1 in [17] for the n = 70 (no 90° control) dataset. The context-conditioned reward rates, ρ_{α} , are computed as the accuracy $\langle R \rangle_{|\alpha}$ divided by the average trial time, $\langle T \rangle_{|\alpha}$ for choice number $\alpha \in \{2, 4\}$ as context. We computed $\langle R \rangle_{|\alpha=2} = 0.71$ and $\langle R \rangle_{|\alpha=4} = 0.49$. The trial time is the sum of the response time, the added time penalty if incorrect, and the inter-trial interval. We computed the response times $t_{\text{response},\alpha=2} = 0.527$ and $t_{\text{response},\alpha=4} =$ 0.725. While the dataset contains the response times, it does not have the latter two. The time penalty was on the order of 1 second, as was the time penalty [61]. Under those estimates, the reward rates are $\rho_{\alpha=2} = 0.40$ and $\rho_{\alpha=4} = 0.22$. The ratio between slopes is 1.8 and the ratio of reward rates was 2.3 giving an error of about 20%.

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Supplemental Materials




Figure S1. Reward filtering scheme for online computation of within-trial opportunity cost. With t denoting absolute time, the reward sequence, R_t , is integrated on both a stationary (τ_{long}) and context (τ_{context}) filtering timescale to produce estimates of the stationary and context-specific reward rates, respectively. These are large and small, respectively, relative to the average context switching timescale, T_{block} . The estimate of the context-specific offset, o_t is computed by time-integrating the difference of these two estimates. In this filtering, when a trial terminates, the effective operation is that C_t^{del} is set to o_t , and the latter is zeroed. Thus, the opportunity cost starts at this offset and then integrates ρ_{long} , $C_{t,k}^{\text{del}} = o_{T_{k-1},k-1} + \rho_{\text{long},k-1}t$, where $o_{T_{k-1},k-1} = (\rho_{\text{context},k-1} - \rho_{\text{long},k-1})T_{k-1}$. Notes on the computational graph: Arrows pass the value at each time step (dashed arrows only pass the value when a trial terminates). Links annotated with '-' multiply the passed quantity by -1.

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


Figure S2. *PGD agent plays the tokens task with periodic* α -dynamics. (a) Trials are grouped into alternating trial blocks of constant α (fast (orange) and slow (blue) conditions). (b) Here, trial block durations are constant over the experiment. (c) Decision times over the trials from (a) distribute widely, but relax after context switches. (d) Block-averaged decision times remain stationary. Inset shows the context-conditioned trial-averaged reward $\langle R_k \rangle$ and trial duration $\langle T_k \rangle$ (orange and blue dots; black is unconditioned average; $\langle \cdot \rangle$ denotes the trial ensemble average). Lines pass through the origin (slope given by the respective reward rate). (e) Distribution of estimates have lower variance than the trial reward rates, ρ^{trial} (gray). The conditioned averages of $\hat{\rho}_k^{\tau_{\text{context}}}$ shown as blue and orange. (f) The relative error in estimating ρ , $E_t = \frac{1}{t} \sum_k^t |\hat{\rho}_k^{\tau_{\text{long}}} - \rho|/\rho$, for $\tau_{\text{long}} = 10^3(\text{circle})$, $10^4(\text{square})$, $10^5(\text{triangle})$. Inset shows that $E_{T_{\text{exp}}} \propto (\tau_{\text{long}}/T_{\text{block}})^{-1}$ over a grid of τ_{long} and T_{block} as expected (black line).




Figure S3. Comparison of PGD and NHP in non-stationary α dynamics from [19]: Subject 2. Same as fig. 5.




Figure S4. Asymmetric switching cost model. (a) Attentional cost rate, q, is set to be inversely proportional to tracking timescale, T_{track} . (b) Filtering timescale τ_{context} is scaled down with tracking cost, $Q = T_{\text{sys}}/T_{\text{track}}$ from a base timescale, here denoted τ_0 (shown for three values of sensitivity $\nu = 2, 4, 8$).




Figure S5. sigmoidal approximation to expected reward. (a) the approximation explained in Methods: State-conditioned expected trial reward, for different dec,[p]ision times. (b) The error in the approximation for different decision times.

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


Figure S6. Model validation on behavioural statistics from [19]. (a,b) Running average (last 1000 trial) of trial reward rate ρ_k^{trial} . (c,d) Histograms of trial reward rate, ρ_k^{trial} (c) and trial duration, T_k (d). (e) Auto-correlation function of trial duration. (f) Data vs. model decision time (gray-scale is count; white dashed line is perfect correlation; actual Pearson correlation is shown)

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


Figure S7. Comparison of trial-aware and trial-unaware results. (a,b) 1/2-Survival probability contours for subject 1 (dashed), trial-aware PGD (blue), and trial-unaware PGD (red) for slow (a) and fast (b) context-conditioned data. (c) Opportunity cost for trial-unaware PGD (compare with fig. 2b). Opportunity cost range adjusted here such that data within standard error of trial-unaware PGD model prediction for slow block (blue).

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


Figure S8. Comparison of PGD and AR-RL learning on a patch leaving task. Performance is defined as relative regret rate, $(\hat{\rho} - \rho^*)/\rho^*$ (PGD (dots); AR-RL (lines)). (a) Performance over different sizes of the state vector (d = 100 (blue), 200 (orange), 300 (green)). (b) Performance over different learning rates (parametrized by integration time constant, $\tau = 1 \times 10^4$ (blue), 2×10^4 (orange), 3×10^4 (green)). (parameters: $\lambda = 1/5$; r_{max} sampled uniformily on [0,1]). A random state label permutation is made at the time indicated by the black arrow. Values were initialized at -1.




Figure S9. Reward rate optimal strategies in (α, c) plane. (a) The reward-rate maximizing policy interpolates from the wait-for-certainty strategy at weak incentive (low α) and low deliberation cost (low c), to the one-and-done strategy at strong incentive (high α) and high deliberation cost (high c). Dashed lines bound a transition regime between the two extreme strategies. Red line denotes where they have equal performance. (b-e) Slices of the (α, c) -plane. Shown are the reward rate as a function of α (b,c) and c (d,e) (wait-for-certainty strategy is shown in blue; one-and-done strategy is shown in orange). N is the magnitude of the token difference




Figure S10. Asymmetric action rewards skew survival probability. Here, we plot the half-maximum of the PGD survival probability for three values of the action reward bias, $\gamma = -0.6, 0, 0.6$ (blue, black and orange, respectively). Other model parameters same as in fitted model.




Figure S11. Decision times relative to token jumps. Here, we plot the histograms of decision times using their position between token jumps, the step fraction. The data is separated by α and monkey.