

1 **Title:** Evolution of behavioral resistance in host-pathogen systems

2

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11 distancing

12

13 **Abstract**

14 Behavioral resistance to parasites is widespread in animals, yet little is known about the
15 evolutionary dynamics that have shaped these strategies. Theory developed for the evolution of
16 physiological parasite resistance can only be applied to behavioral resistance under limited
17 circumstances. We find that accounting explicitly for the behavioral processes, including the
18 detectability of infected individuals, leads to novel dynamics that are strongly dependent on the
19 nature of the costs and benefits of social interactions. As with physiological resistance, the
20 evolutionary dynamics can also lead to mixed strategies that balance the costs of disease risk and
21 the benefits of social interaction, with implications for understanding avoidance strategies in
22 human disease outbreaks.

23

24 **Introduction**

25 Hosts resist parasites using diverse strategies, with broad implications for host-parasite
26 coevolution [1–4]. Previous theoretical models of resistance evolution have largely focused on
27 physiological or biochemical resistance [1,5–7]. Yet resistance against parasites can also take the
28 form of behavioral traits [3,8,9] such as direct avoidance or “disgust” in response to diseased
29 individuals [10,11] or general avoidance of interactions with other individuals, which in a human
30 context is now termed “social distancing.” Here, we ask whether the ecological and evolutionary
31 dynamics of behavioral defenses against parasites operate according to similar principles as
32 physiological defenses.

33 Host behavior is implicit in classical models of microparasite transmission as a
34 component of the parameter β [12,13]. β is a composite of multiple factors [14], including, for
35 directly transmitted parasites, the contact rate between hosts, which is a function of host
36 behavior, and the per contact transmission probability, which is a function of host physiology
37 [15]. Models of resistance evolution typically vary the per contact transmission probability, i.e.
38 the physiological resistance [5,16]. Nevertheless, a high degree of variation in behavioral
39 resistance to parasites has been reported across and within species: for example, avoidance of
40 infected conspecifics in crustaceans [17], birds [18,19], and primates [20], including humans
41 [10]. Despite the broad diversity of these behaviors [8,21,22], behavioral resistance has rarely
42 been examined explicitly in theoretical contexts [23,24]. It remains unknown whether
43 evolutionary dynamics of behavioral resistance follow the same patterns as physiological
44 resistance. Previous theoretical research on physiological resistance has shown that susceptible
45 and resistant individuals can coexist in the presence of a disease when resistance carries a direct

46 physiological cost [5,7,25], but such models have also not considered how behavioral costs
47 might influence resistance evolution.

48 Here, we develop a theoretical model of a disease that is transmitted in a social context,
49 through direct contact or aerosol, and investigate the evolution of behavioral resistance under
50 several assumptions about behavioral processes and cost-benefit trade-offs. We show that
51 behavioral resistance can result in evolutionary dynamics that are different from physiological
52 resistance, depending on the specificity of behavioral responses to diseased conspecifics and the
53 nature of the costs and benefits of sociality.

54

55 **The Model**

56 *Social Behavior*

57 We model the social behavior of the host in a population of individuals that enter into groups or
58 remain singletons. Let S be the number of singletons and G the number of groups of size T , and
59 total population size, $N = S + TG$.

60 The frequency of groups depends on the group encounter rate, ρ , and group dissociation
61 rate, ν . We use the simplest case of pair formation ($T = 2$) to illustrate the dynamics. Pair
62 formation in populations has been studied in the context of mating and marriage, and represents a
63 complex problem of sampling without replacement [26,27]. Following previous work [28], we
64 consider two forms of encounter. First, singletons can encounter one another at a constant
65 frequency that is independent of their density, as would occur when individuals seek others out
66 to form associations. Second, singletons can encounter others randomly, such that encounters
67 occur at a higher rate at greater densities. These two types of group formation have parallels with

68 frequency-dependent and density-dependent disease transmission processes [28,29]. Throughout,
69 the derivations of the equations are given in the Supplementary Materials (S1).

