

The successor representation in human reinforcement learning

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Abstract

Theories of reinforcement learning in neuroscience have focused on two families of algorithms. Model-free algorithms cache action values, making them cheap but inflexible: a candidate mechanism for adaptive and maladaptive habits. Model-based algorithms achieve flexibility at computational expense, by rebuilding values from a model of the environment. We examine an intermediate class of algorithms, the successor representation (SR), which caches long-run state expectancies, blending model-free efficiency with model-based flexibility. Although previous reward revaluation studies distinguish model-free from model-based learning algorithms, such designs cannot discriminate between model-based and SR-based algorithms, both of which predict sensitivity to reward revaluation. However, changing the transition structure (“transition revaluation”) should selectively impair revaluation for the SR. In two studies we provide evidence that humans are differentially sensitive to reward vs. transition revaluation, consistent with SR predictions. These results support a new neuro-computational mechanism for flexible choice, while introducing a subtler, more cognitive notion of habit.

Keywords: Successor representation, Retrospective revaluation, Planning, Decision making, Human behavior, Reinforcement learning

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Introduction

What algorithms underlie the ability of humans and other animals to discover adaptive behaviors in dynamic task environments? Identifying such behaviors poses a particular challenge in sequential decision tasks like chess or maze navigation, in which the consequences of an action may unfold gradually, over many subsequent steps and choices. In the past two decades, much attention has focused on a distinction between two families of reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms for solving multi-step problems, known respectively as *model-free* (MF) and *model-based* (MB) RL^{1,2}. Although both approaches formalize the problem of choice as comparing the long-term future reward expected following different candidate actions, they differ in the representations and computations they use to estimate these values³ (Figure 1). The MF vs. MB dichotomy has been influential, in part, because it poses an appealingly clean tradeoff between decision speed and accuracy: MF algorithms store (“cache”) pre-computed long-run action values directly, whereas MB algorithms achieve more flexibility at greater computational expense by re-computing action values using an internal model of the short-term environmental contingencies. This tradeoff has been put forward as a computational basis for phenomena relating to automaticity, deliberation, and control, and the inflexibility of MF learning in particular has been argued to explain maladaptive, compulsive behaviors such as drug abuse.

However, although experiments suggest that people (and other animals) can flexibly alter their decisions in situations that would defeat fully MF choice, there remains surprisingly little evidence for how, or indeed whether, the brain carries out the sort of full MB re-computation that has typically been invoked to explain these capabilities. Furthermore, there exist other computational shortcuts along the spectrum between MF and MB, which might suffice to explain many of the available experimental results. For the brain, such shortcuts provide plausible strategies for maximizing fitness; for the theorist, they enrich and complicate the theoretical tradeoffs involved in controlling decisions and managing habits. Here we report two experiments examining whether humans employ one important class of such shortcuts that lie between the MB and MF strategies. This intermediate algorithm, based on the successor representation (SR)^{4,5}, caches long-range state predictions. The remainder of the introduction will focus on summarizing MF and MB algorithms and explaining SR-based algorithms in relation.

MF strategies, such as temporal difference (TD) learning, cache fully computed long-run *action values* as decision variables. Caching makes action evaluation at decision time computationally cheap, because stored action values can be simply retrieved. Action values (Q in Figure 1) can be estimated and updated using reward prediction error (RPE) signals and aggregating net value over a series of events and rewards unfolding over time. This means MF learners do not store any information about relations between different states, and hence fail to solve problems involving distal changes in reward value⁶. This has been empirically demonstrated by “reward revaluation” studies⁷ and latent learning⁸.

In contrast, MB algorithms do not rely on cached value functions. Instead, they store a full model of the world and compute full trajectories at the time of the decision. Specifically, they learn and store a one-step internal model of the short-term environmental dynamics, specifically a reward function R and a state transition function T (R and T in Figure 1). By iterative computation using this model (analogous to mental simulation using a “cognitive map,” stringing together the series of outcomes expected to follow each action), action values can be computed at decision time. This planning capacity endows MB algorithms with sensitivity to distal changes in reward (as in reward revaluation) and also to changes in the transition structure (such as detour problems in spatial tasks). This flexibility comes at a higher computational cost compared to caching: computations traversing a model are intensive in time and working memory. Such computation may be intractable (requiring error-prone approximations) in large search spaces such as wide and deep trees^{9,10}.

The successor representation (SR) was originally introduced as a method for rapid generalization in reinforcement learning⁴, lending a powerful theoretical possibility for studying algorithms with which humans learn and make decision. The SR simplifies choice-time evaluation by caching long-term predictions about the states it expects to visit

in the future. Computationally, it has been shown that SR can be learned via simple temporal difference (TD) learning⁵. Specifically, the SR is a matrix M , where the i th row is a vector in which each element, $M(i,j)$, stores the expected discounted future occupancy of state j following initial state i . To understand what this means, imagine starting a trajectory in state i , and counting the number of times each state j is encountered subsequently, while exponentially discounting visits that occur farther in the future. This representation is useful because at decision time, action values can be computed by linearly combining the SR for the current state with the one-step reward function. This obviates the MB strategy's laborious iterative simulation of future state trajectories using MB's one-step model, but stops short of storing the fully computed decision variable, as does MF learning. Thus, action evaluation with the SR has similar computational complexity to MF algorithms, while at the same time retaining some of the flexibility characteristic of the MB strategy. This form of predictive caching, if it exists, would provide an important waystation between fully flexible deliberation and complete automaticity, allowing choices to be adjusted nimbly in some circumstances but still producing inappropriate, habit-like behavior in others. Such a strategy is particularly well-suited to environments where the trajectories of states are fairly reliable, but rewards and goals change frequently. In such "multi-goal" environments, as they are referred to by the RL literature, a compromise between MF and MB strategies becomes an appealing algorithm. The wealth of findings that people and animals can solve (at least small and simple) reward revaluation tasks in spite of MB algorithms' computational complexity lends further support to the validity of a more cost-efficient algorithm at play that better balances the benefits of MF and MB algorithms.