70 *Equilibrium Group Formation*

71 The number of groups at equilibrium under frequency-dependent encounter is

$$G = \left(\frac{\frac{\rho}{v}}{1 + \frac{\rho}{v}} \right) \left(\frac{N}{T} \right) \quad (1)$$

72 In the case of density dependent encounter, we assume the rate of group formation is a
73 linear function of the number of singletons, πS , rather than the total population density. Then, the
74 number of groups at equilibrium is

$$G = N - \frac{(-v + \sqrt{v^2 + 4T\rho vN})}{2T^2\rho} \quad (2)$$

75

76 *Behavioral Resistance*

77 We compare two types of behavioral resistance: specific avoidance of diseased individuals and
78 general avoidance of all associations. For specific avoidance, a healthy, avoiding individual can
79 detect an infected individual, and avoid pairing with it, determined by a factor ϕ . For general
80 avoidance, a healthy, avoiding individual encounters all other individuals, regardless of their
81 infection status, at a reduced rate $(\rho - a)$, relative to the background rate of non-avoiding
82 individuals ρ . We derive how R_0 depends on the equilibrium frequency of pairs.

83

84 *Evolution of Behavioral Resistance*

85 To understand the evolution of behavioral resistance we use the one-locus, two allele dynamical
86 framework developed for physiological resistance evolution [5]. In this system, X_1 and X_2

87 represent two haploid genotypes that differ in their behavioral resistance to the disease, with X_2
88 being the avoider. X_1 and X_2 are equivalent in their transmission once infected, such that they
89 can be pooled into one class of diseased individuals, Y . Transmission occurs at rate δ from
90 infected (Y) individuals to X_1 or X_2 when they are in a pair. Individuals can enter into a pair with
91 their own type and the other types, the number of pairs of each type calculated from binomial
92 proportions. We use b and $(b - c)$ to refer to birth rate for X_1 and X_2 respectively, where c is the
93 cost of resistance (see below), and μ the background mortality rate. We assume the disease is
94 sterilizing, such that diseased individuals do not contribute to reproduction. We also impose
95 density dependence on birth rate of the healthy individuals because without a numerical or
96 ecological feedback, the system does not reach stable equilibrium [25]. These processes are
97 represented by

$$\frac{dX_1}{dt} = X_1(b - kN - \mu) - \delta \left(\frac{2GX_1Y}{N^2} \right) \quad (3)$$

$$\frac{dX_2}{dt} = X_2((b - c) - kN - \mu) - \delta \left(\frac{2GX_2Y}{N^2} \right) \quad (4)$$

$$\frac{dY}{dt} = \delta \left(\frac{2GY}{N^2} \right) (X_1 + X_2) - \mu Y \quad (5)$$

98 We simulated each model to equilibrium using an ordinary differential equation solver
99 (function “ode” Runge-Kutta “rk4” method) from the R package *deSolve* [29,30]. We explored a
100 range of values for each parameter (see results), and confirmed equilibria by perturbation.

101

102 *Resistance Costs*

103 Physiological resistance is usually assumed to carry some cost that results in reduced fitness in
104 the absence of the parasite [5,25]. Similarly, we assume X_2 individuals pay some reproductive
105 cost for avoiding others. First, avoidance may be costly regardless of whether it is instantiated;

106 for example, a less active genotype could have fewer encounters with others, but also have
107 reduced food acquisition. Thus, the birth rate of X_2 is $(b - c)$.

108 Alternatively, costs of avoidance may only be instantiated when the individual avoids
109 being in a group. This reflects a situation where sociality is beneficial. Thus, we examine the
110 case in which the reproduction of both X_1 and X_2 increases as a function of the frequency at
111 which it pairs. We model this benefit as a direct, linear function of the frequency of pairs within
112 each genotype, such that birth rate for X_1 is calculated as $(1 + \frac{TGX_1}{X_1})b_1$ and for X_2 as
113 $(1 + \frac{TGX_2}{X_2})b_2$.