	Stored Representation	Computation at decision time	Behavior
MF learner	Q : Cached value	Retrieve cached value Lowest cost	Habit, fast
MB learner	R : vector of all state rewards T : one-step state transition matrix	Iteratively compute values Highest cost, resource-constrained	Fully flexible Slow
SR learner	R : vector of all state rewards M : multi-step future state occupancy matrix (Policy-dependent caching)	Combine cached occupancies with rewards, Intermediate cost	Semi-flexible Fast
Hybrid SR	R & M (as above) SR output combined with T or trained offline via T or replay	Intermediate: mostly SR costs, MB or replay costs at times	Flexible, but asymmetric

Figure 1. Comparison of stored representation, computations at decision time, and behavior across models *A brief comparison of the representations stored and used by different learning algorithms, their computational requirements at decision time, and their behavior. Q: value function (cached action values), R: reward function, T: full single-step transition matrix, M: the successor representation or a 'rough' predictive map of each state's successor states. Both model-free cached value and the successor representation can be learned via simple temporal difference (TD) learning during the direct experience of trajectories in the environment.*

Several lines of evidence motivate consideration of the SR as a hypothesis for biological reinforcement learning. First, converging evidence from other domains suggests that the SR is explicitly represented in the brain: the SR defined over space can capture many properties of rodent hippocampal place cells¹¹, whereas in tasks with more abstract sequential stimulus structure, the SR captures properties of fMRI pattern similarity in hippocampal and prefrontal areas¹². The SR

is also closely related to the representation posited by the Temporal Context Model of memory⁵. Second, the SR can be implemented as an augmented version of the predominant neural theory of MF learning, the TD learning theory of the dopamine response. In particular, if the future occupancies M are used as the state input for a TD learner, TD will learn the reward function R^4 . Together with the MB-like flexibility of the SR, this observation may help to explain several puzzling reports that dopamine affects putative behavioral signatures of not just MF but also MB learning^{13,14}. These results are unexpected for standard MB algorithms, which do not share any aspects of their learning with TD. Third, most of the evidence previously adduced in favor of MB algorithms in the brain is equally consistent with an SR-based account. In particular, SR and MB algorithms make identical predictions about reward revaluation experiments, a class which includes reward devaluation, latent learning^{8,15}, sensory preconditioning^{16,17}, and the two-step Markov decision tasks that have been widely used with humans^{6,13}. Discriminating between these accounts thus stands as an important challenge.




Figure 2. Schematic of retrieved representations at test and model predictions in reward and transition revaluation trials (A) Schematics for task structures in reward revaluation (top) and transition revaluation (bottom). (B) Schematics of the representations retrieved at decision time by different learners: an MB learner retrieves 1-step transitions, and rolls out and computes full transitions (a costly computation), then combines them with the reward vector R to produce a decision. The MB learner is equally successful in both reward and transition revaluation. A

purely SR learner retrieves the successor representation (of which only the relevant rows are displayed here) without further computation and readily combines it with the reward vector. (C) Qualitative model predictions for reward (gray) and transition (red) revaluation. Predicted revaluation scores for model-free (MF), model based (MB), mixture model (MB-MF), purely successor representation (SR), and a hybrid SR learner (which would combine SR with model-based or replay, hybrid SR-MB and SR-replay for short). Classic RL solutions all predict symmetrical responses to the retrospective revaluation problems. That is, while the model-free strategy has no solution to reward or transition revaluations, MB and hybrid MF-MB learners predict symmetrical performance for all types of revaluation. (D) successor representation (SR) strategies predict asymmetrical responses: the SR algorithm is sensitive to changes in reward. However, since SR stores a multi-step predictive map M , and not the step-by-step transition structure, it cannot update M in absence of direct experience. That is, the SR effectively “compiles” the transition structure into an aggregate predictive representation of future states, and therefore, cannot adapt to local changes in the transition structure in the environment, without experiencing the new trajectories in full. While a pure SR algorithm cannot solve transition revaluation, a hybrid SR learner that is updated via simulated experience, e.g. via MB representations or episodic replay, adjusts its decision for any revaluation, but performs best in reward revaluation.

In the present work, we present new experimental designs that aim to tease apart behavior using SR and MB computations, and in particular to investigate whether people cache long run expectancies about future state occupancy. Although the SR can flexibly adapt to distal changes in reward (as in reward revaluation), it cannot do so with distal changes in the transition structure (what we call transition revaluation). Because SR caches a predictive representation that effectively aggregates over the transition structure, it cannot be flexibly updated in response to changes in this structure, unlike an MB strategy. Instead, SR can only learn about changes in the transition structure incrementally and through direct experience, much like the way MF algorithms learn about changes in the reward structure. We exploited this difference by comparing the effects of reward and transition revaluation manipulations on human behavior. MF algorithms predict that participants will be equally insensitive to reward and transition revaluation, whereas MB algorithms predict that participants will be equally sensitive to both. Crucially, any learning strategy that uses the SR (either SR alone or a hybrid SR strategy that combines SR with the other strategies) predicts that participants will be more sensitive to reward than transition devaluation (Figure 2).

To summarize, MF strategies do not store any representations of states and do not compute state representations at decision time (Figures 1 and 2). MB strategies, on the other hand, store and retrieve one-step representations, leading to high computational demand at decision time. However, SR caches a ‘rough map’ of multi-step transitions to states that the agent expects to visit in the future. Using these cached representations at decision time, SR makes better decisions than MF in reward revaluation, but cannot solve transition revaluation, while MB is equally successful at all revaluations. Another possibility is to have a blend of SR with other strategies, which we will refer to as hybrid SR strategies. Hybrid SR strategies could combine the half-computed rough representations of trajectories with MB representations or *replay* in order to either update SR during offline delays in a Dyna-like architecture¹⁸ (which could be called SR-Dyna) or combine and top up SR decisions with MB or replay outcomes at decision time (which could be referred to as hybrid SR-MB or SR-replay strategies). As such, all hybrid SR strategies would perform better than an pure SR strategy on transition revaluation (but worse than MB). Specifically, hybrid SR strategies will predict higher accuracy and faster reaction times for reward revaluation than transition revaluation (an asymmetry in performance that is not predicted by either MF or MB, see Figures 1 and 2). We experimentally test and confirm this prediction in two studies, providing the first direct evidence for the SR in human reinforcement learning.

Results

Experiment 1: Differential sensitivity to reward and transition revaluation in a passive learning task

We designed a multistep sequential learning task to compare human behavior under reward revaluation and transition revaluation. A schematic of the design is displayed in Figure 3 and Supplementary Figure 1. Participants played twenty games, each of which was made up of three phases. In phase 1 (the learning phase), participants first learned three-step trajectories leading to reward. These trajectories were deterministic and passively experienced (i.e., transition required no action from the participant). Participants were exposed to one stimulus at a time, and were asked to indicate their preference for the middle state after every five stimuli. The learning phase ended if the participant indicated preference for the highest paying trajectory three times, or after 20 stimulus presentations. At the end of the learning phase, they were asked to indicate which starting state they believed led to greater future reward by reporting their relative preference using a continuous scale. Learning was assessed by the participant's preference for the starting state associated with the more rewarding trajectory.