114


115 **Results**

116 *Overall Dynamics*

117 In basic models of physiological resistance, the transmission coefficient is a compound of per
118 contact transmission rate and number of contacts. It can be shown that if all individuals are in
119 pairs, i.e. in contact, then the dynamics of disease with pair formation are identical to the
120 physiological resistance model.

121 If pair formation is incomplete, the basic reproductive number of the parasite, $R_0 = \frac{2\delta G}{N\mu}$,
122 and equivalent to canonical formulations for R_0 . We first examined the effect of the different
123 pairing behaviors and avoidance strategies on the equilibrium frequency of individuals in pairs,
124 prevalence of disease, and R_0 when only X_2 , the avoiding genotype, was present (Fig. 1).

125



126

127 **Figure 1.** Pairing and disease dynamics at equilibrium when only the avoiding genotype (X_2) is present in the
 128 population, under different pairing processes and avoidance strategies. The light gray horizontal dotted line
 129 represents when the basic reproductive number, $R_0 = 1$, below which the disease cannot persist in the population,
 130 and above which sustained transmission is possible. $b = 1, \mu = 0.2, \delta = 1, v = 0.3, k = 0.01$.

131

132 Under both pair formation processes, increased specific avoidance of infected individuals

133 (Figs. 1a and 1b) is highly effective at reducing prevalence of the disease, and as X_2 avoids Y it

134 also results in a decrease in the frequency of individuals in pairs. However, the frequency of

135 individuals in pairs increases again at high specific avoidance, because few infected individuals

136 remain for the healthy X_2 individuals to encounter. With further avoidance, R_0 falls below 1,

137 prevalence drops to 0, and pair formation is only among healthy individuals. Thus, at high levels
138 of specific avoidance, hosts can successfully extirpate the disease from the population while
139 maintaining their social structure.

140 Contrarily, while general avoidance reduces R_0 and prevalence, as long as per contact
141 transmission rate is high, avoidance of pairing must be nearly complete (Figs. 1c and 1d) to
142 reduce R_0 below the threshold of 1. In other words, if hosts are not able to detect infection in
143 conspecifics, behavioral avoidance effectively reduces disease risk, but possibly at levels where
144 the hosts compromise their social structure.


145

146 *Resistance Evolution*

147 We next examined the evolutionary dynamics in a population with genetic variants that do (X_2)
148 and do not (X_1) avoid disease when resistance carried a fixed cost. When behavioral resistance
149 was through specific avoidance of infected individuals (ϕ), X_1 and X_2 could stably coexist across
150 a range of avoidance levels, even at very high costs (>50% reduction in birth rate) when
151 avoidance of infected individuals was highest (Fig. 2a). Varying behavioral resistance through
152 general avoidance, ($\rho - a$), resulted in the same overall pattern, with polymorphism occurring
153 across the broadest range of costs when avoidance was greatest (Fig. 2b). However, consistent
154 with the results in Fig. 1, even high levels of general avoidance still resulted in some frequency
155 of pairing with infected individuals. Thus, under the general avoidance strategy, X_2 could not
156 tolerate as great a reduction in birth rate at intermediate levels of avoidance.

157

158



159 **Figure 2:** Shaded areas represent equilibrium gene frequency states for the models when the cost of X_2 and the
 160 avoidance strategy of X_2 are varied. Possible outcomes include X_1 or X_2 becoming fixed in the population, or X_1 and
 161 X_2 coexisting, i.e. polymorphism. All plots show results for constant rate of pair encounter. (Corresponding plots for
 162 density-dependent pair encounter rates can be found in Supplementary Materials S2). $b = 1, \mu = 0.2, \delta = 1, v =$
 163 $0.3, k = 0.01$.
 164

165 We next assumed that individuals receive a benefit as a function of social behavior

166 relative to being alone, we found that in the case of specific avoidance the benefits of reduced

167 disease risk evenly balanced the costs of lost social interactions, such that X_2 only went to
168 fixation when its fitness was relatively greater than X_1 (Fig. 2c). When avoidance was general,
169 X_1 could even sometimes reach fixation when X_2 had a higher birth rate, because at high rates of
170 general avoidance, reductions in disease risk are not substantial enough to compensate for the
171 loss of social contacts (Fig. 2d). In both cases, when costs were linearly dependent on the
172 frequency of individuals in pairs, polymorphism between X_1 and X_2 was not possible.