Figure 3. Schematic of Study I experimental design A schematic of experimental conditions with reward and transition revaluation and a control condition. The graph represents the structure of states, rewards, and revaluation conditions. Participants never saw these graphs, and experienced the task structure one stimulus at a time as displayed in B. The experiment consisted of three phases: learning, relearning/revaluation, and test in extinction. At the end of phase 1 (learning) and phase 3 (test), participants indicated their preference for the starting state of the trajectory that would maximize reward. Revaluation scores were calculated as the difference between participants' preference scores phases 1 and 3.

In phase 2 (the relearning phase), trajectories were initiated at the second or middle state of the trajectory, and the structure of the task was altered in one of two ways (manipulated within participant, across games): in the reward revaluation condition, the rewards associated with the terminal states were swapped, whereas in the transition revaluation condition, the transitions between step 2 and step 3 states were swapped (Figures 2 and 3). Both conditions induced equivalent changes to the values of the first-stage states. In addition, we included a control condition in which no change occurred during phase 2 (the relearning phase). As in phase 1, participants were probed for state 2 preferences after each 5 stimuli, and phase 2 ended if participants had indicated the middle state of the most rewarding trajectory 3 times or after 20 stimuli (see Methods and Supplementary Figure 1). Finally, in phase 3 (test phase), participants were again asked which starting state they preferred. They had virtually unlimited time to give this response (20 s). Revaluation was measured as the amount of preference change between phases 1 and 3 (Δ preference, signed so that positive values indicate preference shift toward the newly optimal starting state; Figure 3, Supplementary Figure 1). See *Methods* for a more detailed explanation of the experimental design.

A Different sensitivity to varieties of revaluation



B Distributions of participant revaluation scores and RTs



C Revaluation-RT correlation




Figure 4. Behavioral performance in a passive sequential learning task. Human performance was measured as the change in their preference ratings for the starting states. Revaluation scores denote the change in a given game's relative preference rating, after vs. before the relearning phase. (A, left) Mean revaluation scores are plotted for the

three conditions: reward revaluation, transition revaluation, and control games. There was a significant main effect of condition. (A, right) Mean reaction times (s) to the final preference decision in phase 3 under reward and transition revaluation. Behavioral responses to the preference rating were significantly slower during transition revaluation. Error bars indicate SEM. (B) Histograms reveal the distribution of revaluation scores and response times across the main conditions. (C) There was a significant correlation between the accuracy of transition revaluation responses and reaction times: more accurate transition revaluation took longer, suggesting that successful transition revaluation might have involved more computation at decision time. Together with significantly higher reaction times compared to reward revaluation (A, right), this positive correlation lends further evidence to the possibility that compared to reward revaluation, transition revaluation required more cycles of computation at decision time, relying less on cached representations. This outcome is consistent with the predictions of a hybrid SR model.

Figure 4A displays mean (\pm 1 SEM) revaluation scores for the three conditions ($n = 58$ participants). Revaluation scores were higher for reward revaluation than both the transition revaluation [$t(57) = 2.89, p < 0.01$] and the control condition [$t(57) = 10.14, p < 0.001$]. Furthermore, revaluation scores were significantly higher in the transition revaluation compared to the control condition [$t(57) = 9.05, p < 0.001$]. In the control condition, as expected, revaluation scores were not significantly different from zero, [$t(57) = 1.2; p = 0.22$]. This finding is important because it verifies that baseline forgetting or randomness cannot explain participants' behavior in the non-control conditions. We also analyzed the data for any time-on-task effects on accuracy or differences in accuracy, i.e. whether behavior improved as a result of practice, and whether these changes were significantly different in transition vs. reward revaluation conditions. For non-control trials, there was a significant effect of time on task (trial number) on the revaluation score [$F(1, 57.259) = 9.9171, P < 0.01$] indicating that participants improved at the task over time. However, there was no significant interaction of this effect with revaluation condition [$F(1, 68.284) = .15436, P = 0.695$].

We also found a significant main effect of revaluation condition on response times during the test phase [$F(2, 171) = 7.74, p < 0.001$; Figure 4A, right]. In particular, response times were slower in the transition revaluation condition compared to both the reward revaluation condition [$t(57) = 2.08, p < 0.05$] and the control condition [$t(57) = 4.04, p < 0.001$], and response times in the reward revaluation condition were significantly slower compared to the control condition where no changes had occurred [$t(57) = 3.5646, p < 0.001$].

A hybrid model that combines model-based learning with the successor representation explains differential sensitivity to varieties of revaluation

The key signature of SR's caching of multistep future state occupancies is differential sensitivity to reward vs. transition revaluations. Participants' differential sensitivity to these manipulations argues against a pure MB or MF account (see *Methods* for a detailed description of all the models considered here). MF algorithms predict equivalent and total insensitivity to both revaluation conditions, because participants are never given the opportunity to re-experience the start state following the revaluation phase. This effectively fools algorithms like TD learning that rely on chaining of trajectories of direct experience to incrementally update cached value estimates. In contrast, MB algorithms predict equal sensitivity to both conditions (Figure 5, left panel) so long as the revalued contingencies are themselves learned, because the updated internal model following the revaluation phase will produce accurate action values for the start state in either case. Accordingly, any weighted combination of these two evaluation mechanisms – which is the hybrid reinforcement learning model often used to explain previous sequential decision tasks¹⁹ – also does not predict differential sensitivity. This is because the combination will simply scale the equal sensitivity of either algorithm up or down.

SR-based algorithms fare better (Figure 5, middle panel), in that they predict that an agent will be insensitive to transition revaluation but sensitive to reward revaluation. In particular, algorithms that update a cached estimate of the SR using a TD-like learning rule require full trajectories through the state-space in order to update the start state's SR (i.e., the future state occupancies it predicts) following the revaluation phase. This mirrors the direct experience requirement of MF algorithms for value estimation. However, unlike MF algorithms, SR-based algorithms can instantly adapt to changes in reward structure, because this only requires updating the immediate reward prediction, which then propagates through the entire state space when combined with the SR.




Figure 5. Model fits to the phase-3 test data from the passive learning task. We compared model performance against human data using a pure model-based learner (left), a pure SR learner (middle), and a hybrid SR-MB learner (right). Experimental results are represented in red and model performance is depicted in blue. Human behavior is best explained by the hybrid account.

We did not hypothesize, nor do our results suggest, total reliance on an SR strategy; instead, we sought to investigate whether such a strategy is used at all by humans. A pure SR account does not by itself explain our data, because it predicts *complete* insensitivity to transition revaluation. In contrast, we see significantly greater revaluation in the transition revaluation condition compared to the control condition. This can be understood in terms of a hybrid SR-MB account analogous to the MB-MF hybrids considered previously (Figure 5, right panel). Although (as we discuss later) there are several ways to realize such a hybrid, we chose for simplicity to linearly combine the ratings from MB and SR algorithms. This linear combination allows the hybrid model to show partial sensitivity to transition revaluation. The hybrid model may also provide insight into the response time differences; under the assumption that effortful MB re-computation is invoked preferentially following transition revaluation (when it is, in fact, most needed), this condition would slow response time, consistent with our findings.

Experiment 2: Differential sensitivity to revaluation types in a sequential decision task

In a second experiment, we sought to replicate and extend our results in two ways. First, Experiment 1 used a passive learning task, in which participants were exposed to a sequence of images, and the dependent measure was relative

preference rating between different starting states. This is similar to previous Pavlovian experiments such as sensory preconditioning^{16,20}. Since a key purpose of state evaluation is guiding action choice, we sought to examine the same questions in the terms of decisions in a multistep instrumental task. This framing also allowed us to include an additional condition, which we call “policy revaluation.” The various algorithms predict the same patterns of behavior in this condition as to the transition revaluation, but the actual sequence of participants’ experiences are much more closely matched to the reward revaluation condition. In particular, this condition turns on a change in reward amounts rather than state transition contingencies during the phase 2 relearning. The addition of this condition helps to rule out a potential alternative interpretation suggesting that in experiment 1 some difference in learning of transitions vs. rewards (e.g., difference in difficulty) could account for the differential revaluation sensitivity. Together with the finding that, in experiment 1, participants did not reach learning criterion earlier in reward vs. transition revaluation (or vice versa), any difference between policy revaluation and reward revaluation further consolidates an algorithmic or strategic difference in solving verities of revaluation.




Figure 6. Schematic of the active sequential learning task. The underlying structure of each condition in Study II is represented in graphs. Numbered circles denote different states (rooms in a castle), and edges denote unidirectional actions available upon entering that state and the deterministic transition associated with those actions (that flow always from states with lower numbers to higher numbers, top to bottom in the schematic). Unavailable actions in States 2 and 3 are not shown. On each trial, participants were placed in 1 of the 6 states (castle rooms) and were required to make choices between upcoming states until they arrived in a terminal state and collected its reward. For a given phase of a given condition, trials began only in the states that are displayed in the figure for that condition and phase. For example, trials in Phase 2 of Reward revaluation condition began only from states 4, 5 and 6. In all conditions, State 1 contained 2 actions, both of which were always available. States 2 and 3 each contained 3 actions, however at any given time only 2 were available. Upon arriving in either state 2 or 3, the participant observed which

actions were available and which were unavailable. For each condition, we measured whether participants changed their State 1 action choice between the end of Phase 1 and the single probe trial in Phase 3 from the action leading to State 3 to the action leading to State 2.

Participants each completed four games, each of which corresponded to a different experimental condition (Figure 6). In each trial of each game, participants navigated through a three-stage decision tree (represented as rooms in a castle; see *Methods* for experiment details, Supplementary Figure 2). From the first stage (State 1), participants made a choice that took them deterministically to one of two second-stage states (States 2 and 3). Each second-stage state contained two available actions (and one unavailable action), and each action led deterministically to one of 3 reward-containing terminal states.

As in the previous experiment, these trials were grouped into 3 phases for each game (Figure 6). In phase 1 (the learning phase), participants were trained on a specific reward and transition structure. If, for any condition, participants failed to perform the correct action from each non-terminal state on three of their last four visits to that state during phase 1, they were removed from analysis. In phase 2, (the relearning phase where revaluation could happen) a change in either the reward structure or the set of available actions occurred (the latter causing a change in the state-action-state transition function). Participants learned about the changed structure in 9 trials, such that they were exposed to the change at least 3 times. Importantly, as in Experiment 1, participants did not revisit the starting state in phase 2, and hence never experienced any of the new contingencies following an action taken from the starting state. In phase 3, participants performed a single test trial beginning from the starting state. For each condition, we defined the revaluation score as a binary variable indicating whether a participant switched their action in State 1 between the end of phase 1 and the single probe trial in phase 3.




Figure 7. Behavioral performance in a sequential decision task. Proportion of participants ($n=88$) who changed preference following the relearning phase for reward, transition, and policy revaluation as well as the no revaluation control condition. Error bars represent 1 standard error of proportion estimate, i.e. $\sqrt{(p \times (1 - p) / n)}$.

Our results replicate those from Experiment 1, extending them to a new policy revaluation condition. The proportion of changed choices in the Phase 3 test, by condition, is shown in Figure 6. Logistic regression verified that more participants successfully switched their stage-one action choice following the reward revaluation than the transition revaluation (Contrast estimate = $-.7958$, Wald $Z = -2.85$, $p = .0034$) and also the policy revaluation (Contrast estimate = $-.6592$, Wald $Z = -2.61$, $p = 0.0043$). In contrast, there was no significant difference between the proportions of

participants that changed preference following policy revaluation compared to transition revaluation conditions (*Contrast estimate* = .1366, *Wald Z* = 0.56, *p* = 0.5771). All three of the revaluation manipulations produced more switching than the control, no-revaluation condition (*reward* > *control contrast estimate* = 3.1078, *Wald Z* = 6.95, *p* < 0.0001; *transition* > *control contrast estimate* = 2.3120, *Wald Z* = 5.11, *P* < 0.0001; *policy* > *control contrast estimate* = 2.4485, *Wald Z* = 5.20, *p* < 0.0001), verifying that these results were due to a shift in preferences rather than nonspecific effects like forgetting. There was no significant effect of time on task (trial number) on revaluation score ($F(1,190.6)$, $P = .076$). There was also no significant interaction of time on task with revaluation condition ($F(2,69.49)$, $P = 0.367$).

A hybrid model explains lower sensitivity to policy revaluation

The logic of the policy revaluation (Figure 6) is that the introduction of a large new reward at state 4 in the relearning phase should cause a change in the preferred action at State 2. The effect of this is to change which terminal state can be expected to follow the top-stage action that leads to State 2. Like transition revaluation, this manipulation should produce a change in top-stage preferences due to a change in the terminal state transition expectancies, but crucially it does so due to learning about reward amounts rather than the actual transition links in the graph. Because the SR caches predictions about which terminal state follows either State 1 action, it cannot update its decision policy without experiencing the newly preferred state along a trajectory initiated by the State 1 action leading to State 2. The MB and MF models (and the various hybrids) also treat this condition the same as the transition revaluation: in particular, the MB model should correctly re-compute the new Stage 1 action choice given learning about the new reward, whereas the MF model's Stage 1 preferences should be blind to the change.