173 While we only present the results from models with a constant rate of pair encounter, the
174 patterns of polymorphism were qualitatively similar when pair encounter rate depended on the
175 density of singletons (Supplementary Materials S2).

176

177 **Discussion**

178 We present evidence here that the evolution of behavioral resistance can differ from
179 physiological or biochemical resistance evolution depending on the costs and benefits of
180 resistance and sociality. Similar to physiological resistance, polymorphism in behavioral
181 resistance can be maintained across a broad range of fixed costs when the level of resistance is
182 high [5,25]. When enough behaviorally resistant individuals are present in the population,
183 behavioral avoidance strategies can effectively reduce the disease risk so that susceptible
184 individuals can coexist.

185 However, such polymorphism is much less likely to occur when social interactions have
186 benefits, as they do in many social organisms. In the case of specific avoidance, when infected
187 individuals are detectable, social interactions are limited only in situations where avoidance will
188 provide the benefit of reduced transmission. Thus specific avoidance reduces the negative
189 impacts of lost social opportunities, and even allows for the full recuperation of social behavior

190 when avoidance is high enough to fully extirpate the disease through behavioral mechanisms.
191 Yet when avoidance is general and at a high level, the costs of lost social interactions are higher
192 than the benefits of reduced disease risk because of ‘mistakes’ in selection of diseased or healthy
193 social partners. This comparison highlights the challenge of controlling an outbreak of an
194 emergent disease, especially when asymptomatic transmission is possible, as in COVID-19 [31].
195 The maintenance of a polymorphic state under some conditions suggests that if avoidance
196 behavior could be performed flexibly, a mixed strategy of social distancing that allows for some
197 social interaction could strike a balance between the costs and benefits.

198 To dissect the basic differences between behavioral and physiological resistance we have
199 deliberately kept the models simple. Application to any specific host-pathogen context would
200 require more complexity in the temporal and social structure of the interactions. For example, in
201 nature individuals interact more fluidly, increasing opportunities for transmission. As groups
202 become larger, transmission within groups and movement between groups would be possible,
203 and behavioral resistance strategies could become more diverse. Consistent with previous
204 research, this simple model highlights trade-offs between the benefits of reducing disease risk
205 and the costs of foregoing other opportunities, whether nutritional [23], reproductive [24], or in
206 the case of our model, social.

207 Behavioral and physiological resistance are not separate phenomena but are likely to
208 interact, with behavioral effects being antecedent to physiological resistance, in a framework
209 similar to a two-step infection process [32]. In such situations, genetic associations can arise
210 between genes determining resistance, even though they may have no direct physiological
211 interaction. Physiological and behavioral defenses against parasites might therefore trade-off

212 with one another either directly or indirectly. For example, house finches that avoid sick
213 conspecifics invest less in immune defenses [19].

214 A genetic basis for parasite avoidance behaviors has support from knockout experiments
215 in laboratory mice [33] and selective breeding in livestock [34]. Direct evidence of genetic
216 polymorphism in social behavior in natural populations has also begun to emerge [35].
217 Behavioral resistance can thus be innate, as we model it, or it can be learned through prior
218 exposure [36–38], and how dynamics of learned resistance would differ from innate is a rich
219 direction for future research. Together these innate and learned responses represent a suite of
220 psychological and cognitive mechanisms that psychologists have termed the “behavioral immune
221 system” [39]. Innate and acquired behavioral resistance are conceptually parallel to innate and
222 adaptive immune responses, but whether this metaphor translates to equivalent dynamics merits
223 further examination.

224

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227 Evolution of Infectious Diseases program.