Figure 8. Model fits to the data from the sequential decision task. Behavioral data are represented with red error bars and model performance is depicted in blue. Proportion of switches predicted by a pure model-based learner, a pure SR learner, and the hybrid SR-MB algorithm are shown for reward, transition, and policy revaluation conditions, compared to control (with matched learning rates for reward and transition learning). Consistent with results from the passive learning task, human behavior is best captured by an algorithm using hybrid representations.

The similarity in performance between the transition and policy revaluations suggests that the difference between transition revaluation and reward revaluation (here, and by extension, in the previous experiment) cannot be explained

due to differences in acquiring the Phase 2 revaluation learning itself, about transitions than rewards. (For instance, consider an MB learner with a much slower learning rate for the transition matrix T than the learning rate R .) This is because the policy revaluation fools the SR in the same way as transition revaluation, but it does so by requiring participants to learn about a change in rewards rather than transitions. If participants were using a pure MB algorithm but were differentially skilled at transition and reward learning, we would expect policy revaluation to look more like reward revaluation than like transition revaluation, which was not the case.

We developed action-based variants of the models described in the previous section and fit them to the behavioral data (see *Methods* for details). Consistent with the results from the passive learning task, only the hybrid SR-MB model was able to adequately capture the pattern of differential sensitivity across conditions (Figure 8).

Discussion

The brain must trade off the computational costs of solving complex, dynamic decision tasks, against the costs of making suboptimal decisions due to employing various computational shortcuts. It has, accordingly, been argued that simple MF learning saves time and computation at the cost of occasionally producing maladaptive choices in particular circumstances, such as rats working for devalued food. Here we consider a subtler approximation based on the SR, which is noteworthy for two reasons. First, the SR produces rapid, flexible behavior in many circumstances previously taken as signatures of the more costly MB deliberation. Second, the SR predicts (and our experiments confirmed) a novel asymmetric pattern of errors across different types of revaluation tasks.

Revaluation tasks have been useful in distinguishing MB from MF predictions, but MB and SR-based algorithms make similar predictions for standard reward revaluation tasks, which account for the bulk of evidence previously argued to support MB learning^{6,8,21,22}. By exploring other variants of revaluation (transition and policy revaluation), we were able to provide the first direct empirical support for SR-based algorithms in human behavior. The crucial prediction made by the SR account, confirmed in two experiments, was that human participants would be more sensitive to changes in reward structure than to changes in transition structure. We also showed that participants were similarly insensitive to a shift in the optimal policy at intermediate states, consistent with SR-based algorithms but inconsistent with MB algorithms.

It is important to stress that the SR is only one of a number of candidates for exact or approximate value computation mechanisms, and our study aimed to find affirmative evidence for its use rather than to argue that it can explain all choice behavior on its own. Studies using tasks with detour and shortcut manipulations²³, particularly in the spatial domain, are conceptually similar to our transition revaluation. As in our study, some previous research suggests that organisms can in some circumstances also solve these tasks²¹. These results (together with more explicit evidence for step-by-step planning in tasks like chess or in evaluating truly novel compound concepts like tea jelly^{24,2}) suggest some residual role for fully MB computation – or alternatively, that the brain employs additional mechanisms, such as replay-based learning, that would achieve the same effect¹⁸.

To reiterate, then, although our findings argue against a pure MB account (which would handle all our revaluation conditions with equal ease, or symmetrically), they also argue against a pure SR account, which predicts complete insensitivity to transition and policy revaluation (See Figures 2 and 8). Our data shows that people display significant revaluation behavior even in these conditions, though less than in the reward revaluation condition. Such results are expected under a hybrid SR-MB model in which decision policies reflect a combination of value estimates from MB and SR. We demonstrate that this hybrid theory provided a close fit to our data. It is best to think of the combination as a rough proxy for multi-system interactions, which are probably more complex²⁰ than what we have sketched here. For instance, although we did not formally include or estimate purely MF learning in our modeling here, this is only

because it predicts equally bad performance across all of our experimental revaluation conditions. We do not mean to deny the substantial evidence in favor of MF learning in certain circumstances, such as after overtraining. Indeed, MF learning may contribute to our finding that participants do not achieve 100% revaluation performance in any of our conditions, accounting for the slight difference between unnecessary switching in the control condition (which should measure nonspecific sloppiness like forgetting or choice randomness) and failure to fully adjust in the reward revaluation condition (see Figures 3 and 6).

Insofar as our results suggest that participants rely on a number of different evaluation strategies, they highlight the question of how the brain determines when to rely on each strategy (an arbitration problem). One general possibility is that humans use a form of meta-decision making, weighing the costs and benefits of extra deliberation to determine when to invoke MB computation^{25,26,27}. This basic approach might fruitfully be extended to MB vs. SR as well as MB vs. MF arbitration. A meta-rational agent would be expected mostly to use the computationally cheap SR for flexible, goal-directed behavior (or even simpler MF for automaticity in stable environments), but would sometimes employ the more computationally intensive MB strategy to correct the SR-based estimate when needed (e.g., when transition structure changes). Given finite computational resources (and the problem that perfectly recognizing the circumstances when MB is required is potentially as hard as MB planning itself) this correction could be insufficient, leaving a residual trace of the biases induced by the SR. Our results on reaction times in the first experiment may provide a hint of such a hybrid strategy, since the MB system should take longer and might be more likely invoked in the transition revaluation condition (where it is, actually, needed).

Another form of SR hybrid could be realized by using the MB system (a cognitive map), or episodic memory replay, as a simulator to generate data for training the SR. This resembles the family of Dyna algorithms¹⁸. Evidence from rodents and human studies showing that offline replay of sequences during rest and sleep enhances memory consolidation²⁸ and learning new trajectories^{29,30}. Because the SR is updated via the simulations of the MB system or episodic memory offline, this Dyna-like hybrid model retains the SR's advantage of fast action evaluation at decision time (Figure 8). Updating predictive representations via replay is in line with recent attention to the role of memory systems in planning and decision-making^{20,31}. These different realizations of an SR-MB hybrid are essentially speculative in the absence of direct evidence. Further work will be required to adjudicate between them.

All these models highlight the fact that the SR is itself a sort of world model, not entirely unlike the sorts of cognitive maps usually associated with hippocampus. It is a predictive model, which allows mentally simulating future events, at least in the aggregate. It differs from the one-step internal model in standard MB learning, mainly because it aggregates these predictions over many future time-steps.

The SR hypothesis generates clear predictions about the neural representations underlying varieties of revaluation behavior, which could be tested in future functional neuroimaging studies. At least two major brain structures may underlie the SR: the medial temporal lobe (in particular, the hippocampus) and the prefrontal cortex. The hippocampus is implicated in the representation of both spatial³² and non-spatial^{33,34} cognitive maps¹² (consistent with Tolman's classic notion⁸), predictive representations of prospective goals³⁷, as well as associative³⁸, sequential³⁹ and statistical learning^{12,40}. Hippocampal replay processes help capture the topological structure of novel environments³⁰ and sequentially simulate and construct path to future goals⁴¹ - beyond the animal's direct experience - via forward and reverse replay⁴². This is consistent with recent fMRI and neural network modeling suggesting a potential role for the SR in complimentary learning systems, especially in the medial PFC and the hippocampus^{12,43}. A recent modeling study¹¹ suggested that the SR could explain the underlying design principles of place cells as studied in rodent electrophysiology. Taken together, these findings lend evidence to the hypothesis that the hippocampus may be involved in building and updating representation of SR's predictive maps.

The second brain structure that may underlie predictive representations is the prefrontal cortex (PFC). A number of human studies have demonstrated the PFC's role in the representation of prospective goals^{44,45}. Lesions to the rat prefrontal cortex impair learning of transition structures (contingencies) but not incentive learning²¹. Ventromedial PFC is well connected to the hippocampus³⁸ and is thought to mediate sampling information from episodic memory with the goal of decision-making⁴⁶ and consolidation^{47,48}, as well as the comparison and integration of value, abstract state-based inference⁴⁹, and latent causes⁵⁰. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), may also be involved in 'cognitive map'-like representations of task spaces³⁵ and state spaces^{36,51}. A recent finding suggests that the ventromedial PFC and the hippocampus encode proximity to a goal-state⁵². Together, the hippocampus and the OFC may be involved in forming and updating the SR, i.e. a rough predictive map of multi-step state transitions, according to simulated experience. Optimal decision-making may rely on the integration of OFC/ventromedial PFC and hippocampal cognitive maps consistent with our proposed hypothesis of hybrid predictive representations involved in decision-making. Testing the specific role of the prefrontal and hippocampal contributions to the successor representations offers an exciting avenue for future functional neuroimaging studies.

In short, we have shown that human behavior reveals the contribution of a particular sort of internal model of outcome predictions, the successor representation (SR). The successor representation stores rough predictive representations of future states. It can be learned via mechanisms such as temporal difference learning, and can be updated via direct experience, interaction with rolled out model-based predictions, or via simulated experience or replay. We have shown that human behavior under varieties of revaluation reveals the contribution of SR's predictive representations. We anticipate these findings to open up avenues for computational, electrophysiology, and neuroimaging studies investigating the neural underpinnings for this evaluation mechanism.

Methods

Task 1: Sequential learning task

69 (*mean age* = 22.2, *STD* = 4.6) participants were recruited for the passive learning task, of which 4 participants were excluded as they did not learn the task and could not finish the study within the allotted 1.5 hours. 7 were removed from final analysis due to accuracies below 80% in the categorization task (described below), a threshold used as a measure of attention to (engagement with) the experiment, leaving 58 participants.

Participants played 20 games, each corresponding to one of three conditions: reward devaluation (8 games), transition devaluation (8 games), and a control condition (4 games). Each game had three phases: 1) a learning phase, 2) a revaluation phase, and 3) a test phase. Games of various conditions were randomly interleaved for each participant. In Figure 2, the schematic of all phases and two experimental conditions (reward and transition revaluation) are shown as state transition diagrams. Here ‘states’ are represented as numbered circles and arrows specify one-step deterministic transitions. Each state was uniquely tagged in each game with a distinct image (of either a face, scene, or an object, Figure 2). The stage of the current state within a multi-stage trajectory was indicated by the distinct background color of that state (e.g., state 1 had a green background, state 2 blue, and state 3 red; Figure 2, Supplementary Figure 1).

During phase 1 (learning phase) of each game, participants first experienced all states and their associated reward. They passively traversed 6 states and learned the transition structure that divided them up into 2 trajectories. To ensure that participants attended to each state, participants were asked to perform a category judgment on the images associated with each state (face, scene, object). Phase 1 was concluded once the participant reached a learning criterion, which was reached if the participant preferred the middle state of the most rewarding trajectory (preference between state 3 vs. 4 in Figure 2, Supplementary Figure 1). The criterion was tested every 5 trials: participants were shown the middle states of each trajectory (blue background in Figure 2) of the two trajectories and asked which one they preferred. For each trajectory, learning phase criterion was reached once their preference indicated the middle state of the optimally rewarding trajectory, or after 20 stimulus presentations. Trials in which participants did not reach learning criterion within the allotted 20 stimulus presentations were excluded from further analysis. During the final test phase, participants were once again shown the starting state of the two trajectories and asked to indicate which one they preferred (i.e., which one led to greater reward) on a continuous scale.

During phase 2 (revaluation phase) participants passively viewed all states except the starting states of each trajectory (states 1 and 2 in Figure 1); trajectories were always initiated in one of the second-stage states. As in phase 1, participants performed a category judgment on the images of the states they visited. This category task served as a measure of attention to the states during both phases. In the control condition, there were no changes to the task structure. In the reward revaluation condition, the rewards associated with the terminal states of the trajectories were swapped. In the transition revaluation condition, the connectivity between the second- and third-stage states was altered, such that the middle state of a given trajectory now led to the final state of the other trajectory (Figure 2). As in phase 1, participants were probed for their preference of the middle states every 5 stimuli, and phase 2 concluded once they met the learning criterion (3 correct decisions about the middle states) or after 20 stimuli. During phase 3, participants were instructed to once again rate their preference for the start states.

Task 1: Computational models

We compared the performance of three models to human behavior: a model-based learner that computes values using its knowledge of the transition and reward functions (Figure 4, left), a pure SR learner that computes values using

estimates of the reward function and SR (Figure 4, middle), and a hybrid SR-MB model that linearly combines the ratings of the two learners (Figure 4, right).

The SR learner uses two structures to compute state value: a vector R (the reward function encoding the expected immediate reward in each state) and a matrix M (the expected discounted future occupancy in each state):

$$M(s, s') = E[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t I(s_t = s') | s_0 = s] \quad (1)$$

where γ is a discount parameter. Since in our task the terminal states are absorbing, we set $\gamma=1$ (i.e., no discounting). The SR learner combines these two structures to compute the value of a state by taking the inner product of R and the row of M corresponding to that state:

$$V(s) = \sum_{s'} M(s, s') R(s') \quad (2)$$

The model-based learner computes state values by iterating the Bellman equation over all states until convergence [cite Sutton & Barto]:

$$V(s) = R(s) + \gamma V(s') \quad (3)$$

where s' is the immediate successor of state s .