228

229 **Code and Supporting Materials**

230 All code and derivations can be found in the Supplementary Materials.

231

232 **Competing Interests**

233 The authors have no competing interests to declare.

234

235 Authors' Contributions

236 CRA and JA conceived the project and derived the equations together. CRA carried out the
237 simulations and drafted the manuscript. JA provided critical input on the simulations and
238 revisions to the manuscript. All authors gave final approval for publication and agree to be held
239 accountable for the work performed therein.

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Supplementary Materials – S1: Equations

Equations are numbered as Supplementary Equations (SE) for ease of reference relative to the equations in the main text.

If encounter rate is at a constant frequency

The differential equations for number of groups and singletons are given as:

$$\frac{dG}{dt} = \rho S - \nu G \quad (SE1)$$

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = T(\nu G - \rho S) \quad (SE2)$$

By setting $\frac{dS}{dt}$ and $\frac{dG}{dt}$ to zero, we can calculate that at equilibrium, the ratio of groups to singletons, $\frac{G}{S} = \frac{\rho}{\nu}$. The frequency of individuals in groups, or $\frac{TG}{N}$, can be calculated from this equation as $\frac{\frac{\rho}{\nu}}{1 + \frac{\rho}{\nu}}$. Thus, the number of groups at equilibrium is

Number of pairs of X1 (if all the individuals in the population were X1):

$$G_1 = \left(\frac{\frac{\rho}{\nu}}{1 + \frac{\rho}{\nu}} \right) \left(\frac{N}{T} \right) \quad (SE3)$$

Number of pairs of X2 (if all individuals in the population were X2):

$$G_2 = \left(\frac{\frac{\rho - a}{\nu}}{1 + \frac{\rho - a}{\nu}} \right) \left(\frac{N}{T} \right) \quad (SE4)$$

If encounter rate is dependent on the density of singletons

Such a scenario could be represented by a number of functions, but for the sake of simplicity, we calculate the rate at which groups encounter one another as a function of the number of singletons, ρS . Thus, as more singletons exist in the population, group formation increases.

This gives us the following differential equations:

$$\frac{dG}{dt} = \rho S^2 - \nu G \quad (SE5)$$

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = T(vG - \rho S^2) \quad (SE6)$$

At equilibrium, $\frac{G}{S^2} = \frac{\rho}{v}$. We can substitute $G = \frac{N-S}{T}$ into this equation, which can be reduced to $T\rho S^2 + vS - vN = 0$. Using the quadratic formula, we can calculate that

$$S = \frac{-\mu + \sqrt{\mu^2 + 4T\rho\mu N}}{2T\rho} \quad (SE7)$$

And the number of pairs at equilibrium can be calculated as follows.

$$G = \frac{N - S}{T} \quad (SE8)$$

Thus, the number of pairs of X1 (if all the individuals in the population were X1) is

$$G_1 = N - \frac{-v + \sqrt{v^2 + 4T(\rho)vN}}{2T^2\rho} \quad (SE9)$$

And the number of pairs of X2 (if all individuals in the population were X2) is

$$G_2 = N - \frac{-v + \sqrt{v^2 + 4T(\rho - a)vN}}{2T^2(\rho - a)} \quad (SE10)$$

Where...

N = total population size

ρ = rate of pair encounter

v = rate of unpairing

a = general avoidance parameter (=0 in case of specific avoidance)

T = group size (=2 henceforth)

Number of pairs of each type

Number of pairs of X1 and X2 with Y individuals, which provides the opportunity for transmission:

$$P_{X_1Y} = 2G_1 \left(\frac{X_1}{N}\right) \left(\frac{Y}{N}\right) = \left(\frac{2G_1X_1Y}{N^2}\right) \quad (SE11)$$

$$P_{X_2Y} = (1 - \phi) 2G_2 \left(\frac{X_2}{N}\right) \left(\frac{Y}{N}\right) = (1 - \phi) \left(\frac{2G_2X_2Y}{N^2}\right) \quad (SE12)$$

Where ϕ = specific avoidance (=0 in case of general avoidance)

Total number of X1 and X2 in pairs:

$$P_{X1} = \frac{2G_1X_1}{N} \quad (SE13)$$

$$P_{X2} = \frac{2G_2X_2}{N} - (\phi) 2G_2 \left(\frac{X_2}{N}\right) \left(\frac{Y}{N}\right) \quad (SE14)$$

where subtracting $(\phi) 2G_2 \left(\frac{X_2}{N}\right) \left(\frac{Y}{N}\right)$ represents removing the pairs that were NOT formed as a result of specific avoidance of infected individuals.