We assumed that preference ratings were generated by a scaled function of the state values:

$$Rating = b \frac{V(2)}{V(1) + V(2)}$$

where b is a free parameter. For the SR-MB hybrid model, we assumed that the preference rating was a linear combination of the ratings generated by the two component models:

$$Rating_{hybrid} = w \times Rating_{MB} + (1 - w) \times Rating_{SR}$$

where w is a free parameter.

Note that our strategy here is to model the phase-3 performance predicted by the different algorithms' representations, rather than the trial-by-trial learning process that produced these representations. This is because the structure of the task does not provide enough variability in participants' experience, or monitoring as to participants' ongoing beliefs, to constrain trial-by-trial learning within the acquisition phases. In particular, because the experienced rewards and transitions are deterministic within a given phase of each game, variables like learning rates, which would govern the rate at which model representations reach their asymptotic values, are under-constrained. Furthermore, the task is passive; participants' beliefs are tested only sporadically and indirectly with relative preference judgments.

We thus assume that by the end of each phase, each model representation has reached its asymptotic value, consistent with the information presented and the experiences permitted during that phase, and with the usual learning rules for these algorithms. Specifically, we assume that at the end of phase 1 and again following phase 2, the model-based learner has appropriately updated the transition function (providing which s' follows which s) to the most recently experienced contingencies, the SR learner has appropriately updated $M(s, s')$, and both learners have appropriately

updated $R(s)$. Importantly – to capture what would be the endpoint of trial-by-trial learning of the different representations – in each case we assume the various representations are only updated for all states s visited during a phase; representations for states not visited in phase 2 remain unchanged. Using these updated representations, we compute $V(s)$ at the end of phase 1 and again end of phase 2 using equation 2 for the SR learner and 3 for MB learner. $V(s)$ is used to derive ratings at the end of phase 1 and the beginning of phase 3. Revaluation scores are then computed by subtracting the phase 1 rating from phase 3 rating.

Free parameters were fit via grid-search using the squared error between model-predicted and mean experimental revaluation scores as the cost function. The SR and MB models each had one free parameter (b) and SR-MB had two (b, w). Because participants could only advance past phase 1 by we only considered parameters that caused participants to prefer the right level 1 state at the end of phase 1.

Task 2: Sequential decision task

This task was run on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT) using Psiturk software⁵³. 115 participants were recruited to complete the experiment. All participants were required to achieve 100% accuracy on a 9-item instruction comprehension task before beginning the task. 27 participants were excluded for failing to learn the appropriate decision policy at the end of phase 1 training (Preference 1) in at least one of the conditions (see below). Participants received a bonus proportional to the total amount of reward collected.

Participants made choices in order to collect rewards by navigating an avatar through the rooms of a castle. The underlying structure of each condition of the task is displayed schematically in Figure 5. In each trial, participants were placed in 1 of the 6 states (castle rooms) and were required to make choices until they arrived to a terminal state and collected the associated reward. States were displayed as colored shapes on a screen. The spatial position and color of each state was randomized across blocks, yet remained fixed within a block.

Each participant performed four blocks of trials. Each block corresponded to a different condition. Block order was counterbalanced across participants according to a Latin square design. Each block consisted of 3 phases (Figure 5). In the learning phase (phase 1) participants were trained on a specific reward and transition structure. Training involved completing 39 trials. The starting state for each trial was randomized so that at least 14 trials began from State 1, at least 7 trials began from State 2 as well as State 3, and at least 2 trials began in each terminal state. In each condition, the reward and available actions for phase 1 were arranged so that State 6 contained the highest reward and was exclusively accessible from State 3. Thus, by the end of phase 1, participants should have learned to select the State 1 action leading to State 3. The other terminal states respectively contained, low and medium sized reward. One of the other terminal states was accessible from both States 2 and 3 and one was accessible exclusively from State 3. This arrangement ensured that there was a ‘correct’ action from each non-terminal state that would lead to a higher reward. If, for any condition, participants failed to perform the correct action from each non-terminal state on three of their last four visits to that state, they were removed from analysis.

In phase 2, a change in either the reward associated with one of the terminal states or in the set of available actions in States 2 and 3 occurred. In the reward revaluation condition, the amount of reward in State 4, which previously contained the highest reward accessible from State 2, was increased so that this state was now the most rewarding terminal state. This change thus altered the reward of the state that the participant had previously experienced as following the State 1 action leading to State 2. In the transition revaluation condition, the set of available actions in States 2 and 3 was changed so that State 6, the terminal state containing the highest reward could be reached

exclusively from State 2. This change thus altered which terminal state could follow either State 1 action and was thus comparable to the transition revaluation in passive learning task. In the policy revaluation condition, the amount of reward in the terminal state containing the smallest reward was increased so that this state now contained the highest reward. Because this would alter which action was preferred from State 2, it changed which terminal state would be expected to follow the action leading to State 2. Thus despite involving a reward change, this change would have similar effects on successor representation models as the transition revaluation. Finally, in the control condition, the amount of reward in the state containing the highest amount of reward increased. In each condition, phase 2 consisted of 9 trials. In the reward revaluation, policy revaluation and control conditions, these trials started 3 times from each terminal state. Phase 2 trials in the transition revaluation started 3 times from both State 2 and State 3, so as to allow participants to observe the change in available actions, and 1 time from each terminal state. Crucially, participants did not visit the start state (state 1) during phase 2, and hence never experienced any changes in reward following an action taken from the start state. In the test phase (phase 3), participants performed a single trial beginning from the start state. In phase 3, participants completed a single trial starting in State 1. We defined the revaluation score as 1 if they switched to the now better action leading to State 2 and 0 if they stayed with the action leading to State 3.

Logistic regression analysis

All of our descriptive analyses involved performing pair-wise comparisons between proportions of participants that switch action preference following different revaluation conditions. In order to perform such pairwise comparisons while correctly accounting for the repeated-measure structure of the experiment, we fit a logistic regression model where the dependent variable was a binary indicator of whether a given participant changed action preference in state 1 between phases 1 and 3. The model had four independent variables: a binary indicator variable for each condition that was set to 1 when the given response was from that condition. This model provided a coefficient estimate for each condition indicating the logit-transformed probability that participants switched state 1 action preference in phase 3 of that condition. To obtain standard errors on coefficient estimates that accounted for participant-level clustering due to the repeated measures, we employed a cluster-robust Huber-White estimator (using the `robust` function from the R package `rms`⁵⁴). Contrasts between coefficients were computed by fitting the model once for each condition, substituting that condition in as the intercept so that coefficient estimates for the other three conditions represented contrasts from it.