Fixed costs

If costs are fixed, then the following equations define the rate of change of each type of individual:

$$\frac{dX_1}{dt} = X_1(b - kN - \mu) - \delta \left(\frac{2G_1X_1Y}{N^2}\right) \quad (SE15)$$

$$\frac{dX_2}{dt} = X_2((b - c) - kN - \mu) - \delta(1 - \phi) \left(\frac{2G_2X_2Y}{N^2}\right) \quad (SE16)$$

$$\frac{dY}{dt} = \delta \left(\frac{2G_1X_1Y}{N^2}\right) + \delta(1 - \phi) \left(\frac{2G_2X_2Y}{N^2}\right) - \mu Y \quad (SE17)$$

Where...

b = birth rate

c = fixed cost

δ = transmission given contact

μ = mortality

Costs depend on social structure

If costs depend on pairing, then the following equations define the rate of change of each type of individual:

$$\frac{dX_1}{dt} = X_1 \left(b_1 \left(1 + \frac{P_{X1}}{X_1} \right) - kN - \mu \right) - \delta \left(\frac{2G_1X_1Y}{N^2} \right) \quad (SE18)$$

$$\frac{dX_2}{dt} = X_2 \left((b_2 \left(1 + \frac{P_{X2}}{X_2} \right) - kN - \mu) - \delta(1 - \phi) \left(\frac{2G_2X_2Y}{N^2} \right) \right) \quad (SE19)$$

$$\frac{dY}{dt} = \delta \left(\frac{2G_1X_1Y}{N^2} \right) + \delta(1 - \phi) \left(\frac{2G_2X_2Y}{N^2} \right) - \mu Y \quad (SE20)$$

Transmission term in behavioral vs. physiological resistance

When all individuals are in pairs, the model of behavioral processes of resistance is identical to a mass action model of mixing behavior. To illustrate this, using the X_1 genotype as an example,

the transmission term is classically represented by $\beta X_1 \left(\frac{Y}{N}\right)$. In the present behavioral model, when all individuals are in pairs, $G = \frac{N}{2}$. Substituting this fraction for G in the transmission term for X_1 above gives

$$2\delta \left(\frac{N}{2}\right) \left(\frac{X_1}{N}\right) \left(\frac{Y}{N}\right) \quad (SE21)$$

which simplifies to the equivalent $\delta X_1 \left(\frac{Y}{N}\right)$. The same follows for transmission to X_2 .

Calculating R_0

R_0 , or the basic reproductive number, is the condition that must be met for new infections to be produced in any time step of the model. In other words, the differential equation for Y must be greater than 0.

$$0 < \frac{dY}{dt} = \frac{2\delta G Y}{N^2} (X_1 + X_2) - \mu Y \quad (SE22)$$

When Y is rare, $X_1 + X_2 \approx N$, which gives

$$0 < \frac{2\delta G}{N} - \mu \quad (SE23)$$

This can be further reduced to the formula for R_0 :

$$1 < \frac{2\delta G}{N\mu} = R_0 \quad (SE24)$$

This formulation represents the frequency of pairs $\frac{2G}{N}$ multiplied by per contact transmission probability (δ), divided by the background mortality rate (μ).




Figure S1: Shaded areas represent equilibrium gene frequency states for the models when the cost of X_2 and the avoidance strategy of X_2 are varied. Possible outcomes include X_1 or X_2 becoming fixed in the population, or X_1 and X_2 coexisting, i.e. polymorphism. All plots show results for density dependent encounter rate. $b = 1, \mu = 0.2, \delta = 1, v = 0.3, k = 0.01$.