Computational models for the task 2

All learners convert action values, Q , to choice probabilities using an ϵ -greedy rule. This rule chooses the available action with the max Q value with probability $1 - \epsilon$ and chooses a random available action with probability ϵ . Thus, for available actions sa in state s :

$$P(sa|s) = \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{(N-1)\epsilon}{N} & \text{if } \operatorname{argmax}_j Q(j) = sa \\ \frac{\epsilon}{N} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

where N is the number of actions available in state s . We consider terminal states to have a single available action. We set $P(sa|s) = 0$ for all actions not available in state s .

As in our modeling of the passive learning task, the SR learner uses two structures to compute value: a reward vector R and a matrix of expected future occupancies, M . The only change here is that the elements of M are indexed by actions,

sa . Likewise, $R(sa)$ stores the reward associated with taking action a from state s . $M(sa, s'a')$ stores the expected future (cumulative, discounted) number of times action $s'a'$ will be performed on a trial following action a from state s , sa . The SR learner combines these two structures to compute the value of an action by taking the inner product of the reward vector R and the row of M that corresponds to that action in the current state:

$$Q(sa) = \sum_{s'} M(sa, s'a') R(s'a') \quad (7)$$

The model-based learner computes value estimates by combining its knowledge of the transition and reward structure, iterating the following Bellman equation until convergence:

$$Q(sa) = R(sa) + \max_{s' \in A_s} \gamma Q(s'a'|s') \quad (8)$$

where s' is the state to which $s'a'$ transitions and A_s is the set of actions, s, a' , available in state s' .

The SR-MB hybrid learner forms action probabilities by combining action probabilities from both SR and MB learners $P_{sr}(sa|s)$ and $P_{mb}(sa|s)$. The model assumes that the two action probabilities are combined according to a weighted average:

$$P_{hybrid}(sa|s) = w \times P_{mb}(sa|s) + (1 - w) \times P_{sr}(sa|s)$$

where w is a free parameter.

As with the passive learning task, because parameters like learning rates are under constrained, we assume that by the end of each phase, each model representation has reached its asymptotic value, appropriately updated according to the information presented and the experiences permitted during that phase. For the active learning task, this means that at the end of phase 1 and also phase 2, the MB learner has appropriately updated A_s , the SR learner has updated $M(sa, s'a')$, and both learners have adjusted $R(sa)$, but again in each case only for all states s visited and actions sa performed during that phase.

Using these updated representations, we compute $Q(s, a)$ at the end of phase 1 and again end of phase 2 using equation 6 for the SR learner and 7 for MB learner. $Q(s, a)$ is used to derive action probabilities at the end of phase 1 and also at the beginning of phase 3. Because participants were excluded from analysis if they did not perform the correct action in each state in 3 of their last 4 visits to state 1, we only consider parameters that place action probability of the correct action from each state at least .75 at the end of phase 1.

The pure SR and MB models each have a single free parameter (ϵ), and the SR-MB hybrid model has two (ϵ and w). Using grid-search, we identified the parameter values that minimize the mean-squared distance between the model's test phase switch probability and proportion of participants that switched state 1 action preference for that condition.

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
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
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Supplementary Material



Supplementary Figure 1. Detailed time course of stimuli for the first experiment are depicted. The cover story instructed participants that they were photographers that will take photos on a ride starting from 2 starting stations (green). Each trajectory started in a given station (green) then passed through a middle station (blue) and ended at a final station (red). As such, the color context always indicated where along a trajectory the participants were. Every station had a unique picture of a face, scene, or object: participants were told this is the photograph they took. Below each photograph appeared a scrambled dollar bill or a complete one, indicating how much the participant would earn by selling that photograph. The goal of the game was to indicate at the end preference for one of the starting states that participants had learned about, and the basis of this preference was to maximize the reward of the photos they took. In order to ensure that participants were paying attention to the unique images on screen, they were asked to perform a categorization task where they would indicate whether the object on screen was a face, a scene, or an object. Their performance on the category task served as an indication of how much attention they were paying to the categories at hand. During the learning phase participants visited the trajectories 20 times, or until they satisfied the learning criterion. The learning criterion was based on their performance on intermittent preference tests, where they were probed for their preference of the middle station (blue background) every 5 trials. This allowed us to know that they learned the associative value of the trajectories. After the learning phase, participants indicated their preference for either one of the starting states (green background) on a sliding scale (Preference 1 in the figure). Following Preference 1 ratings, participants entered the relearning phase, where they did not visit the starting state (green background) any longer, but only visited the middle

and final states. During control trials, these transitions remained unchanged compared to the learning phase. In trials in the reward revaluation condition, participants experienced a change in rewards associated with the final states, and in trials in the transition revaluation condition they experienced a change in the transition from the middle states (stations with the blue background) to the final states (stations with the red background), as indicated in the Figure. As in the relearning phase, participants were probed for their preference of the middle stations after every exposure to 5 stimuli. This was used as a learning criterion, and participants were exposed to stimuli 20 times or until they satisfied learning criterion. After the relearning phase, participants entered the test phase (Preference 2) where they were shown the starting states (stations with the green background) and asked again to indicate their preference for one or the other using a sliding scale as in Preference 1. By subtracting the preference scores in Preference 2 from Preference 1, we get the revaluation score, which tells us whether a participant, on a given trial, has changed their preference. The direction or sign of the change in preference denotes whether participants revalued their initial preference.



Supplementary Figure 2. (a) Example trial from task 2, beginning in state 1. In state 1, the participant saw an image of the outside of the castle they were in and were required to select one of two entrances. Each condition had a unique castle image as well as unique doors that were constant for the trials in that condition. In this trial, the participant selected the left castle entrance. Selecting the left entrance transitioned the participant to the circle room on the left side of the castle and selecting the right entrance transitioned the participant to the castle room on the right. Upon arriving in the circle room, the participant observed three doors, two of which were open. Upon selecting one of the open doors, the participant transitioned to one of three-square rooms. Upon pressing ‘space bar’ in one of the square rooms, the participant received the reward contained in that room. (b) Transition structure within the castle. State 1 was outside the castle. States 2 and 3 were represented as circle rooms on the left and right side of the castle. Which side of the screen States 2 and 3 were on was randomized across blocks yet constant within a block. States 4, 5 and 6 were represented as squares that lied along a column middle of the screen. The position (top, middle or bottom) of States 4, 5 and 6 was randomized across blocks yet constant within a block. Similarly, the color of states 2-6 was randomized across blocks, yet constant within a block. Arrows denote transitions from States 2 and 3. For example, selecting the door above the circle in either state 2 or 3 always took the participant to the state represented by the square room on the top of the screen. Each door was open when the action it corresponded to was available.